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Introduction
With all that has been written on the topic of summary judgment m
books, articles, and cases - and so much of it already duplicative - one
would hardly imagme that anything new of value could be said about it.1 As
this Article will demonstrate, however, our federal court system is strug-
gling in the grip of four profound and ubiquitous myths about summary
judgment procedure. Even more surprisingly, these errors are directly
attributable to many of the highest placed sources in the legal world,
including the United States Supreme Court, the United States courts of
appeals, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
some of the most respected and authoritative reference works on civil
procedure and evidence.
This Article exposes each of those four errors, reveals how they are all
intimately connected, and points the way toward a proper resolution of the
questions addressed by those misconceptions. These recommendations, if
adopted, will augment both the efficiency and the fairness of our system of
civil justice and will greatly enhance our ability to communicate the theory
of that system to new students of the law 2
L Is Hearsay Admissible on a Motion for Summary Judgment?
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, is a judge permitted to
consider "hearsay" m the form of an affidavit from a witness?3 The answer
1. As my civil procedure and copyright teacher, Professor Arthur R. Miller, was fond
of telling our class, "There is nothing new under the sun!" Imagine my disillusionment when
I later discovered that he did not even make up that line, but that he stole it from someone
else. See Ecclesiastes 1:9. Just the same, I am grateful to him for his inspiration and
instruction.
2. When I speak of new students of the law, I am referring primarily to law students
and young lawyers, but I am also including one of the more unpopular segments of our legal
culture: pro se litigants. For better or worse, the fundamental right to represent oneself has
been protected by statute in federal court "since the beginnings of our Nation," Faretta v
California, 422 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1975) (citing § 35 of Judiciary Act of 1789 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1654 (1988))), and is guaranteed by the Constitution for criminal defendants, id.
at 807 That being the case, there is something substantial to be said in favor of any proposal
that will enhance the analytical clarity of our rules of evidence and procedure and the ability
of educated pro se litigants to teach themselves those rules accurately That is one of the
many long-run objectives of this Article.
3. Two brief notes of clarification might be in order here: (1) Whenever I use the
term "hearsay" in this Article, I am referring, for the sake of brevity, to hearsay that it is not
already made admissible under any of the numerous exceptions listed in Federal Rules of
Evidence 803-805. Obviously, if a judge ruling on a summary judgment motion is presented
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to that question can be found in a host of sources, including an impressive
collection of the nation's most respected authorities on evidence and civil
procedure, and they all give the same answer. Unfortunately, that standard
answer - which has been universally accepted (until today) - is both con-
fusing and wrong.
A. The Traditional Answer
May a judge ruling upon a summary judgment motion consider
hearsay'? Consider the question from the perspective of someone who is
relatively new to legal study - a law student, a young lawyer, or a pro se
litigant. As that new student of the law would quickly discover, the
traditional and universally accepted answer to tis question is quite straight-
forward: Yes, a judge may consider hearsay - if it is in the form of an
affidavit. This answer can be found readily m a host of prominent legal
authorities, perhaps most notably in the Advisory Committee Notes to the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 (Rule 802) states, "Hearsay is not admis-
sible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress."4
The accompanying Advisory Committee Note states that this exception is
designed to insure the continued admissibility of "hearsay which is made
admissible by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court [but] which
would not qualify under these Evidence Rules. "I The Advisory Committee
with an affidavit that falls under one of those exceptions, the judge would be able to use that
affidavit regardless of what assumptions one might make about whether the Federal Rules of
Evidence apply to pretrial motion practice or the relationship between Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 802 (Rule 802) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Rule 56). (2) Whenever I
speak about the use of affidavits and other materials "on a summary judgment motion," I am
referring to the normal situation governed by Rule 56(c), (d), and (e). In that situation, at
least one party asks for summary judgment, and some opposing party argues that the motion
should be denied. The parties then submit what Rule 56(e) calls "[s]upporting and opposing
affidavits." FED. R. Civ P 56(e). I do not discuss the obviously distinct requirements
applicable to the less common situation governed by Rule 56(f) ("When Affidavits are Un-
available"), m which the nonmovmg party submits affidavits to suggest merely that the
motion is premature and that further discovery may be necessary. Affidavits submitted under
that subsection are not subject to the requirements of Rule 56(e), including the requirement
that affidavits contain admissible evidence stated upon personal knowledge. Affidavits
submitted under Rule 56(f), therefore, do not pose the analytical difficulties addressed m this
Article.
4. FED. R. EViD. 802.
5. Id. advisory committee's note.
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Notes go on to explicitly cite the provision of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 56 (Rule 56) governing "affidavits m summary judgment proceedings"
as one of several examples of other rules allowing the use of otherwise mad-
missible "hearsay which would not qualify under these Evidence Rules. " 6
Elsewhere m those Notes, the Advisory Committee again manifests its
assumption that the affidavits used on a summary judgment motion consti-
tute hearsay made admissible under an exception to the general rules of
evidence. When a dispute over the admissibility of evidence turns upon the
resolution of some underlying question of fact, Federal Rule of Evidence
104 provides that the factual question is to be decided by the judge, who "is
not bound by the rules of evidence" in making that ruling.7 In explaining
why the judge should not be bound generally by the rules of evidence in that
process, the Advisory Committee expressed the view that "the judge should
be empowered to hear any relevant evidence, such as affidavits or other
reliable hearsay "8 To illustrate this conclusion, the Committee again drew
the following analogy to the supposed use of hearsay affidavits for summary
judgment motions: "If concern is felt over the use of affidavits by the judge
in preliminary hearings on adrmssibility, attention is directed to the many
important judicial determinations made on the basis of affidavits. Rule
56 provides in detail for the entry of summary judgment based on affida-
vits. 9
Following the venerable lead of the Advisory Committee Notes, virtu-
ally every major American treatise on the law of evidence offers the same
claim that Rule 56 makes hearsay (in the form of affidavits) admissible on
summary judgment motions and that it constitutes a noteworthy exception to
the general rule of exclusion found in Rule 802.10 The same conclusion is
6. Id.
7 FED. R. EviD. 104(a). This rule contains an exception, of course, for the rules with
respect to privileges. Id., see also FED. R. EVID. 1101(c).
8. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee's note (quoting CHARLES T. MCCOR-
MICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 53, at 123 n.8 (1954)).
9. Id.
10. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 6741, at 539-40 (interim ed. 1992) (citing use of affidavits on summary judgment motion
as example of "evidence classified as hearsay" made admissible "by a non-evidence rule");
McICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 802.1, at 815-16 (3d ed. 1991)
(same); 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 802[02], at 802-5 to 802-6
(1995) ("The rules of [civil] procedure limit the operation of the hearsay rule by authorizing
the use of affidavits in a number of instances including motions for summary judgment
"); GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 802.1, at 427 (2d ed. 1995) (cting
Rule 56 as one of "several examples of rules or statutes which operate to admit hearsay
1526
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found also m some of the leading reference works on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." No major treatise or writer on evidence or civil pro-
cedure has ever suggested otherwise.
12
Any law student or young lawyer who read these prominent legal
authorities would be left, by design, with the clear impressions that:
(1) Rule 56 allowsa judge ruling on a summary judgment motion to
consider hearsay m the form of an affidavit, and (2) this relaxation of the
hearsay rule is a reflection of our general willingness to trust judges to make
important decisions on the basis of madussible evidence. Indeed, the first
claim recently was made explicit m an important publication of the Federal
Judicial Center on summary judgment." In fact, however, as this Article
will demonstrate, both of those universally unquestioned assumptions are
false, and anyone under such an impression would have a profoundly dis-
torted understanding of either the definition of hearsay or the theory behind
summary judgment.
Moreover, even if these two clais were true, they would make no
sense. If that law student were to research just a bit further, she would
quickly discover a host of courts that have stated, m seeming contradiction,
that "[a] hearsay affidavit is a nullity on a motion for summary judgment,"'
4
evidence"); see also 1 WIGMORE, EVmENcE § 4, at 42 n.15 (Tillers rev 1983) ("In some
interlocutory proceedings, however - as m motions for summary judgment - the rules of
admissibility are expressly made applicable even though the use of affidavits is authorized.")
(emphasis added).
11. See JAMES W MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES PAMPHLET: FEDERAL
CIvIL RULES pt. 1, at 574 (1995) ("Evidence Rule 802 provides, m effect, that affidavits
submitted under Rule 56(e) m support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
are exceptions to the hearsay rule.").
12. Of course, some leading reference works make no mention of the connection
between the federal rules on hearsay and summary judgment, perhaps thinking that the point
made in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 802 is too obvious to deserve elaboration.
But no writer to my knowledge has ever questioned the explicit statement in those Committee
Notes to the effect that Rule 56 is an example of a rule authorizing the limited use of hearsay
in the form of affidavits. (One leading commentator, however, has suggested that such
hearsay still would have been admissible on a summary judgment motion even if Rule 56 had
not authorized such use. See mfra note 31.)
13. A recent publication on summary judgment by the Federal Judicial Center,
authored by the director of the center and others, states categorically- "Thefact that a wit-
ness affidavit is hearsay does not make the testimony it contains madmissible when offered
at trial by that witness." William W Schwarzer et al., The Analysis and Decision of Sum-
mary Judgment Motions: A Monograph on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
139 F.R.D. 441, 481-82 (1992) (emphasis added).
14. Schwimmer v Sony Corp. of Am., 637 F.2d 41, 45 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980). This
phrase, originally coined in Schwimmer, has been highly influential in shaping judicial
1527
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that "[a]ffidavits composed of hearsay do not satisfy Rule 56(e)
and must be disregarded,"' 5 and that "[h]earsay evidence, inadmissible
at trial, cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment."16
This legal rule, m turn, is based upon Rule 56(e), which states that affi-
davits on a summary judgment motion "shall be made on personal knowl-
edge, [and] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence."
17
By that point, the typical student naturally would be in a state of great
confusion. 1
8
Of course, most readers of tis Article believe that they know the
proper resolution to this apparent inconsistency Professor James Moore,
noted commentator on the Federal Rules, recently tried to explain it this
way-
Evidence Rule 802 provides, m effect, that affidavits and depositions sub-
mitted under Rule 56(e) m support of or m opposition to a motion for
summary judgment are exceptions to the hearsay rule. See the Advisory
Committee's Note to Evidence Rule 802 This hearsay exception
attitudes toward summary judgment and continues to be quoted widely. See, e.g., Caldwell
v American Basketball Ass'n, 825 F Supp. 558, 571 (S.D.N.Y 1993), aff'd, 66 F.3d 523
(2d Cir. 1995); Maritime Ventures Int'l, Inc. v Caribbean Trading & Fidelity, Ltd., 722 F
Supp. 1032, 1037 (S.D.N.Y 1989); SEC v Blavm, 557 F Supp. 1304, 1314 (E.D. Mich.
1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Sellers v M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc.,
842 F.2d 639, 643 (2d Cir. 1988) (condemning "a hearsay affidavit" as inadequate to defeat
summary judgment motion).
15. Dole v Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 968 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting
State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v Deer Creek Park, 612 F.2d 259, 264 (6th Cir. 1979)).
16. Garside v Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990); accord Financial
Timing Publications, Inc. v Compugraphic Corp., 893 F.2d 936, 942 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)
("[IH]earsay evidence alone may not defeat a summary judgment motion."); Walker v
Wayne County, Iowa, 850 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Thus, without a showing of
admissibility, a party may not rely on hearsay evidence to support or oppose the motion."),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989). Likewise, although Rule 56(c) allows a judge to
consider depositions on a summary judgment motion, the Supreme Court has held that Rule
56(e) forbids the consideration of sworn statements given at a deposition if those statements
are inadmissible hearsay. See Adickes v S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 n.19
(1970).
17 FED. R. Civ P 56(e).
18. To make matters even worse, if that ambitious young lawyer were to research just
a bit further, she also would discover a distinct but sizable minority of circuit courts of
appeals and legal commentators that (erroneously) have reached the opposite conclusion that
hearsay may be used to oppose a summary judgment motion! See cases and authorities cited
infra notes 31, 86. By that point in her research, one hardly could blame this unfortunate
young scholar for concluding that the law was in a state of hopeless confusion, and one could
only pray that she manages to stumble across a copy of the Article you are now reading.
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refers, of course, only to the affidavits and depositions themselves as hear-
say The statements contained therein must be admissible mn evidence. 9
In other words, the standard "explanation" for this apparent inconsistency
is that an affidavit considered on a summary judgment motion may be hear-
say but may not include hearsay 2 To put the matter in slightly more
technical terminology, the almost universally received view is that Rule 56
allows a judge to consider hearsay (in the form of an affidavit), but not
"multiple hearsay "21 The hearsay words of the affidavit, we often are told,
may be accepted in lieu of oral testimony from the afflant himself as long as
they describe a matter within his personal knowledge, but his words about
what another has told him may not be accepted m lieu of a statement from
that other person.2
Apart from the fact that this "explanation" is wrong, as the next section
of this Article will demonstrate,' it is also senseless and unnecessarily
confusing. The concepts of hearsay and multiple hearsay already are chal-
lenging enough for most newcomers,' and I frankly doubt that many law
19. MOORE, supra note 11, at 574 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As noted later
in this Article, it bears emphasis that a number of courts and commentators would not agree
with Professor Moore's view that the statements contained in the affidavit must be admissible
in evidence. See authorities cited infra notes 31, 86. But that point can be put to the side.
It will suffice for now to demonstrate why Professor Moore is incorrect; later we will explain
why the others are also wrong.
20. Or, one might say, the affidavit may constitute hearsay but may not consist of
hearsay. Another variation on the same theme: On a summary judgment motion, hearsay is
admissible if it is an affidavit, but not if it is in an affidavit. I seriously doubt that any of
these formulations, including Professor Moore's phrasing, mean anything to most young
lawyers and law students who are newcomers to the concept of hearsay.
21. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 324.1, at 368 (John W Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
(using term "multiple hearsay"). Federal Rule of Evidence 805 describes the same concept
as "Hearsay within Hearsay." FED. R. EvM. 805. Of course, hearsay contained within an
affidavit may be admissible if it falls under one of the other exceptions listed in Evidence
Rule 803 or 804. I am assuming for the sake of simplicity the case of an affidavit containing
second-hand information that does not fall under any such exception.
22. Anyone who subscribed to this view would "explain" that the cases condemning "a
hearsay affidavit" as a nullity on a summary judgment motion, see supra note 14, were
referring to an affidavit that contains hearsay, but not to an affidavit that itself is hearsay
That is hardly the most natural interpretation of the phrase, but that linguistic point is
fortunately academic. As this Article will demonstrate, that "explanation" is simply wrong.
23. See infra part I.B.
24. In the landmark case of Faretta v California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), which
established the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to conduct his own defense, it was
no coincidence that the trial judge attempting to test whether the accused truly understood the
rules for trial first tried to stump him with a question about the hearsay rule. See id. at 808
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students are able to attach much meaning to the almost metaphysical distinc-
tion between what an affidavit is and what it contains. Even for those of us
who can, the distinction proposed by Professor Moore simply makes no
sense. Why would the framers of the federal rules trust a judge on a sum-
mary judgment motion to use and consider all hearsay evidence in the form
of an affidavit - no matter what the source - but never multiple hearsay?
At best, the two differ only in degree of reliability, not in kind, and every-
one knows that some forms of multiple hearsay are infinitely more reliable
than some simple hearsay ' In all other contexts, the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not distinguish between hearsay and multiple hearsay in terms
of admissibility; they trust a judge to consider either one when making a
preliminary ruling on admissibility, 26 and they allow a jury to consider
neither one.27 It would be extremely difficult to reconcile that pattern with
the assumption that Rule 56 was intended to trust judges with any hearsay
in the form of an affidavit, however suspicious, but never with multiple
hearsay, no matter how trustworthy 28
Fortunately, there is no need to make such a reconciliation because the
umversally accepted view of this issue is simply wrong. As the next section
of this Article will demonstrate,29 the truth of the matter is that judges ruling
upon summary judgment motions are not authorized to consider hearsay in
the form of affidavits, they do not do so, and Rule 56 is not an exception to
& n.3.
25. When the New York Tmes quotes the Pope as saying he has been praying for world
peace, it is technically "multiple hearsay " But who would argue that this news report is less
reliable than a simple hearsay affidavit from a convicted mass murderer who denies his guilt
to avoid the death penalty on his most recent arrest?
26. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a), 1101(d)(1).
27 See FED. R. EVID. 802, 805. Again, because this section of this Article focuses on
the reach and effect of Rule 56, I am assuming for the sake of simplicity that we are
discussing hearsay that does not fall within one of the exceptions in Federal Rules of
Evidence 803 and 804. See supra note 3.
28. Moreover, as noted m the next section of this Article, the incoherence of the
prevailing understanding of the law runs even deeper than that. See infra part I.B. If the
federal rules governing summary judgment were in fact a reflection of our supposed
willingness to trust judges to intelligently gauge the probative value of inadmissible evidence,
it would be impossible to justify the rule that forbids a judge from giving any weight to
unsworn statements (or unauthenticated documents) when deciding whether summary
judgment should be granted. See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text. Even juries
bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence are often entrusted with statements that are not
under oath! See FED. R. EvID. 803, 804 (outlining hearsay exceptions).
29 See ifra part I.B.
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the hearsay rules at all. In short, the Advisory Committee Notes are dead
wrong.
B. The Truth of the Matter
For the sake of our discussion, we will begin with the assumption that
the Federal Rules of Evidence are generally applicable to pretrial motions,
as the Advisory Committee Notes appear to assume.' In fact, that question
is actually quite controversial, and a staggering amount has been written on
the subject both ways. 31 Fortunately, that issue is academic for our purpose,
30. If the Federal Rules of Evidence literally had no applicability to summary judgment
motions, it would, of course, be illogical for the Advisory Committee to cite Rule 56 as an
exception to Rule 802 or as a rule governing the use of "hearsay which is made admissible
by other rules [but] which would not qualify under these Evidence Rules." FED. R.
EVID. 802 advisory committee's note.
31. One prominent authority has suggested that hearsay would be admissible on a
summary judgment motion regardless of Rule 56 because the Federal Rules of Evidence are
not applicable to pretrial motion procedures. See 4 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 10,
802[02], at 802-6 (citing Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 1101(d) for conclusion that
"[h]earsay would, in any event, be usable in [summary judgment motions] under these
Rules"). But those two rules do not squarely address or resolve the issue, as Wigmore notes.
See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 4, at 42 n.15 (stating that "the Federal Rules contain no
express general exemption for adversary interlocutory proceedings"). Wigmore, though,
ultimately reaches the same conclusion on different grounds after acknowledging that
complicated arguments of statutory construction can be made on both sides of the question.
Id. Then again, the Advisory Committee has implicitly suggested that the Federal Rules of
Evidence are generally applicable to pretrial motion practice before a district judge because
the committee lists a number of pretrial motions (including summary judgment) where
hearsay is made admissible only because of the operatuon of some other rule of civil or
criminal procedure. See FED. R. EviD. 802 advisory committee's note. On the other hand,
one of those "exceptions" is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e), which appears to give
the district judge a broad grant of authority to decide pretrial motions "on affidavits" -
subject, of course, to the apparent exception of Rule 56(e) requiring affidavits in summary
judgment motions to "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." See FED. R.
EVID. 43(e), 56(e). This collection of exceptions to exceptions has led some to ultimately
conclude that the Federal Rules of Evidence are fully applicable to summary judgment
motions. See EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 116 (1994) ("It is clear that the evidence submitted by the parties to support or
oppose a motion for summary judgment must be admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence."); see also 1 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 4, at 42 n.15 (concluding that Federal
Rules of Evidence "are expressly made applicable" in certain motions, such as summary
judgment). To top it all off, however, the Supreme Court has made the perplexing claim
that the party opposing the motion is not required "to produce evidence in a form that would
be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment," Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 324 (1986), and commentators are divided as to whether that remark throws
the Federal Rules of Evidence back out the window again. Compare Melissa L. Nelken,
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which is determining whether the Advisory Committee's identification of
summary judgment as an exception to the logic (if not the force) of Rule 802
and as a rule that authorizes the limited admissibility of hearsay in the form
of affidavits is correct.
Returning to our original question, and assuming that the Federal Rules
of Evidence are generally applicable to a summary judgment motion, is
hearsay admissible on a motion for summary judgment? When Rule 56(e)
authorizes a judge to rule upon a summary judgment motion on the basis of
"supporting and opposing affidavits" in lieu of live testimony,3' does that
rule authorize the court to consider hearsay9 Is Rule 56, m fact, an excep-
tion to Rule 802? Contrary to what you will read anywhere else you look,
the answer to all three questions is "no."
The proper resolution of tis dilemma is almost too obvious. Indeed,
the short form of the demonstration consists of two incontrovertible steps:
(1) An assertion made out of court - including an affidavit - is not hearsay
at all and, therefore, not even subject to exclusion under Rule 802 unless it
is "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.""
(2) When does that description apply to affidavits submitted on a summary
judgment motion? Never. In the landmark case of Anderson v Liberty
Lobby, Inc. ,' the Supreme Court stated that a judge ruling upon a summary
judgment motion "is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter" involved in the litigation which, of course, includes the
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back-- Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53,
76, 82 n. 140 (1988) (arguing that Celotex "[i]nvent[ed] a new rule of procedural admissi-
bility that goes against the express language of Rule 56" and created "an unfortunate
change m summary judgment law") with BRUNET Er AL., supra, at 119 (concluding that
this "potentially misleading passage" in Celotex was not intended to override "the clear
command of Rule 56(e) that the rules of evidence apply to affidavits") and Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Prelim-
inary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 127 F.R.D. 237, 384 (1990) (containing Advis-
ory Committee Note to proposed Rule 56, which describes Celotex as 1) case containing
"dicta indicating that summary judgment can be successfully resisted on basis of inadmis-
sible evidence" but also as 2) case that did not change rule requiring "showing that admis-
sible evidence can be realistically expected to be available at trial"). The federal courts of
appeals are just as profoundly split on the same question. See cases cited infra note 86.
Enough ink has been spilt on this topic to fill Lake Erie and that is just about how murky
it still remains. We will return to this thorny problem and sort it out later. See infra part
I.C.
32. FED. R. Civ P 56(e).
33. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
34. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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matter asserted in the parties' pleadings, depositions, and affidavits. 35 So,
those affidavits are not hearsay, they are not excluded by Rule 802, and they
would be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence even if Rule 56
said nothing about them.36
Is it really that simple? In fact it is, although a little bit more explana-
tion is in order. (Otherwise, of course, somebody else would have caught
this point before now ) In what sense can it be said that affidavits submitted
to a judge on a summary judgment motion are neither offered nor consid-
ered for "the truth of the matter asserted" m those affidavits? The answer
requires us to review a few of the most basic - but most frequently
overlooked - principles about hearsay and summary judgment.3 7
Consider first the definition of hearsay A written statement made out
of court is relevant to a judicial proceeding without regard to its truth and
therefore is not hearsay "[i]f the significance of [the] offered statement
lies solely in the fact that it was made. 3  When would that be the case?
Consider this simple example: During a trial, a party offers into evidence a
duly authenticated, 39 handwritten statement signed one day earlier by
Edward, stating "Last December, I saw the traffic light turn red just before
the police car ran through with its siren and lights off." If this statement is
offered to prove what the police did, it is hearsay and presumptively
madmissible because it makes better sense to force the proponent of the
35. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (emphasis added).
36. See FED. R. EviD. 401, see also United States v Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1984)
(stating that "all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided" by federal
law and rules).
37 In fairness to the many others who have missed this point, the Anderson decision
is less than perfectly consistent on this score. Elsewhere m the same opinion, the Court also
made the regrettable but highly influential claim that the evidence, including affidavits,
submitted to a court by the nonmoving party "is to be believed," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255
(emphasis added), which certainly sounds a lot like it is being accepted for its truth. As Part
M of this Article will demonstrate, however, that poorly chosen language from Anderson
was one of the greatest mistakes ever made about summary judgment.
38. FED. R. Evm. 801(c) advisory cominuttee's note (emphasis added). Legal
commentators have noted several examples including, among others, statements offered to
show their effect on the reader, legally operative language (sometimes called "verbal acts"),
and circumstantial evidence of the declarant's state of mind. See 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 21, § 249, at 104-06; ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK
§ 4.01 (1991). None of those categories is applicable to affidavits submitted on a summary
judgment motion.
39. In other words, the proponent of the statement has been able to offer evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the letter was handwritten by Edward. See FED. R. Evm.
901(a).
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statement to call Edward to the stand, if he is available, so that he can be
cross-examined under oath and the jury can observe his demeanor.
But what if this case has nothing to do with the police or the traffic
light? If the statement is offered to show only that Edward speaks English,
that he was alive at some time yesterday, that he is not illiterate, that he is
capable of relatively fine motor control, or that he is not in a coma, then the
statement is not hearsay at all. In any one of those cases, we could say that
the relevance of the statement "lies solely in the fact that it was made,'I and
it would not make the slightest difference whether the statement was the
truth or a lie.4' In such cases, the mere fact that the statement was written
by Edward is relevant, and the probative value of the letter would be
enhanced in no way by asking Edward to come downtown to tell us the
same things about the police car m person.42
To take a slightly more complicated example closer to the point of
this discussion, imagine that the jury at a trial conducted pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Evidence needs to decide the factual question of whether
Joseph is likely to be disruptive of the workplace in the future if he is
restored to some former position. To prove that Joseph would be such a
threat, a party offers a number of offensive and lewd notes by Joseph about
Ins supposed sexual history, which notes he wrote to female co-workers
when he held that position in the recent past. Would the notes be hearsay9
Of course not. The notes are not being offered to prove the truth of what-
ever outrageous assertions he made in those notes; they are admissible
merely because the making of such statements in the past is relevant evi-
dence (perhaps even the best available evidence) of what he is likely to say
in the same setting if he is given the chance. For that purpose, the truth or
falsity of the notes is beside the point, so it would make no sense to exclude
the letters and insist that Joseph testify under oath to the contents. of the
notes. The letters are not being offered for any conclusions about his sexual
40. FED. R. EviD. 801(c) advisory committee's note.
41. All of these examples are obviously variations on the well-known hypothetical
suggested by McCornck on Evidence: "On an issue whether a given person was alive at a
particular time, evidence that she said [or wrote] something at the time would be proof that
she was alive. Whether she said, 'I am alive,' or 'Hi, Joe,' would be immaterial; the
inference of life is drawn from the fact that she spoke, not what was said. No problem of
veracity is involved." 2 McCORMIcK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 21, § 250, at 113-14.
42. Indeed, the probative value of the written statement might be positively destroyed
by calling him as a witness to testify in person rather than offering the statement. For
example, if a party wishes to discredit Edward's claim that he is illiterate or that he is unable
to move his arms and hands, the handwritten statement by Edward would be infinitely more
valuable than asking Edward to tell us about the police car in person from the witness stand.
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history (the contents of the notes) but rather about what the man is likely to
say m the future.4'
That is precisely how a judge uses affidavits when ruling upon a motion
for summary judgment. Although this point has been widely misunder-
stood, the fact is that a judge ruling on such a motion is neither permitted
nor required to draw any conclusions about what happened m the past -
that is, the truth of the matter asserted m the parties' pleadings and affida-
vits - but what will happen at a future trial if there is one. Admittedly,
this basic principle has been largely obscured, and the Supreme Court itself
deserves the majority of the blame for that confusion.44 Nevertheless, this
vital point is manifested clearly in at least three different aspects of sum-
43. Generalizing from this illustration, we could fainly identify a distinct but previously
unidentified category of statements that are not hearsay because their significance lies solely
m the flct that they were made: statements offered to prove what the author or speaker of the
statement is likely to say m the future (that is, after the trial or hearing). Statements offered
for that limited purpose are never hearsay because they are relevant without regard to their
truth or falsity. That "category" of nonhearsay statements is admittedly a limited one because
our law usually asks the trier to decide questions of fact about the past. See Daubert v
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993) (describing "the quest for truth
in the courtroom" as "the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment -
often of great consequence - about a particular set of events in the past"). There are a few
other obvious exceptions, however, as where a judge or jury makes findings of fact pertinent
to the propriety of ijunctive relief or crumnal sentencing (at least under the mcapacitative
model of punishment). See Dawson v Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (1992) ("A
defendant's membership in an organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group
might be relevant to a jury's inquiry into whether the defendant will be dangerous in the
future.").
44. For many years, the Supreme Court stated, incorrectly, that summary judgment
was to be granted only "where it is quite clear what the truth is." Poller v Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962) .(quoting Sartor v Arkansas Natural Gas
Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944)). Although this standard has since been overruled sub
silentio, see infra note 268, it has never been repudiated explicitly by the Court and con-
tinues to exert a powerfully confusing influence over leading legal commentators and lower
courts. See lacobelli Constr., Inc. v County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that summary judgment is inappropriate in face of "uncertainty as to the true state of
aol material fact") (citations omitted); 10A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2727, at 124 (2d ed. 1983) ("Before summary judgment will be granted
it must be clear what the truth is ") (footnote omitted). More recently, the Court
unwittingly has sown even more confusion by stating, with minimal explanation, that "[tihere
is no requirement that the trial judge make findings of fact" when ruling upon summary
judgment motions although "[in many cases findings are extremely helpful to a
reviewing court." Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 & n.6 (1986). Both
of those standards certainly tend to reinforce the common myth that summary judgment
motions invite the judge to look back in time to make historical findings of fact. These
errors are dealt with more fully in later sections of this Article. See infra parts I.C., II, m11.
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mary judgment practice and procedure. We can illustrate this point by
considering several fundamental questions about summary judgment that
apparently have never even been asked, much less answered (until now).
The "prospective looking" character of a summary judgment motion is
perhaps best illustrated by the rare - but not unprecedented - situation in
which an affidavit filed on a summary judgment motion was signed by a
witness who subsequently died before the motion was argued or decided.45
Assuming that such an affidavit was made under oath, on personal knowl-
edge, and m compliance in all other respects with Rule 56(e), how much
weight, if any, should it be given by the judge? Even a moment's reflection
teaches that the affidavit cannot be given any weight at all. 6 Under the
federal rules, supporting and opposing affidavits may be considered by the
court only if "the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated there-
in" - not merely because he was competent to testify to such matters when
he signed the affidavit.47 This restriction would have been an arbitrary
limitation to impose upon the judge if (as has often been suggested) the
purpose of a summary judgment motion were to find out whether it is "clear
what the truth is."4" After all, the fact that a man was competent to speak
45. This question was raised but not decided m Massachusetts v United States, 788 F
Supp. 1267, 1271 n.8 (D. Mass. 1992) ("Mr. Hansen is now deceased, so arguably his
affidavit, although in standard form for consideration upon a motion for summary judgment,
is now inadmissible hearsay "), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare v
Secretary of Agric., 984 F.2d 514 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 81 (1993).
46. I am assuming, of course, that we are not dealing with the even more unusual
situation m which the affidavit itself might be admissible at trial as an exhibit under some
exception to the hearsay rules. In that case, the admissibility of the dead man's statement
would be analyzed in terms of the rules governing the use of exhibits and other papers on a
summary judgment motion, see infra notes 59-60, rather than the rules normally applied to
the use of affidavits.
47 FED. R. Civ P 56(e) (emphasis added). To be precise, the rule techmcally
requires that the affiant, at the time he makes and signs the affidavit, "show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Id. The rule does not
literally require that the affiant also make an affirmative showing at that same time that he
still will be competent to testify at the time of the trial; that would be absurd. Nobody
knows, when he signs an affidavit, how long it will be until trial or whether he will still be
alive and well by then. Nevertheless, it can be inferred safely from both the text and the
logic of Rule 56(e) that the rule would not allow consideration of an affidavit when it appears
through other evidence that the affiant is no longer available and "competent" to testify at
trial. It would make absolutely no sense to require an affiant to make an affirmative showing
of competence to testify unless the rule implicitly authorized the judge to disregard the
affidavit when it subsequently becomes absolutely clear that the affiant is not competent to
testify any more.
48. Poller, 368 U.S. at 467 (quoting Sartor v Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S.
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from personal knowledge at the time he wrote something would be ample
reason for a historian to rely on his writings. But a judge ruling upon a
motion for summary judgment is looking into the future, not the past.
Thus, an affidavit signed by a man who died before the argument of the
summary judgment motion is worthless to the court. It may tell us some-
thing reliable (and maybe even quite important) about the past, but it tells us
nothing about the testimony we can count on hearing at a future trial if we
have one.
We also can find valuable evidence of the true purpose and scope of
summary judgment motions if we consider the limits placed upon the kinds
of written statements the judge may consider from witnesses. Rule 56(c)
states that a party may ask a judge to grant or deny summary judgment on
the basis of only two kinds of witness statements: (1) the pleadings and
admissions of the other party,49 and (2) statements made under oath or
affirmation.' ° Because the detailed specification of certain items normally
implies the deliberate exclusion of all others,5 the courts correctly have
interpreted this rule to preclude a judge from considering any other form of
written statement by a witness - including, most notably, any unsworn
620, 627 (1944)); see supra note 44.
49. FED. R. Civ P 56(c). Rule 56(c) states generally that a judge may consider,
among other items, "the pleadings and admissions on file." Id. Those items, by
definition, can only be served and filed by a party to the action. See FED. R. Civ P 7(a)
(listing permissible pleadings), 36(a) (noting that requests for admission may only be served
upon and answered by party). When Rule 56 states that a party may ask the court to grant
summary judgment because the absence of a genuine issue is demonstrated by "the
pleadings," it means, of course, the pleadings of the adverse party; the rule clearly states that
a genuine issue of material fact cannot be created by a party's reliance on "the mere
allegations or denials of [his own] pleading." FED. R. Civ P 56(e).
50. FED. R. Civ P 56(c). In addition to the pleadings and admissions, see supra note
49, the only other witness statements that a court may consider under the rule are "deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories [and] affidavits, if any " Id. All three of those
materials, by definition, must be made under oath or affirmation. See FED. R. Crv P 30(c)
(officer conducting deposition "shall put the witness on oath or affirmation"), 33(b)(1) (all
answers to interrogatories must be "in writing under oath"); BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 58
(6th ed. 1990) (defining affidavit as written statement "confirmed by the oath or affirmation
of the party making it"); see also Henderson v Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 569 n.1
(10th Cir. 1994) (noting that, m light of 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (1988), affidavits filed on
summary judgment motion may be either made under oath or affirmed under penalty of
perjury).
51. See Leathernman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113
S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993) (refusing to read any requirements into Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) beyond those specifically listed there).
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letter or other writing.' But why should judges categorically be barred
from relying on unsworn statements, regardless of how credible or trustwor-
thy they might otherwise appear to be? That restriction would be arbitrary
and indefensible if, as has been widely reported, the rules governing sum-
mary judgment practice were a reflection of our supposed trust in the super-
ior ability of judges to accurately gauge the reliability of hearsay and other
madnussible evidence.53
Why on earth would the framers of the federal rules trust a judge to
consider any statement made under oath, no matter how suspicious it
seemed, but never an unsworn letter, no matter how trustworthy9 In nearly
every other context, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not distinguish
between sworn and unsworn statements in terms of admissibility,' and
everybody knows that some unsworn statements are incomparably more
52. E.g., Adickes v S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-59 nn.16-17 & 19 (1970);
Sellers v Henman, 41 F.3d 1100, 1101 (7th Cir. 1994); Dole v Elliott Travel & Tours,
Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 968 (6th Cir. 1991); Rohrbough v Wyeth Lab., Inc., 916 F.2d 970, 973
n.8 (4th Cir. 1990). Despite this overwhelming body of precedent, including the Supreme
Court's holding m Adickes, Professor Brunet has reasoned - incorrectly - that Rule 56 does
not contain an exhaustive listing of the materials the court may consider because the Supreme
Court itself has considered summary judgment records including "documents," even though
Rule 56(c) makes no mention of them. Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Matenals, 147
F.R.D. 647, 649 (1993) ("Documents are routinely considered in Rule 56 motions and the
omission of them in Rule 56(c)'s listing of summary judgment evidence must be considered
nothing more than an oversight."). Indeed, Professor Brunet even goes so far as to conclude
that the judge ought to be permitted to consider any "fruits of discovery " Id. The fatal flaw
in that argument, which would render the listing of materials in Rule 56(c) superfluous, is
that Rule 56 does contain an express provision that makes documents and other "papers"
admissible on a summary judgment motion but only as long as they are served with a proper
authenticating affidavit and would themselves be admissible as exhibits at trial. See FED. R.
Civ P 56(e); see mfra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
53. As noted supra notes 7-9, this view has been suggested for years by the Advisory
Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a).
54. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, there are a few isolated situations in which
the presence of an oath - coupled with other factors - may make the difference in whether
a written statement is admissible. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A) (statement under oath
admissible if it was made at trial, hearing, or deposition and is inconsistent with declarant's
later trial testimony), 804(b)(1) (former testimony under oath admissible only if declarant is
unavailable and testimony is offered against party who had fair opportunity to question
declarant earlier). In every other situation, however, the admissibility of statements made
out of court has nothing to do with whether the statement was made under oath. See FED. R.
EVID. 801-806. Indeed, the Advisory Committee noted its view: "So far as concerns the
oath, its mere presence has never been regarded as sufficient to remove a statement from the
hearsay category, and it receives much less emphasis than cross-examination as a truth-
compelling device." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee's note.
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trustworthy than some affidavits filed under oath.55 So why should the
presence or absence of the oath make such a radical difference m terms of
whether a statement can be considered m the summary judgment context? 6
Although no answer is perfectly satisfactory, the most coherent explanation,
once again, reflects the nature of the judge's inquiry on such a motion: to
identify the testimony we are likely to hear at trial m the future. In contrast
with unsworn statements, affidavits and other statements made under oath
are not always more reliable as a guide to the truth about questions of
historical fact, but they are always more reliable evidence (indeed, the best
available evidence) of what we can reasonably expect the affiant to say
under oath or affirmation on the witness stand at trial.' Likewise, although
55. To borrow once again from an analogy used earlier to illustrate a different point:
If the New York Times quotes the Pope as saying that he has been praying for world peace,
nobody m his right mind would suggest that this report - because it is not under oath - is
less credible than a sworn affidavit from a convicted mass murderer who denies his guilt on
his most recent arrest m an effort to escape the death penalty.
56. Indeed, the contrast is even more stark than it appears at first blush. As noted
below in Part III of this Article, the lower courts have uniformly given a literal interpretation
to the Supreme Court's direction that an affidavit submitted in opposition to a summary
judgment motion, if in proper form, "is to be believed." Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Meanwhile, the identical statement, if not made under oath, is
to be given no weight whatsoever. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157-59 nn.16-17 & 19. Under
current law, therefore, the presence or absence of the oath on a witness statement literally
makes all the difference in the world as to whether the statement will be given uncondition-
ally conclusive weight or none at all.
57 Every experienced litigator has encountered the occasional witness who is willing
to say one thing, perhaps even m open court, but changes his story as soon as he is required
to repeat it under oath. Indeed, the world saw a nice example of that phenomenon'in the
midst of the recent murder trial of O.J. Simpson, in which Judge Lance Ito complained to
defense counsel:
Let me tell you what concerns me about Mr. Pavelic. When I first asked him, are
there any tape recordings or notes, he said these are the only two statements.
Then at Miss Clark's urging and over - and with some reluctance by the Court,
I put him under oath and I got a different answer.
People v Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 79806, at *6 (Cal. Dep't Super. Ct. Feb. 28,
1995). Moreover, even apart from the problem of the witness who changes his story under
oath, an unsworn statement gives the court no way to know whether it was signed by a
witness who would decline to take an oath or affirmation, perhaps for some sort of religious
or conscientious scruples, and therefore would be unable to testify at trial at all. See FED.
R. EVID. 603; see also United States v Fowler, 605 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating
that trial judge properly refused to allow testimony from defendant who refused to take oath
or affirmation), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980). Such witnesses admittedly are quite rare,
but Rule 56 implicitly and wisely takes the position that there is no point in taking the unnec-
essary risk, however slight, that summary judgment might be demed on the basis of an
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the admissions and pleadings of an adverse party have never been regarded
as an infallible guide to the truth, they are, as a matter of law, an infallible
guide as to what the adverse party can be expected to testify at a trial in the
future. This function is a result of the fact that pleadings and responses to
a request for admission - unlike other statements by a witness - are both
examples of "judicial adrmssions" binding on the party making them, who
willnot be allowed to testify otherwise at trial.5"
Finally, the "prospective looking" aspect of summary judgment
procedure is illustrated also by the treatment of documents and other
exhibits under the federal rules. Those rules state that all such "papers"
may be considered by the court only if they are "[s]worn or certified" in an
authenticating affidavit and "attached thereto or served therewith.""
Documents and other exhibits, no matter how trustworthy or plausible they
may appear to the judge, may not be given any weight unless they are
accompanied by an affidavit from a sponsoring witness with personal
knowledge - an affiant "through whom the exhibits could be admitted into
evidence. "I Why do we insist on that limitation? Like the other rules listed
above, that restriction would be indefensible if, as has been widely reported,
the purpose of summary judgment was to decide whether there was any
room for doubt about questions of ustoncal fact, unencumbered by the
ordinary Federal Rules of Evidence. After all, the presence of an authenti-
cating affidavit often will have little bearing on the ability of an experienced
judge to assess intelligently the weight and probative value of a document;
so why should its absence preclude the judge from giving the document any
legal effect whatsoever 9 The explanation, once again, involves the purpose
unswom statement from the occasional witness who turns out to be unwilling to testify to the
same points at trial under oath. See FED. R. Civ P 56.
58. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 21, § 254, at 142 (noting that "U]udicial
admissions," unlike evidentiary admissions, are "conclusive m the case," and are not "subject
to contradiction or explanation"); PARK, supra note 38, §§ 11.02, 11.04 ("Once the
admission has been obtained, evidence to the contrary is not admissible unless the trial judge
relieves the party of the admission."). Of course, the pleadings and responses to a request
to admit may be amended or withdrawn m the discretion of the court, FED. R. Crv P 15(b),
36(b), but until that time they are binding on the party who signed them. When presented on
a summary judgment motion, therefore, they can fatirly be treated as a conclusive indication
of how their signers would testify (or be allowed to testify) at trial unless the party who
signed them makes an immediate cross-motion to amend them.
59. FED. R. Civ P 56(e).
60. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v Richard Femer & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550-51 (9th
Cir. 1990); accord Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v Baltes, 15 F.3d 660, 662 (7th Cir. 1994);
Moore v Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1993); Orsi v Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 92
(4th Cir. 1993).
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and scope of a summary judgment motion. Just as affidavits and other
sworn witness statements may be considered by the judge as a preview of
the likely testimony at trial, letters and other papers presented to the judge
on a summary judgment motion are relevant only to the extent that they
serve as a preview of the adussible exhibits we can fairly expect to be
available at trial. Unless a party can supply an affidavit from a supporting
witness to properly identify or authenticate a letter or other document, there
is no basis for believmg that a proper foundation can be laid for the
admissibility of the document at a trial in the future, regardless of how
much light it might shed for historians on what happened in the past.
So how does the "forward looking" aspect of summary judgment
practice relate to the question of whether the judge may consider hearsay9
Going back to our hypothetical example about Edward's letter,61 suppose
that a civil action involves a contested question of liability arising out of a
collision at an intersection. If a party submits Edward's sworn statement -
"Last December, I saw the traffic light turn red just before the police car
ran through with its siren and lights off" - the judge does not and cannot
use that affidavit to decide what the police car did last year. If the affidavit
were used in that way to help the judge decide what happened in the past,
the affidavit would have literally no value whatsoever unless it is true, and
so the judge necessarily would be relymg on it as evidence of the truth of
the matter asserted in it. In that case, it would make sense for the law to
insist that we defer that judgment until we hear from Edward live, under
oath, and subject to cross-examination before the jury
But that is not what a judge is supposed to be doing when deciding a
motion for summary judgment. Rather, as noted above, the judge is author-
ized to consider Edward's duly authenticated affidavit6 - like the other
materials listed in Rule 56 - solely for the purpose of deciding what
testimony, exhibits, and other evidence we can reasonably expect to see and
hear in the future at a trial if we have one.63 For that limited purpose, Ins
61. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
62. In the context of an affidavit furnished to the judge on a motion for summary
judgment, the authentication requirement is typically satisfied by the mere fact that the
affidavit is submitted by an attorney who represents, at least implicitly, that it was indeed
signed by its purported author. Cf. Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 1986)
(noting that "[a]s an officer of the court," attorney is "under an obligation of candor," and
her representations to judge will be accepted "at face value").
63. Of course, the judge then will be required to make the related determination of
whether the evidence we can reasonably expect at a trial will present "a sufficient disagree-
ment to require submissions to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as a matter of law." Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The
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sworn affidavit has abundant probative value. Regardless of whether it is
true, an innocent mistake, or deliberately false, hs affidavit still has great
predictive value in helping to forecast the testimony we can expect from
Edward at a trial.64 With respect to that forward-looking challenge of antici-
pating the evidence we would hear at a trial, Edward's affidavit is valuable
and relevant regardless of whether it is true or false; either way it gives us
a fairly reliable picture of what is in store for the jury if we unpanel one.
Because the affidavit therefore has legal and logical significance which "lies
solely m the fact that it was made, the statement is not hearsay "65
Bringing Edward m for live testimony might be better than his affidavit for
the purpose of deciding whether his claims about the past are honest or true
or reliable, but neither method is an inherently better way of deciding what
he is likely to say under oath at a trial in the future.'
parameters of that task are discussed more fully m Parts 11-IIl of this Article.
64. See Nelken, supra note 31, at 72-73 ("Although an affiant may die or testify
differently at trial, as a general rule, a sworn statement is a reliable forecast of the evidence
that will be presented at trial."). A judge may and should assume that a trial would turn out
to be, at the very least, "a swearing contest, with the parties saying the same things m the
witness chair they have said m affidavits." Painton & Co. v Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216,
233 (2d Cir. 1971).
65. FED. R. EvID. 801(c) advisory committee's note.
66. This analysis is not significantly altered m the less common situation where the
affidavit is couched m terms of an explicit statement of what the declarant intends to say at
trial, such as where Edward says, "If I am called to testify at a tnal in this matter, I intend
to testify that the police went through the red light with his siren and lights off." See
DeCintio v Westchester County Medical Ctr., 821 F.2d 111, 113 (2d Cir.) (involving party-
submitted signed statement reciting that signatories "are willing to appear before a Federal
Judge and tell him that"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987). There is room for debate as to
whether that statement, in this context, is hearsay at all; it apparently would not be, at least
under "a declarant-oriented definition of hearsay," because the use of such a statement by the
judge on a summary judgment motion would not "require reliance upon the credibility of the
declarant." See PARK, supra note 38, § 4.01, at 101. The mere fact that someone makes
such statements in an affidavit signed under oath is itself valuable (albeit not conclusive)
evidence of what he is likely to say at trial, regardless of whether he is generally honest or
whether he included the extra italicized words quoted above. For the limited purpose of
predicting what the witness is likely to say at a future trial, an affidavit reciting what the
declarant "intends to say" arguably has at least some probative "significance [that] lies
solely in the fact that it was made." FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee's note. But
even if we were to regard such a statement as "hearsay," it would still be admissible in any
case under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) as a "statement of the declarant's then existing
state of mind, such as intent [or] plan." FED. R. Evm. 803(3). For purposes of our
discussion, therefore, even that hypothetical would not entail any qualification to our
conclusion that Rule 56 does not authorize the use of "hearsay which would not qualify under
these Evidence Rules." FED. R. EviD. 802 advisory committee's note.
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Tis same basic analysis also applies, although m a slightly more subtle
fashion, when a party moves for summary judgment on the basis of a legal
defense that ultimately must be resolved by the court before trial m any
event - for example, a claim that the defendant was not properly served
with process. 67 if sgih a defense cannot be resolved solely on the pleadings,
it often is necessary to raise it on a motion for summary judgment supported
by affidavits.6" For example, the defendant may move to dismiss, based
upon his own affidavit, swearing that the summons and complaint were
never served upon him m any way Does the admission of such an affidavit
constitute the use of hearsay9 Technically, no. If the plaintiff admits the
facts set forth in the affidavit (either expressly or by failing to dispute
them) 69 and merely contests the legal significance of those' facts, the factual
allegations will be taken as true on the basis of the de facto stipulation of the
parties - not because the affidavit recites them.7' On the other hand, if the
plaintiff responds by submitting a contrary affidavit based upon personal
knowledge (for example, an affidavit from the process server swearing that
67 This situation also would include, for example, the defenses listed m Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b) (such as personal and subject matter jurisdiction, venue, sufficiency
of process) and any affirmative defenses listed m Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) that
are normally decided by the court (such as statute of limitations). FED. R. Civ P 8(c),
12(b). In the normal course, such defenses "shall be heard and determined before trial on
application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof
be deferred until the trial." FED. R. Civ P 12(d).
68. See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.11[1.-2], at
56-99 (2d ed. 1995).
69. When a motion for summary judgment is supported properly, the burden shifts to
the adverse party to come forward with an affidavit or other materials that "set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," FED. R. Civ P 56(e), or else to show
why he requires additional time for discovery to obtain the facts essential to justify his
opposition to the inbtion. FED. R. Civ P 56(f). His failure to do either will be construed
against him. See 6 MOORE Er AL., supra note 68, 56.23, at 56-784 ("mhe trial court will
normally not look with indulgence upon a party who has presented neither evidentiary
materials m opposition nor any reason for his failure to do so" because he "is not entitled to
hold back evidence until trial."); C. FED. R. Civ P 8(d) (stating that factual allegations of
complaint, if not denied m answer, are deemed admitted).
70. When a judge accepts a fact as established on the basis of the express or implied
stipulation of the parties m court, she is not even relying on evidence, much less hearsay
A stipulation, like a fact conceded by both parties m the pleadings, is not really evidence at
all but a form of "judicial admission" that defines the scope of the issues before the court.
See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 21, § 257, at 141. Moreover, even if the
concessions of the plaintiff and his attorneys were being accepted for their truth, they still
would not be hearsay if they were used as a basis for granting the defendant's motion against
the plaintiff. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2); United States v 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d
529, 537 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (Seitz, J., concurring and dissenting).
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he personally served the defendant) then the judge's responsibility is to
decide whether the matter can be resolved without a hearing.7' That ques-
tion, like the issue before the judge on a conventional summary judgment
motion, does not authorize (much less require) the court to assume anything
about the truth or falsity of the affidavits. It merely requires the judge to
assume that the parties and their witnesses would testify at a hearing just as
they have in their affidavits and then to decide whether such testimony
would entail a conflict that nught be decided more accurately after observing
the witnesses' demeanor at a live hearing. As noted above, when an affi-
davit is used solely to predict what witnesses are likely to say, its signifi-
cance lies solely in the fact that it was made, and it is therefore not hearsay
Even where the judge decides that there is no need for a hearing and
grants the motion without one, it does not mean that he is assuming that the
affidavits submitted by the prevailing party are "true." It merely means that
the affidavits before the judge present no reason to hold a hearing -
regardless of what the truth might be. For example, suppose that the
process server failed to prepare any affidavit of service and died shortly
after he was supposed to have served the defendant, so there is no way to
verify or refute the defendant's assertion that he was not served. Or sup-
pose that, in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff can come up with nothing more than an equivocal affidavit from
an (evidently overpaid) process server who admits that he has absolutely no
records or recollection as to whether. he served the defendant in this case.
In either case, the motion for summary judgment should be granted, but that
does not mean that the judge "believes" the defendant's affidavit or assumes
its truth. Under such circumstances, there would be scant warrant for an
objective judge to accept the self-serving assurances of the defendant that
the suit must be dismissed because he was never served in the past, but we
safely can conclude that there would be only one possible outcome at a
hearing on the matter in the future. That is precisely why the Supreme
Court was perfectly correct when it stated that a motion for summary
judgment, regardless of whether it is demed or granted, neither authorizes
nor requires the judge to "determine the truth of the matter."'
C. Implications for Our Understanding and Description of the Law
This clarification of the connections between hearsay and summary
judgment has a number of important unplications for improving both the
71. See FED. R. Civ P 12(d), 43(e).
72. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
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accuracy and the clarity of the way m which we describe our law For
starters, of course, the most obvious implication is that the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to Rule 802 (and their many commentators) are simply wrong
when they state with one voice that Rule 56 is an exception to that rule and
that it authorizes a judge to consider "hearsay" m the form of an affidavit
when ruling on a summary judgment motion. Any law student or young
lawyer who took those authorities seriously would develop a distorted
understanding of the core concepts behind either hearsay or summary
judgment, if not both.
Likewise, for similar reasons, the Advisory Committee Notes to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 104(a) are both misleading and dead wrong when they
cite the use of "summary judgment based on affidavits" as an example of
"the many important judicial determinations" made by judges on the basis
of "affidavits or other reliable hearsay "' As noted above, a judge using an
affidavit as a basis for granting or denying summary judgment is not using
it m any way as proof of its contents; she is merely using it as evidence of
what the affiant would be likely to say if called as a witness at trial (much as
she might use it for the nonhearsay purpose of deciding whether the affiant
can speak English or hold a pen). Allowing such limited nonhearsay use of
an affidavit does not reflect any trust m a judge's ability to gauge the
reliability of hearsay and is not even remotely analogous to the grant of
authority m Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) for judges to consider
affidavits (and other inadmissible evidence) when ruling upon preliminary
questions such as whether a witness is truly unavailable.74 Indeed, if one
truly understands the limited role authorized for affidavits m summary
judgment motions, the use of that analogy to justify Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a) is as senseless as suggesting that judges should be allowed
to use affidavits in deciding preliminary questions of istorical fact because
some judges have used affidavits to wipe up potentially dangerous coffee
spills or to stop the bleeding from a serious wound.
All of this unfortunate and unnecessary confusion is doubly iromc. As
shown above, the rules governing hearsay and summary judgment, if prop-
erly understood, actually have the potential to help clarify and illuminate
each other. At least from the perspective of legal education, that potential
could be a significant benefit because few concepts are quite as important to
the practicing litigator or as challenging to students the first time they are
73. See supra notes 7-9.
74. This illustration is taken from the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a).
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encountered. Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes have a unique
potential for making such points clear to students and lawyers alike, given
the Supreme Court's increasing willingness to cite those Notes as a "well-
considered" and "respected source of scholarly commentary "I Now more
than ever, those Notes are the worst possible place to find inaccurate and
confusing claims.
Ideally, if it is possible to do so, the Committee Notes to Federal Rules
of Evidence 802 and 104(a) ought to be amended, respectively, to delete any
reference to summary judgment affidavits as an example of "hearsay made
admissible by other rules" or "an important judicial determination" made on
the basis of otherwise madmissible hearsay That sinple amendment would
help eliminate the rampant confusion that has been caused by those errors.
Then, in an effort to enhance the heuristic value of those Committee Notes,
the Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) should be amended to add
summary judgment affidavits as an example of "statements which are not
hearsay" because the "significance of [such a] statement lies solely in the
fact that it was made." Such amendments would go a long way toward
using the Committee Notes to illuminate that which those same Notes now
obscure.76
These remarks also point the way toward clarifying many other con-
fusing and inaccurate points that have been made on related topics. For
example, it is clear that Weinstein's Evidence unwittingly comes closer to
the truth than it realizes when it suggests that affidavits would, in any event,
be usable on summary judgment motions even if it were not for Rule 56
because of the operation of Federal Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 1 101(d).'
75. Tome v United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 702 (1995) (citing cases that rely on Advis-
ory Notes). Even Justice Scalia, who declined to join the majority's apparent willingness
to grant to those Notes any authoritative effect as aids to construing the rules, agreed that
the Notes, "[h]avmg been prepared by a body of experts, are assuredly persuasive
scholarly commentaries - ordinarily the most persuasive - concerning the meaning of the
Rules." Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring m part). Even Scalia's opinion lends support
to the view that the Notes are deserving of careful study for students and lawyers trying to
learn the law.
76. I am not aware of any time when the Committee has amended or supplemented the
Committee Notes without making a simultaneous amendment to the Rules themselves -
which I obviously do not propose - and it is unclear whether such a procedure is even
possible. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d) (1988) (authorizmg Judicial Conference and its standing
committees to recommend "a proposed rule [and] an explanatory note on the rule"); qf
Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (noting absence of "any procedure
by which we formally endorse or disclaim" Advisory Committee Notes).
77 Actually, to be precise, that authoritative reference work mistakenly says that
"Hearsay would, m any event, be usable in [summary judgment motions] under these Rules.
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Although it is highly dubious whether those two rules actually support that
conclusion,78 it would be more accurate and far more clear to state that
affidavits would, m any event, be usable for summary judgment motions
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) because they are not even hearsay
when used m that context.79
By this point in our discussion, most readers can already guess the
proper resolution to the perenmal dilemma posed by the claim of Professor
Moore, among many others, that Rule 56 furnishes a "hearsay exception
[that] refers, of course, only to the affidavits themselves as hearsay" but
not to the "statements contained therem."8° As noted above, this popular
"explanation" is both inscrutable and implausible because it would be incon-
sistent with the structure and theory of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
fashion a rule that trusts a factfinder with hearsay but not with multiple
hearsay 8' Now we understand, however, that Professor Moore's proposed
reconciliation is sinply wrong. Rule 56 does not authorize a judge to
consider hearsay in any form, not even in part; it allows consideration of
affidavits (and other statements, such as deposition transcripts) solely for
predicting what those witnesses are likely to say at trial and not for resolv-
ing the truth of the matter asserted m those statements.
We are now in a position also to see the answer to another question that
rarely has been raised and never correctly answered (until today). On a
motion for summary judgment, what is the legal effect or status of an
affidavit that was signed by a man who is now dead? As noted above, the
only reported decision to consider the question apparently did not squarely
resolve it, but indicated m dictum that the death of the afflant arguably
would render the affidavit "inadmissible hearsay "' That suggestion is not
See Rule 104(a), Rule 1101(d)." 4WEINSTEINETAL., supra note 10, 802[02], at 802-6
(1995) (emphasis added). As noted above, Rule 801(c) makes affidavits admissible for
summary judgment motions but only because they are not hearsay. See supra part I.B.
78. See supra note 31.
79. In future editions of that work, therefore, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE would be
accurate if the quoted line were changed m two small ways to read: "Affidavits would, m any
event, be usable m [summary judgment motions] under these Rules. See Rule 801(c)."
(emphasis added). Better still perhaps, and just as easy, would be to simply include a
citation to this Article.
80. MOORE, supra note 11, pt. 1, at 574.
81. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
82. Massachusetts v United States, 788 F Supp. 1267, 1271 n.8 (D. Mass. 1992)
("Mr. Hansen is now deceased, so arguably his affidavit, although in standard form for
consideration upon a motion for summary judgment, is now madmissible hearsay.")
(emphasis added), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare v Secretary of
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merely wrong, it is also senseless on its face. Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, an affidavit can virtually never be transformed into madmissible
hearsay merely by the death of the declarant.' In point of fact, as we can
now understand, an affidavit submitted on a summary judgment motion is
not hearsay regardless of whether the author is now dead or alive; in neither
case is it to be considered for the truth of the matter asserted in the affidavit.
But if the author of the affidavit is now dead (or otherwise permanently
unavailable to testify) by the time the court rules on an application for
summary judgment, the affidavit is simply irrelevant as a matter of law
Barring his unlikely return from the grave, a dead man's affidavit tells the
judge nothing about the testimony we can expect to hear at trial from the
available witnesses.
Up to this point, one might claim that most of the points made here are
arguably of limited practical significance. After all, everyone was already
m agreement that affidavits are admissible and usable on summary judgment
motions, regardless of whether they are made admissible as nonhearsay
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) or as an exception to the hearsay
rules m Rule 56; this Article (thus far) merely has clarified our understand-
ing of the reasons for that conclusion. Even if that were true, tins important
refinement in the clarity of our analytical framework for understanding the
relationship between hearsay and summary judgment is still significant
because of the light it sheds on the nature of both concepts, especially for
law students and young lawyers. Furthermore, tis analytical refinement
also permits us to unravel several even more pervasive and insidious errors
about the nature of summary judgment - in ways that affect the outcomes
of real cases.
For example, this refinement enables us to unravel the nagging debate
over what Justice Rehnquist meant when he wrote for the Court in Celotex
Corp. v Catrett&4 that a nonmovant is not required to "produce evidence in
a form that would be admissible at trial m order to avoid summary judg-
Agric., 984 F.2d 514 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 81 (1993).
83. Indeed, if anything, the death of a man can only increase the likelihood that his
prior affidavit may thereby become admissible under the hearsay rules. See FED. R. EVID.
804(b) (listing four categories of statements that become admissible if author of statement
dies). There are two kinds of "statements" that might be rendered inadmissible hearsay by
the death of the declarant before trial, but they involve unusual situations that would rarely,
if ever, apply to affidavits submitted to the court on a summary judgment motion. See FED.
R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(C) (statement of identification of person after perceiving him); FED. R.
EViD. 803(5) (statement of recorded recollection).
84. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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ment. " 5 This single line has unleashed a torrent of academic and judicial
debate and commentary, most of it devoted to whether the Court thereby
overrode the apparent requirement m Rule 56(e) that all supporting and
opposing affidavits set forth facts that would be admissible m evidence.s 6
There is an evolving general agreement that this apparent discrepancy can
best be resolved by suggesting that this notorious passage from Celotex
should be read with the emphasis on the word form, with the implication
that the content of those affidavits and other materials must still be admissi-
ble.97
85. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U;S. 317, 324 (1986).
86. See authorities cited supra note 31. The terrible confusion among the academic
analysts is minrrored by the rampant disagreement among the courts of appeals - which often
divide among themselves. Despite the Supreme Court's plain holding that Rule 56(e) forbids
the consideration of sworn statements containing inadmissible hearsay, Adickes v S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 & n.19 (1970), several circuits have read this single line
from Celotex as effectively overruling Adickes, changing the requirements of Rule 56(e) and
allowing summary judgment to be successfully opposed by inadmissible evidence, including
hearsay. See Williams v Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 466 n.12 (3d Cir. 1989)
(holding that Celotex allows "hearsay evidence produced in an affidavit [to] be consid-
ered if the out-of-court declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony");
Offshore Aviation v Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1015-16 & n.1 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(holding by margin of 2-1 that Celotex allows consideration of "inadmissible hearsay" con-
tamed m letter); Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding 2-1 that Celotex allows consideration of inadmissible hearsay letter if "the substance
of the letter is reducible to admissible evidence in the form of trial testimony"), cert. denied,.
484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Bushman v Halm, 798 F.2d 651, 654-55 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986)
(interpreting Celotex as allowing nonmoving party to present evidence that would not be
admissible at trial, including unauthenticated letter). Other circuits have reached the opposite
conclusion - that Celotex did not change the rule that affidavits may not contain hearsay or
other inadmissible evidence. See Duplantis v Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 191-92
(5th Cir. 1991) ("It has long been settled law that a plaintiff must respond to an adequate
motion for summary judgment with admissible evidence."); Financial Timing Publications,
Inc. v Compugraphic Corp., 893 F.2d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 1990) ("A party may not rely
solely on inadmissible hearsay in opposing a motion for summary judgment, but instead must
show that admissible evidence will be available at trial."); Canada v Blam's Helicopters,
Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) ("It is well settled that unauthenticated documents
cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment."); see also Garside v Osco Drug,
Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Hearsay evidence, inadmissible at trial, cannot be
considered on a motion for summary judgment."). One circuit has even tried to reconcile
Celotex with Rule 56(e) by adopting the intermediate, but utterly cryptic, position that hear-
say is "normally" insufficient to raise an issue of fact for summary judgment purposes.
Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 797 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citations omitted), vacated on
other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995). Exactly when it nught be sufficient in that circuit
apparently remains a mystery
87 See, e.g., BRUNET ET AL., supra note 31, § 5.06, at 119 ("The critical word in the
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Despite the fabulous popularity of this proposed resolution of the
Celotex mystery, it has spawned confusion and disagreement m the lower
courts on a massive scale.8" Even more to the point, I doubt that anyone
truly and fully understands this supposed distinction between defects m the
"content" and the "form" of the evidence presented on a summary judgment
motion, especially in connection with objections raised under the hearsay
rules.8 9 I respectfully submt that Justice Rehnquist's statement can be
quotation is 'form.' By limiting the exception from the Rules of Evidence to matters of
'form,' the Court preserved application of the evidence rules to the content of the evi-
dence."); Brunet, supra note 52, at 656 ("Justice Rehnquist's seeming leniency on form
should not be misread as tolerating leniency on content."); John E. Kennedy, Federal Sum-
mary Judgment: Reconciling Celotex v Catrett with Adickes v Kress and the Evidentiary
Problems Under Rule 56, 6 REv LrriG. 227, 239 (1987) ("Justice Rehnquist still meant to
say that in any event the content must be admissible."); William W Schwarzer, Summary
Judgment: A Proposed Revision of Rule 56, 110 F.R.D. 213, 220-21 (1986) (noting that Rule
56 does not "require[ ] the opponent to present facts m a form m which they would be
admissible as evidence"); Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 478 (statmg that materials
submitted on summary judgment motion must "[set] forth facts admissible m evidence,
although the facts need not be presented in admissible form"); see also Offshore Aviation v
Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1016 (1lth Cir. 1987) (Edmondson, J., concurring)
(quoting Celotex with emphasis added to word "form"). One circuit has taken the similar -
but equally opaque - position that the party opposing summary judgment need not "tender
evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial," although "the evidence set forth must
be of a kind admissible at trial." Waldridge v American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921
& n.2 (7th Cir. 1994).
88. For example, as noted above, this supposed "solution" has spawned a tremendous
debate over whether a party may defeat summary judgment by offering an affidavit or letter
signed by one person but containing information about what some other person will say when
he is called at trial, on the theory that the "defect" in such an affidavit is merely a matter of
form, not content, and may be remedied before trial. See authorities cited supra notes 31,
86. I, for one, think the very suggestion makes a mockery out of the plain language of Rule
56(e), which insists that the affidavit "shall be made on personal knowledge," as well as the
Court's contrary holding in Adickes. The very existence of this dispute confirms the
imprecision and ambiguity of the supposed distinction between hearsay defects that go to
content and those that go only to form.
89 For example, consider a multiple hearsay affidavit that states: "I heard that Sheila
says Mike told her that Lois claims she saw the light was red." Do the defects in such an
affidavit go to its content, its form, or both? The numerous authorities describing that
supposed "distinction," supra note 87, shed no light on the answer to this question.
Theoretically, the substance of this almost worthless report is potentially "reducible to
admissible evidence" by the time of trial if that were the only requirement for making the
affidavit sufficient to defeat summary judgment (as some courts have held). E.g., Catrett v
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066
(1988). As one judge has correctly observed, however, it "has long been recognized [that]
hearsay has weaknesses that go beyond questions of mere form." Offshore Aviation, 831
F.2d at 1017 (Edmondson, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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understood far better by reading it with the emphasis supplied elsewhere, to
say that the nonmovmg party is not required to "produce evidence m a form
that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment" -
but without altering in any way Rule 56(e)'s requirement that the affidavit
must be admissible, both in content and form, at the summary judgment
stage, where the court is deciding an altogether different question. As we
have seen, where an affidavit is being considered on a summary judgment
motion and is based on the personal knowledge of the affiant, it is not hear-
say at all, either in content or form, even though the same affidavit will be
hearsay if it is later offered at trial to prove the truth of the events described
in the affidavit.
One related reason for this persistent and pervasive confusion is surely
attributable to the next line in that same opinion. Just after stating in Celo-
tex that the evidence offered in opposition to summary judgment need not be
"in a form that would be admissible at trial, "' Justice Rehnquist also wrote
for the Court that "[o]bviously, Rule 56 does not require the nonmovmg
party to depose her own witnesses."91 This line has likewise generated a
great deal of academic commentary, much of it concluding that the Court
thereby opened the door for parties to resist summary judgment simply by
submitting affidavits signed by the plaintiff, listing who her witnesses will
be and what they are expected to say I Others disagree, pointing out that
such a reading clearly would conflict with the unambiguous text of Rule
56(e), but have been unable to explain how Rehnquist's remark can be taken
literally 91
90. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (emphasis mine - all mine).
91. Id.
92. See authorities and cases cited supra notes 31, 86.
93. See authorities and cases cited supra notes 31, 86. One circuit has taken a third
approach and has stated that Justice Rehnquist merely meant to make it plain that the party
opposing summary judgment "need not depose its own witnesses" because they can simply
be asked to sign affidavits instead. Financial Timing Publications v Compugraphic Corp.,
893 F.2d 936, 942 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). That guess is plausible, but it overlooks the fact that
the word "depose," as a legal term of art, typically includes the act of taking a written
affidavit from someone as well. See, e.g., Wrenn v Benson, 490 U.S. 89, 90 n.3 (1989)
(noting that Supreme Court clerk's own form affidavit asks those who sign to verify that "I,
[John Doe], being first duly sworn, depose and say"); United States v United States Dist.
Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 300 n.2 (1972) (noting that United States Attorney General submitted
affidavit reciting that "John N. Mitchell being duly sworn deposes and says"); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 438 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "deponent" to include "one who makes oath to a
written statement, an affiant"). I suspect that Justice Rehnquist had this broader sense
of the word in mind and that he meant to deny that it always was necessary for a nonmoving
party to depose her own witnesses, either through affidavits or oral questioning.
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Fortunately, there is an available explanation. The answer to this
mystery, I submit, is that Justice Rehnquist really meant to say, and ob-
viously should have said, that "Rule 56 does not always require the non-
moving party to depose her own witnesses," although sometimes it does.
Why are there some times when the rule does not entail such a requirement?
I am convinced that Justice Rehnquist had m mind here the relatively
unusual sort of situation that was squarely before the Court m that very
case: namely, where the defendant offered no evidence of its own as to what
happened in the past but moved for summary judgment based on its con-
tention that the opposing party had the burden of proof on some issue and
would have "no witnesses" who could support that crucial fact at trial.' In
a separate concurring opinion, Justice White made this assumption explicit
by stating that a party need not depose his witnesses "to defeat a summary
judgment motion asserting only that he has failed to produce any support for
his case. "I If plaintiff actually thought she had such witnesses, but she had
not been asked to disclose them,96 it would be unreasonable to insist that she
depose her own witnesses and submit their affidavits or deposition tran-
scripts; she simply should be able to sign an affidavit stating from her own
personal knowledge that she did have such witnesses and let discovery
proceed on its normal course from there. 97
But that logic does not apply to the far more common case where the
defendant moves for summary judgment and comes forward with a seem-
ingly compelling showing that the clais alleged by the plaintiff were not
simply unproven but actually false (for example, if defendant Celotex Corp.
94. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 320. In Celotex, the defendant had alleged m its motion
that Mrs. Catrett had been unable to identify m discovery the names of any witnesses who
could testify that her deceased husband had been exposed to the defendant's products. See
id.
95. Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Indeed, because Justice White
supplied the fifth vote m Celotex and concurred on grounds narrower than those put forth by
the plurality, his position evidently is controlling. See Romano v Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct.
2004, 2010 (1994) (indicating that when justice supplies fifth vote and concurs on narrower
grounds, thatjustice's position is controlling).
96. Or perhaps she had disclosed them - m answers to interrogatories for example -
but the defendant had not even bothered to take their depositions. A defendant who made
such a motion in that case would be effectively "bluffing" m the hopes of forcing the
opposing party to furnish some free disclosure of witness statements.
97 By normal course, I naturally mean that the witnesses would be questioned at a
deposition under oath by the defendant. In effect, such a response from the opposing party
would be tantamount to advising the court that the defendant's motion for summary judgment
was simply maccurate and that it did not show the absence of a genuine issue concerning
whether the plaintiff had any potential witnesses for trial.
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had supplied affidavits from numerous eyewitnesses or employers attesting
that Mrs. Catrett's husband had never been exposed to its product). 9 In that
case, by contrast, it would be contrary to the plain language and purpose of
Rule 56 to allow the plaintiff to respond to such a seemingly compelling
showing by filing her own affidavit in which she lists only what her
witnesses have told her they saw A defendant who succeeds in supporting
that kind of motion plainly is entitled under the rule to "demand at least one
sworn averment of fact before the lengthy process of litigation contin-
ues"'99 and to insist that such averment "be made on personal knowledge. " 1
If the Court meant to say otherwise in Celotex, which is highly doubtful, it
was only mistaken dictum.
One final, related mystery remains to be unraveled. If this analysis is
sound, then just what did the Supreme Court mean in Anderson when it
stated that "findings of fact" are not required when a judge rules on a
motion for summary judgment, but that they often "are extremely helpful to
a reviewing court,,?"0i This remark, although literally true, has contributed
to much misunderstanding. The pertinent authority states that when a case
cannot be fully disposed of on a motion for summary judgment, the judge
may and should "if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted."" That standard authorizes a judge to make findings of fact
not about the past but about the future and what would be likely to happen
at a trial if one is held.1
0 3
98. When I speak of evidence tending to show that a plaintiff's claim is "false," I do
not mean to suggest that such a motion would invite the judge to resolve the "truth of the
matter" asserted in the affidavits. Rather, as noted above m Part I.B., the judge's function
is solely to consider such affidavits as evidence of what the declarants will say at a future
trial if there is one and to decide if such testimony would present a genuine issue for a jury
to resolve.
99. Lujan v National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).
100. FED. R. Civ P 56(e).
101. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 & n.6 (1986); accord Johnson
v Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (1995).
102. FED. R. Civ P 56(d) (emphasis added).
103. For example, suppose the defendant m a civil action moves for summary judgment
based upon his self-serving affidavit denying his liability, and the plaintiff has no witnesses
or evidence - not even circumstantial evidence - to disprove that claim because the
plaintiff's only eyewitness unexpectedly died since the complaint was filed. It would be
absurd for a judge to presume or to find that the defendant did not do it based on such a
record, but he can safely "find" that there will be no "substantial controversy" or "genuine
issue as to any material fact" if the case goes to trial.
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1I. May a Judge "Weigh the Evidence" on a Summary Judgment Motion?
A. The Traditional Answer
Without a doubt, one of the most unfortunate and pervasive myths sur-
rounding summary judgment was spawned unwittingly by the Supreme
Court in Anderson, when Justice White stated for the Court that "at the
summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the
evidence." "4 Later in the same opinion, the Court again stated that "[c]redi-
bility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legiti-
mate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,
whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed
verdict. "
05
This controversial rule from Anderson has been quoted frequently in
countless subsequent opinions by lower courts and continues to be quoted by
the Supreme Court itself, even as recently as this last term.i°6 Yet academic
commentators cannot agree even on whether the rule is ambiguous, much
less on what it means. At one extreme, a distinguished panel of experts
recently commented that the prohibition in Anderson against "weighing evi-
dence" on a summary judgment motion "is an unambiguous and conven-
tional statement of the judge's function [that] should present no
difficulty for judges confronted with a dispute over historical facts. " ° But
as many other observers correctly have observed, tis passage appears, at
least on its face, to be hopelessly mconsistent with other parts of the same
opinion. s
For example, two sentences after claiming that a judge may not "weigh
the evidence" when deciding a summary judgment motion, Justice White
wrote that the judge must decide if the evidence is "merely colorable or is
not significantly probative. " 1 Only a few paragraphs earlier, the Court
104. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
105. Id. at 255.
106. Schiup v Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 869 (1995).
107 Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 487
108. Linda S. Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 433, 462 (1987) ("So replete is the decision with contradictory pronounce-
ments that opposing counsel can m the future legitimately cite Anderson's dicta for
completely repugnant propositions."); Jeffrey W Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme
Court's Shimmenng View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication
Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 115-16 (1988) (lamenting "internal contradictions" m Justice
White's opinion for Court). Justice Brennan made the same accusation, without contradic-
tion, m his dissenting opinion m Anderson. See mfra note 116.
109. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (citations omitted).
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stated that the district judge must decide whether there is "sufficient
evidence" supporting the claimed factual dispute.110 A few pages later, the
Court describes the test in terms of whether the evidence presents "a
sufficient disagreement" to require a jury trial."1 To complicate matters
further, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 56 contain an explicit
statement that the very mission of summary judgment is "to assess the proof
in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." ' 2 Moreover, in
language that has gone almost totally overlooked, the Committee also stated
that the Rule was designed to permit summary judgment where the party
opposing the motion "does not produce any evidentiary matter, or produces
some but not enough to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial."1
And in a case decided almost contemporaneously with Anderson, Matsushita
Electnc Industnal Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 14 the Court stated that sum-
mary judgment should be more readily granted, at least in some cases, if the
opposing *party's claims appear to be "implausible. "11
To be perfectly candid, all of this certainly seems to call for what most
people would describe as "weighing the evidence. "11 Nevertheless, despite
all of these explicit directions for federal judges to assess the probative value
and sufficiency of the parties' proof, virtually all observers have adopted a
contrary reading that they believe is compelled by a literal reading of the
Supreme Court's direction to refrain from "weighing the evidence." Labor-
110. Id. at 249 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v Cities Serv Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89
(1968)).
111. Id. at251-52.
112. 1963 amendment to FED. R. Civ P 56(e) advisory committee's note (emphasis
added); see also Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798
(1993) (noting that summary judgment may be granted where "the scintilla of evidence
presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the
position more likely than not is true") (dictum).
113. 1963 amendment to FED. R. Civ P 56(e) advisory committee's note (emphasis
added).
114. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
115. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Thus important but controversial proposition is discussed more fully later m this Article. See
infra part III.
116. Justice Brennan made the same point when he correctly noted that the majority
opinion mAnderson "is replete with boilerplate language to the effect that trial courts are not
to weigh evidence when deciding summary judgment motions [but] is also full of
language which could surely be understood as an invitation - if not an instruction - to trial
courts to assess and weigh evidence much as a juror would." Anderson v Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 265-66 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority in Anderson
made no response to this accusation.
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mg under the mistaken view that this language prevents a court from
assessing the weight or strength of a party's evidence, courts and commenta-
tors unanimously have adopted the erroneous view that Matsushita only
permits a judge to assess the "plausibility" of inferences from circumstantial
evidence but not direct evidence of historical facts." 7 Thus, where a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment submits direct evidence of a
historical fact, lower courts routinely have adopted the view that "the court
may not assess the credibility of this evidence nor weigh it against any
conflicting evidence presented by the moving party "11 Indeed, one court
of appeals has gone so far as to state that a judge in such a position cannot
grant summary judgment even if he is convinced that the facts alleged in an
affidavit descend "to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible"" 9
or the "fantastic"'" because summary judgment supposedly does not permit
the district judge to "assess credibility ",i21 Needless to say, these holdings
stand in stark contrast with the Advisory Committee's clear direction that
"[t]he very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the
pleadings and to assess the proof""
B. The Truth of the Matter
Faced with all these seemingly irreconcilable signals, one observer
has reasonably complained: "How, one may ask rhetorically, can the court
determine whether the nonmovant's evidence is sufficient or significantly
probative unless the court weighs the evidence?"' Unfortunately, nobody
ever has been able to answer this riddle until today, and only a few have
even given it a serious attempt.' 24 But there is an explanation, and it is
117 This limiting reading has been tenaciously defended by numerous courts and
academic commentators. See authorities cited mfra notes 172-95. The error m this reading
of Matsushita is discussed more fully later m this Article. See infra part III.
118. McLaughlin v Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting T.W Elec.
Serv., Inc. v Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1987)).
119. Bator v Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Denton v Her-
nandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992)).
120. Id. at 1026 n.6.
121. Id. at 1026.
122. 1963 amendment to FED. R. Civ P 56(e) advisory committee's note (emphasis
added).
123. Stempel, supra note 108, at 116.
124. One set of authors recently has tried to resolve this inconsistency by essentially
wishing it away. In Summary Judgment: Federal Law and Practice, the authors concede that
the summary judgment rule permits (indeed, requires) a judge "to assess or evaluate
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surprisingly simple. When Justice White wrote for the Court that judges are
not permitted to "weigh the evidence," in his highly unfortunate choice of
words, he was using a word that can have two distinct connotations. The
metaphor of evidence being "weighed" can be understood in two different
ways, reflecting two different sorts of scales with which we are all familiar.
(1) "The bathroom scale." In one sense, to "weigh" something could
mean to determine whether it is heavy or light, by measunng or assessing
its degree of substantiality We weigh ourselves on a bathroom scale, for
example, to get a more or less precise reading of our weight. Tis sense is
probably the most natural one in which most observers would likely
understand the phrase "to weigh," and it is obviously the way that all lower
courts and legal commentators have interpreted Justice White's direction
that federal judges cannot "weigh the evidence" on a summary judgment
motion. If that is what the Court had m mind, of course, as numerous
confounded critics have observed, 'I then this direction would be in obvious
conflict with the indications elsewhere m the same opinion and in the
Committee Notes that a judge must "assess the proof" to determine if it
meets the preliminary threshold test of being "sufficient" or "significantly
probative" to raise a question of fact. That is exactly what most of us would
describe as "weighing the evidence."
(2) "The Scales of Justice." There is, however, another slightly less
common way in which one can use the word "weigh." That word also can
describe the weighing one might .do with the kind of balance typically
associated in legal lore with the "scales of justice." Such scales may not
give a precise reading of something's weight, but they can be used to
balance or compare it against something else to see which is heavier or more
substantial." This is admittedly a slightly less natural interpretation of the
word in ordinary parlance (as evidenced by the fact that it has escaped the
evidence" and that this process certainly "does bear some similarities to the weighing of
evidence traditionally performed by the finder of fact at trial." BRUNET ET AL., supra note
31, at 80. The authors conclude that the contradiction posed by the language of Anderson,
if any, "appears to be one that is inherent m the nature of summary judgment." Id. That
may well be an accurate description of the way that summary judgment works, but as a
putative answer to the problem of why the Supreme Court said a judge may not "weigh the
evidence" under Rule 56, this supposed "explanation" is tantamount to pretending simply that
the Court never said such a thing at all or that it was not meant to be taken literally. That is
hardly a satisfactory way of dealing with such confusing language from such a high-placed
source.
125. See supra notes 108, 116, 124.
126. C. Daniel 5:27 (noting that Daniel told Belshazzar that "[y]ou have been weighed
m the balances, and found wanting").
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attention of all those who could not solve Justice White's unintended
riddle)."z But it is a fairly common use of the metaphor in judicial
instructions and the openings and closings of trial attorneys who are trying
to describe the burden of proof in a civil case or to contrast it with the
burden in a criminal case."28 A leading reference work on jury instructions
recommends that federal judges describe the preponderance of evidence
standard to civil juries as a comparison of the "weight" of the parties' cases
on a set of "scales" and refers to this language as an instruction on "the
weighing of the evidence. "29 There can be absolutely no doubt that tins is
the sort of scale that Justice White and the majority had in mind when the
127 See sources cited supra notes 108, 116, 124.
128. See JAMES J. GOBERT, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE OF SELEC-
TING A JURY § 9.28, at 348 (2d ed. 1990) ("[S]ome lawyers use their hands to represent
scales of justice, elevating one to indicate how much the scales must be tipped to meet the
burden of proof."). For example, noted trial lawyer Gerry Spence once used voir dire to tell
prospective jurors:
Now, in this case we have to prove our case first to you by a preponderance of
the evidence - and the Judge says that is an adjusting of the scales - that isn't
proof beyond a reasonable doubt like m a criminal case where a man's life is at
stake - but you have to just tip the scales. If you weigh up all the evidence on
both sides, which is the most believable case, Karen Silkwood's case or Kerr-
McGee's case? In other words, if we tip the scales which makes the
evidence preponderate, if we tip the scales m our favor, will you return a verdict,
a full uncompromised verdict in this case?
ROBERT V WELLS, SUCCESSFUL TRIAL TECHNIQUES OF EXPERT PRACTITIONERS 175 (1988)
(emphasis added). Likewise, Robert Habush, former president of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America, told the jury near the outset of his opening statement on behalf of a
plaintiff:
Moreover, unlike the old District Attorney in Perry Mason, Hamilton Berger, I
don't have to prove anything to you beyond a reasonable doubt [b]ut, rather,
by the greater weight of the credible evidence. If you have two scales of justice
and one party's evidence seems to weigh with more persuasive power, that will be
sufficient for us to have met our obligation to you.
Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
129 See 3 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 73.01,
at 73-4, 73-11 (1995). This highly regarded reference work, written by United States Dis-
trict Judge Leonard B. Sand and others, advises federal judges to instruct civil juries that:
[a] preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of the evidence
So long as you find that the scales tip, however slightly, in favor of the party with
the burden of proof - that what the party claims is more likely true than not
true - then that element will have been proved by a preponderance of evidence.
Id. at 73-4 (emphasis added). The authors aptly describe this analogy as an instruction "on
the weighing of the evidence." Id. at 73-11 (emphasis added).
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Court stated, m its regrettably ambiguous choice of words, that federal
courts cannot "weigh the evidence" on a summary judgment motion.
This simple distinction between the two meanings of the verb "to
weigh" furnishes a clear and accurate resolution of the apparent mconsis-
tency m Justice White's opinion for the Court m Anderson. As that case
held, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment it is both necessary
and proper for a federal judge to measure (or, some might be tempted to
say, to "weigh") the evidence of both sides in the limited sense of determin-
ing if it is substantial enough to create at least some genuine factual issues
that "may reasonably be resolved m favor of either party "" In the words
of Matsushita, this rough measurement entails a limited consideration of the
"plausibility" of the parties' clais, regardless of whether they are sup-
ported by direct or circumstantial evidence.' But if the opposing party's
evidence survives that limited assessment or measurement of its substantial-
ity and it appears that such evidence is plausible enough to conceivably
support a verdict, the judge cannot go further and "weigh" - that is,
compare - the evidence for the two sides in the proverbial scales of justice
to determine who has the comparatively stronger case. If the question is
close enough to leave any room for reasonable doubt as to how the evidence
for the parties might weigh in the balance, summary judgment must be
demed. That sort of "weighing" is reserved solely for the jury It really is
just that simple.
Indeed, this interpretation of Justice White's intended meaning is
inescapable. Only three months before the Court announced his opinion
for the Court in Anderson, Justice White wrote m another case that sum-
mary judgment does not permit a federal judge to "decide for himself
whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff, ' to "balance all
the evidence pointing toward [one side's case] against all the evidence
pointing toward [the other side's theory of the case],"'3 or to decide "if the
evidence makes the inference [offered by one side] more probable than
not. "'s It is inconceivable that Justice White did not have the same imagery
130. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
131. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(explaining evidentiary requirements if factual context renders party's clai implausible).
Although this conclusion is contrary to the conclusion reached by all other observers, see
mfra notes 172-94, it is true, for reasons set forth more fully below m Part I of this Article.
132. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 600 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 600 n.1 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
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m mind when he condemned the "weighing of evidence" just a few months
later in Anderson.135
When Justice White wrote for the Court that a judge ruling upon
summary judgment cannot "weigh the evidence," he did not mean to imply
that the judge is obligated to accept the evidence of the opposing party with
unconditional blind faith or that she is barred from assessing whether the
evidence might be accepted by a rational jury This is not merely my guess;
it is a fact. No clearer proof of this fact could be imagmed than Justice
White's own opinion for the Court one year earlier in another case with a
strikingly sunilar title. Only one year before writing the majority opinion
in Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Justice White also authored the opinion of the
Court in another landmark case, Anderson v City of Bessemer City 13 In
that earlier case, the Court explained the legal standard to be applied by
federal appellate courts when reviewing a challenge to a district court's
findings of fact as "clearly erroneous."137  Justice White wrote that an
appeals court in that position is not to ask whether it "would have weighed
the evidence differently""13 and cannot conduct "a de novo weighing of the
evidence in the record."
139
So what role is left for a federal appellate judge who cannot "weigh"
the evidence in such a situation? Far more than you might guess. In
135. This inference follows with even greater force when one considers the nature of the
two opinions written by Justice White. In the ordinary course of events, the majority opinion
for an appellate court is finished first, at least in its preliminary draft, m order to give the
dissenters time to respond to it. Because Justice White's opinion in Matsushita was Ihe only
dissent and because the majority opinion in that case did not once cite or respond to his
dissent, it safely can be inferred that his dissenting opinion probably was finished not long
before the case was decided on March 26, 1986 - which was almost four months after
Anderson was argued before the Court. By that point in time, it is quite likely that White
had substantially completed at least his first draft of the majority opinion in Anderson
because two separate and lengthy dissents were completed in that case before that decision
was announced less than three months later.
136. 470 U.S. 564 (1985). Given the degree of similarity between the logic and the
language of the two opinions, one is sorely tempted to refer to them as "Anderson 1" and
"Anderson I" I will not do so, of course, because they involved totally unrelated parties
and cases. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I will continue throughout this Article to
follow the standard convention observed by other writers on summary judgment and will use
"Anderson" to refer to the Court's holding in Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc.
137 Anderson v City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76'(1985). Under federal
law, findings of fact by a district judge in a civil case may not be set aside on appeal unless
they are "clearly erroneous." Id. at 573 (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)).
138. Id. at 574.
139. Id. at 576.
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deciding whether a factual finding is clearly erroneous, Justice White
explained m Bessemer City, an appeals court cannot "weigh the evidence,"
but is still authorized to assess whether the testimony accepted by the district
judge is "a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by
extrinsic evdence."" In explaining what facts might suffice to establish
"clear error," the Court specifically noted the possibility that "[d]ocuments
or objective evidence may contradict the witness' story; or the story itself
may be so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable
factfinder would not credit it. "141 Tlus language makes it plain beyond any
doubt that a federal judge ordered by Justice White to refrain from "weigh-
ing the evidence" is not barred from assessing the evidence to insure that it
is at least facially plausible and capable of being accepted by a rational
factfmder. 42 That is precisely the same role that White obviously intended
to leave open for judges ruling upon summary judgment motions, despite his
identical statement m Anderson that they are not to "weigh the evidence."
If there was any room for doubt about this interpretation of Justice
White's direction that evidence cannot be "weighed" on a summary judg-
ment motion, it is utterly dispelled by recalling the context in which that
claim was made. Writing for the Court in Anderson, White stated that "the
weighing of the evidence[ ] and the drawing of legitimate inferences from
the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a
motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict."143 When White
wrote that evidence cannot be "weighed" - not even on a motion for a
140. Id. at 575; see also id. at 577 (noting that district court's findings of fact were
neither "illogical [n]or implausible"); id. at 579 (noting that none of evidence accepted by
lower court "is implausible on its face, and none is contradicted by any reliable extrinsic
evidence").
141. Id. at 575.
142. Two other landmark opinions by the Supreme Court, both of them joined by Justice
White, also have underscored this same point. For example, the Court has recently stated
that a federal judge resolving a disputed fact of conditional relevance is not to "weigh[ ]
credibility," but is still authorized and required to decide "whether the jury could reasonably
find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence." Huddleston v United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). And a federal judge reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a state court conviction must preserve and respect "the factfinder's role
as weigher of the evidence," but is still permitted to determine whether the evidence sup-
porting the conviction is sufficient to permit "any rational trier of fact [to] have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979). Both of these opinions, just like Anderson, are obviously using the word
"weigh" to describe the process by which the jury compares two plausible claims in the pro-
verbial balance to decide which is more plausible.
143. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (emphasis added).
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directed verdict - it is inconceivable that he meant that it must be accepted
with unconditional blind faith and that a judge has no power even to con-
sider whether the evidence is substantial enough to support a rational jury's
verdict. Under well-settled federal law, as the Court noted m Anderson, a
motion for a directed verdict need not be denied "merely because some evi-
dence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof"'" and
must be granted if the evidence weighs "so strongly and overwhelmingly in
favor of one party, such that reasonable men could not arrve at a contrary
verdict. "145 That sort of "weighing" has always been perfectly proper for a
judge, regardless of whether he is deciding a motion for either summary
judgment or a directed verdict, to assess whether the party opposing the
motion has a minimally viable and plausible case. The only "weighing" that
the Court meant to forbid in Anderson is the type of comparison one might
do in the proverbial scales of justice to decide which of two plausible cases
is comparatively stronger. Although this is contrary to the reading of And-
erson that has been universally accepted by the lower courts for almost a
decade, I guarantee that the Court will confirm I am right the first time
someone invites them to do so.146
N. What Evidence Must a Judge "Believe" When
Ruling on a Summary Judgment Motion?
A. The Traditional Answer
There is an old story, perhaps apocryphal, of a newly appointed federal
district judge who received the following instructions on summary judgment
procedure from a senior member of the bench:
"Let's consider your age to begin with - how old are you?"
"I'm seven and a half, exactly "
144. Id. at 251 (quoting Improvement Co. v Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448
(1871)).
145. Enlow v Tishomingo County, Miss., 45 F.3d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1995); accord
Stockstill v Shell Oil Co., 3 F.3d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1307
(1994); Hinds v General Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1045 (10th Cir. 1993); Davis v
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 967 F.2d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
146. I am confident enough to make this standing offer: If you cite this Article in a brief
to the Supreme Court and the Court tells you I am wrong about this point, I will personally
reimburse your printing expenses for that portion of the brief if you and your client have a
combined net worth that is less than mine. (Offer also good for pro se litigants, but void
where prohibited by local laws against games of chance.)
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"You needn't say 'exactually,"' the Queen remarked. "I can believe it
without that. Now I'll give you something to believe. I'm just one
hundred and one, five months and a day"
"I can't believe that!" said Alice.
"Can't you?" the Queen said in a pitying tone. "Try again: draw a long
breath, and shut your eyes."
Alice laughed. "There's no use trying," she said: "one can't believe
impossible things."
"I daresay you haven't had much practice," said the Queen. "When I was
your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a day Why, sometimes I've
believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast. "147
Although it may only be a comcidence,i 1 this supposedly absurd account
bears a striking resemblance to what the Supreme Court has been telling
federal judges to do for years when confronted by summary judgment
motions.
The genesis of this confusing judicial nonsense lies in a single unfortu-
nate line from the Anderson opinion, which has proven to be one of the
most permcious and widely cited mistakes ever made by the Court. When
a motion for summary judgment is decided, the Court said, "[tihe evidence
of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.' 149 Prior to that time, the lower courts generally agreed
that there was no such requirement and that a federal judge was authorized
to determine whether an opposing party's affidavit was at least arguably
worthy of belief.I"° Although the Court cited no authority that supported
147 LEwIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND
AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 251 (Bramhall House 1960).
148. Summary judgment statutes were first enacted m several American states m the late
1800s, and the first recorded federal case revoking the procedure was decided m 1876.
Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 446. The passage quoted here from Alice's hypothetical
visit to the Federal Judicial Center was first written and published just five years earlier in
1871.
149. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (emphasis added). It
is noteworthy that this sentence about "believing" one side's evidence immediately follows
a sentence m which the Court claimed that "the weighing of evidence" is not allowed on the
motion. Id. This is certainly an important reason why so many commentators and lower
courts have mistakenly reached the erroneous conclusion that they are not permitted to
engage m even the most rudimentary assessment of the probative value of either side's case.
See supra part II.
150. Long before Anderson, lower courts had uniformly held that evidence submitted by
the opposing party was not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact and defeat summary
judgment if it was "too incredible to be accepted by reasonable minds." 6 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 68, 56.15[4], at 56-295 nn.42-47 & 52 (collecting more than two dozen cases
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this remarkable and unprecedented requirement that the nonmovant's evi-
dence must be "believed,"'' this single line has been uncritically accepted
as gospel around the nation. Indeed, this line is part of the same passage
that one prominent group of authorities hailed as "an unambiguous and con-
ventional statement" that "should present no difficulty for judges confronted
with a dispute over historical facts. "1'2 That newly minted rule was not
questioned by either of the dissenting opinions in the case" and has been
cited repeatedly and followed by the Court in subsequent cases - in
opinions joined by a total of thirteen different Justices. " This rule also has
been quoted m literally hundreds of lower court opinions, even to this
decided prior to 1976, more than 10 years before Anderson was decided). As it happens, I
fully believe that this remains an accurate statement of the law, for reasons outlined below.
But Professor Moore's current "explanation" of this statement, which is taken verbatim from
his first edition, consists merely of citations to several dozen reported cases all decided more
than 10 years before the Supreme Court's announcement m Anderson that the nonmoving
party's evidence must be believed. Professor Moore does not cite one case decided since
Anderson upholding the supposed right of a federal judge to reject opposing affidavits as
"incredible," and the lower courts almost unanimously have assumed that there is no longer
such power, as I note below. See infra notes 155, 161, 177-95. With all due respect, the
value of this statement of the law by Professor Moore (although still accurate m my view) is
compromised severely by his failure to reconcile it with what the lower courts have con-
sistently stated in the decade since Anderson was decided. I attempt to offer that reconcilia-
tion here.
151. Not one word in the text or Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 56 states or implies
that the judge must "believe" anything. The only case cited by Justice White for this prop-
osition, Adickes v S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), did not state that the district
judge is required to "believe" anything, but only that the "inferences to be drawn' from the
evidence must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id.
at 158-59 (quoting United States v Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). That is not
the same thing as "believing" either side's evidence, as this Article will demonstrate. The
question of why the Supreme Court would say something so mistaken for so long is Important
but a bit complicated; it is dealt with below. See infra part IH.C. It will suffice for now to
show both why the Court's statement is wrong and the horrible confusion it has caused in the
lower courts.
152. Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 487
153. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 268-73 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
154. E.g., Reves v Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1175 n.3 (1993) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2077
(1992); Palmer v BRG, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 n.5 (1990); see also McKennon v Nashville
Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 883 (1995) (noting that "summary judgment
procedures require us to assume" truth of plaintiff's claims when deciding defendant's
summary judgment motion); Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)
(affidavits of opposing party "for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to
be true").
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day, 155 as well as many leading reference works on summary judgment and
civil procedure.156 It is now about as "well-settled" as anything ever written
about summary judgment.
Despite the unquestioned acceptance with which lower courts and
academic commentators have embraced the rule that the nonmoving party's
evidence must be "believed," the suggestion is both wrong and non-
sensical."s At least m theory, the rule might be plausible m a case like
Anderson, where only one side was moving for summary judgment. But m
the common situation where two or more parties file cross-motions for
summary judgment and submit conflicting and flatly inconsistent affidavits,
what is the judge supposed to do? Believe two mutually exclusive stones?
Or perhaps take turns believing one thing and then believing the opposite
when ruling on the cross-motion? Obviously, none of this corresponds with
what any of us would normally describe as "believing."'5" If the district
155. As of December 1995, a Westlaw search revealed that Anderson has been cited for
this proposition over 100 tunes by the United States courts of appeals alone - not to mention
the innumerable district court opinions that have done the same. Indeed, just within the past
year alone, almost every circuit court of appeals has cited Anderson or its progeny for the
"rule" that the evidence of the nonmovmg party must be "believed." See, e.g., Underwager
v Channel 9 Australia, 69 F.3d 361, 368 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995); Allied Colloids, Inc., v
American Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Rolsereen Co. v Pella
Prods., 64 F.3d 1202, 1211 (8th Cir. 1995); Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1545 (10th Cir. 1995),
cert. dented, No. 95-587, 1995 WL 625402 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1996); Willis v Roche Biomedical
Lab., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995); Amirmokn v Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 60
F.3d 1126, 1134 n.3 (4th Cir. 1995); Romstadt v Allstate Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 608, 610 (6th
Cir. 1995); Semco, Inc. v Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1995); Tabas v Tabas,
47 F.3d 1280, 1287 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2269 (1995). Other circuits also have
cited this supposed rule in the very recent past. E.g., Goldman v Bequai, 19 F.3d 666, 669
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Derrico v Bungee Int'l Mfg. Co., 989 F.2d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 1993);
Velten v Regis B. Lippert, Intercat, Inc., 985 F.2d 1515, 1523 (11th Cir. 1993); Rogers v
Fair, 902 F.2d 140, 143 (1st Cir. 1990).
156. E.g., Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 487
157 In addition to other more substantial problems noted below, Justice White's choice
of words exhibits less than ideal clarity when he said that a judge must believe the evidence
of "the non-movant." That may be an accurate designation of the appropriate party if there
are only two parties in the case and only one moves for summary judgment. But there may
be more than one "non-movant" in multiparty litigation (some of whom may file papers in
support of the motion), and surely the Court did not mean to require all such evidence to be
accepted as true. Or there may be no "non-movants" at all, in the common case where both
parties file cross-motions. For the sake of analytical clarity, it is more accuratd to refer to
the "adverse party" or the "party opposing the motion," just as the Rule does. See FED. R.
Civ P 56(c), (e), (f).
158. Try this little epistemological test on your spouse over breakfast: "Honey, you've
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judge has an unusually heavy motions calendar in the early morning, a
literal application of this rule might very well require him to believe as
many as six impossible things before breakfast!" 9
Naturally, many will be quick to respond to the absurdity of this
suggestion by observing that the Supreme Court's poorly chosen phrase was
not meant to be taken literally and that what the Court obviously meant to
say was that the district judge must assume the truth of any evidence
submitted by the opposing party " Although that is not the same as
"believing," of course, that is precisely how most lower courts and com-
mentators have uniformly interpreted the district judge's duty under Ander-
son. " ' This refinement at least has the important advantage of being
got to believe me - of course I believe you when you say that you clean the house while I
am at the office. But I also believe the kids when I talk to them and they tell me that you
don't." Don't be surprised if he throws something at you because you will deserve it for
talking such nonsense.
159. The very idea calls to mind the suggestion of the young trial lawyer who told his
sweetheart, just a few years after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"Faith is believing in things when common sense tells you not to." MIRACLF ON 34TH
STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1947). Although the film does not indicate exactly where
he got that idea, it is probably safe to assume that he had recently argued a motion for
summary judgment m federal court.
160. Or perhaps, some might say, the judge should "pretend to believe" that evidence -
but even that would not be an accurate description of what a judge is doing when denying
summary judgment. No lawyer who reads the decision is fooled into thinking that the judge
is actually indicating what he believes, and no judge expects them to think so.
161. Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 479 ("Because credibility is not an issue on
summary judgment, the nonmovant's evidence must be accepted as true for purposes of the
motion."); see also Johnson v Multnomah County, Or., 48 F.3d 420, 427 (9th Cir.) ("[W]e
presume for the purposes of summary judgment that Johnson's allegations were true. "),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2616 (1995); Lam v University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th
Cir. 1994) ("We accept as true for purposes of summary judgment" adverse party's
allegations of fact); Fuller v Vines, 36 F.3d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We must accept the
[plaintiffs'] portrayal of the facts as set forth m the sworn affidavits as true."), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1361 (1995); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 23 (2d
Cir. 1994) (noting that adverse party's allegations "must be taken as true"); Adams v
Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that direct evidence presented by adverse
party "must be accepted as true"); Knox v Lederle Lab., 4 F.3d 875, 880 (10th Cir. 1993)
(noting that "evidence of non-movant [is] to be taken as true on summary judgment");
Jackson v Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1238 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Because we are reviewing a
summary judgment motion we accept Jackson's allegations as true."); McLaughlin v Liu,
849 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that party opposing summary judgment "is
clearly entitled under Anderson" to have his affidavit "taken as true"); Eisenberg v Ins. Co.
of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "the non-moving party's evi-
dence is to be taken as true"); Bushman v Halm, 798 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 1986) ("Plain-
tiffs allegations as to the accident and attendant injuries must be taken as true, even if m
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coherent, but it is still a seriously erroneous description of a judge's
responsibility under the rules. In fact, as we shall see, a judge ruling on a
motion for summary judgment need not, and should not, assume the truth of
(much less "believe") anything he reads m the affidavits or evidence of
either party
Although this point has not been noticed previously, it really should
have been more obvious than it has been. Even within the Anderson opinion
itself, remember, Justice White stated that summary judgment may be
denied if the opposing party's evidence is "merely colorable or is not sig-
nificantly probative"'62 or if it is "of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow
a rational finder of fact" to find in favor of that party 163 Likewise, the
Advisory Committee has expressly urged trial judges to "assess the proof"
of the opposing party, in part to weed out those cases where that party "pro-
duces some [evidence] but not enough" to get to trial. 64 More recently, the
Court also has said in dictum that "[s]ome improbable allegations might
properly be disposed of on summary judgment."'6  At least m a great
number of cases, it obviously will be impossible for a judge to discharge
any of these responsibilities if he categorically assumes the truth of every-
thing the opposing party says in an affidavit, no matter how absurd or
implausible it may be. 'I
Despite all these points, lower courts and commentators have labored
under the terribly mistaken view that Anderson compels a judge to place
unconditional faith m the truth of any direct evidence submitted by the
opposing party on a historical fact - such as the statement of an alleged
eyewitness in an affidavit - no matter how implausible or unbelievable it
conflict with those of the moving party."). The Supreme Court itself evidently has embraced
this standard m its most recent comments on summary judgment procedure; it has stated that
the affidavits of the opposing party "for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be
taken to be true." Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
162. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 254.
164. 1963 amendment to FED. R. Civ P 56(e) advisory committee's note.
165. Denton v Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992). The implications of this
interesting dictum for our discussion are analyzed more fully infra part III.B.
166. Some might counter this demonstration by urging that a judge's duty is to "assume
the truth" of the opposing party's affidavits unless the judge decides that those affidavits are
not "significantly probative enough" to be believed. That sort of procedure is not even
remotely analogous to what logicians and scientists do when they assume the truth of some
proposition or take something as a given for the sake of argument (much less what anyone
would normally mean by "believing" a statement). Besides, that is not the way the lower
courts have interpreted their obligations under Anderson. See cases cited infra notes 177-95.
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might be. 167 This view, which would be compelled by a literal reading of
the direction to "believe" such evidence, is reinforced also by the Supreme
Court's statement in that same opmnon that a judge ruling on summary
judgment cannot make "[c]redibility determinations." " This error has, in
turn, led most observers to make a series of related mistakes about summary
judgment. Most notably, it has caused them to give an unduly cramped
reading to the significance of the Supreme Court's holding in Matsushita -
a case that ultimately will be recognized as a major landmark in summary
judgment jurisprudence although it has been distinguished and limited
almost to the point of oblivion by lower courts and academic observers.
169
In that antitrust case, decided only three months before Anderson, the
Court held that parties seeking to survive summary judgment must "come
forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would
otherwise be necessary" if the "factual context renders [their] claim
implausible."170 In making this statement, the Supreme Court, of course,
was doing nothing more than following well-settled principles applicable to
all summary judgment motions, which require a judge to assess the adverse
167 This nearly universal tendency among the lower courts is, unfortunately, only
further supported by a literal reading of the Court's subsequent dictum that "[ifn ruling upon
a Rule 56 motion, 'a District Court must resolve any factual issues of controversy m favor
of the non-moving party' only m the sense that, where the facts specifically averred by that
party contradict facts specifically averred by the movant, the motion must be denied." Lujan
v National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (dictum) (emphasis added). As it
happens, however, no court has given this quotation a literal reading because they universally
have assumed that such a conflict would not necessarily prevent summary judgment when the
opposing party specifically avers facts that constitute only circumstantial evidence. See cases
cited infra notes 177-95.
168. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Then again, the
Court also has said in dictum - both before and after it decided Anderson - that "a district
court generally cannot grant summary judgment based on its assessment of the credibility of
the evidence presented." Schlup v Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 869 (1995) (emphasis added)
(quoting Agosto v INS, 436 U.S. 748, 756 (1978)). That language certainly seems to
suggest there is room for an occasional exception although the Supreme Court has not yet
explicitly said so.
169. This situation is, fortunately, only temporary When the points made m this Article
ultimately become accepted as commonplace, as they inevitably will, the Matsushita decision
will be recognized as setting a standard that governs all summary judgment motions.
170. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(emphasis added). The full quote goes on to say that more persuasive evidence may be
required "if the factual context renders respondent's claim implausible - if the claim is one
that simply makes no economic sense." Id. This last phrase unfortunately has induced many
to reach the mistaken conclusion that this line of the opinion is possibly limited to antitrust
cases and perhaps other comparable forms of commercial litigation. See infra notes 172-73.
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party's proof to determine if it is substantial enough to possibly support a
jury verdict in his favor.17'
Unfortunately, ths very natural and inportant reading of Matsushita
(and the other lines cited above) has been tenaciously resisted in literally
every quarter of the legal world, which insists that the case simply cannot
mean what it rather plainly seems to say 7 That reading is utterly mcon-
ceivable to all those who labor under the universal (but profoundly mis-
taken) view that a judge must assume the truth of the adverse party's
evidence and cannot assess its weight in any way Consequently, a veritable
chorus of analysts has risen up, all crying out with one voice that Matsushita
must be limited somehow to the special case of a judge asked to draw
inferences from circumstantial evidence - and perhaps limited even further
to antitrust cases'73 - but does not permit a judge under any circumstances
_q
171. See supra notes 109-15 and discussion supra part II. Only two sentences earlier m
the same opinion, the Supreme Court had quoted the Advisory Committee Note stating that
the purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and assess the proof."
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 That is exactly why the Court correctly perceived that it has
the authority to make at least a rudimentary assessment of whether the nonmoving party's
claims are facially "implausible." Id.
172. See Schwarzer et al:, supra note 13, at 491 ("Some language m Matsushita
suggests that summary judgment is appropriate where a plaintiff's case rests on 'implausible'
inferences. Courts should use care in accepting this language at face value when ruling on
summary judgment motions.").
173. It frequently has been suggested that Matsushita might authorize a judge to inquire
into the "plausibility" of a party's circumstantial evidence only m antitrust cases. E.g.,
Williams v Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Matsu-
shita's principles arguably apply only to summary judgment motions m antitrust cases.").
The continued persistence of that suggestion is remarkable because the Supreme Court
explicitly has declared that the "requirement in Matsushita that the plaintiffs' claims make
economic sense did not introduce a special burden on plaintiffs facing summary judgment in
antitrust cases." Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072,
2083 (1992). The Court added that Matsushita's demand "that the nonmovmg party's infer-
ences be reasonable in order to reach the jury [was] a requirement that was not invented, but
merely articulated, m that decision," id., and the Court underscored the point by citing the
Anderson opinion, a libel suit that did not involve antitrust law at all. Id. at 2083 n.14.
Incredibly, despite these explicit disclaimers by the Court in Kodak, many commentators and
courts continue to insist that the logic of Matsushita must be limited to antitrust cases. E.g.,
William W Schwarzer & Alan Hirsch, Summary Judgment After Eastman Kodak, 154
F.R.D. 311, 316 (1993) ("Matsushita, rather than making a statement about implausible
inferences in summary judgment motions generally, rests on a specific point of antitrust law
"). In one recent case, the Ninth Circuit even went so far as to suggest that the
"plausibility" inquiry authorized by Matsushita is permissible only in a narrow class of
cases - including antitrust cases, where "economic rationality might safely be presumed" -
and therefore does not apply to the assessment of even circumstantial evidence m a case
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to assess the plausibility of factual claims supported by direct evidence of a
historical fact,174 such as a sworn affidavit from an alleged eyewitness to the
color of a traffic light."~ Under this view, it has been said that a judge may
grant summary judgment rejecting a claim based on her conclusion that it is
an implausible inference from the facts but may never reject direct evidence
of a claim about historical fact on the grounds that it is implausible or
unbelievable. 76 Only in this way, it is generally thought, can Matsushita be
reconciled with the teachings of Anderson and the constitutionally protected
province of the jury
This limited reading of Matsushita has been embraced by at least three
circuit courts of appeals. In the first of these three cases, Leonard v Dixie
Well Service & Supply, Inc.,l11 the district judge granted summary judgment
after rejecting the plaintiff's recollections about work assignments that were
contradicted by the employer's detailed work records.17 1 After giving pas-
sing lip service to %the Supreme Court's direction that "more persuasive
evidence" might be required of parties making an "implausible" claim,'79 the
Umted States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit then quoted the holding
in Anderson that the evidence of the opposing party must be "believed.o180
In attempting to reconcile the holdings of those two cases, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that a district judge's, power to assess the persuasiveness of evi-
charging discrimination under Title VII, which "involves a very different kind of motiva-
tion." Lam v University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 n.22 (9th Cir. 1994).
174. Under the traditional definition, direct (as opposed to circumstantial) evidence "is
evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter m issue." 1 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 21, § 185, at 339. The testimony of an alleged eyewitness is the classic example.
175. This view has been defended with remarkable diligence and tenacity, considering
that it apparently has never been criticized before today. E.g., WILLIAM D. QUARLES ET
AL., SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONS: DiSPOSIVE MOTIONS AND SUMMARY TRIALS § 5.14, at 118
(1991); Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material
Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV 770, 781-82 (1988); Schwarzer & Hirsch,
supra note 173, at 327-28; Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 491, Daniel P Collins, Note,
Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40 STAN. L. REy 491, 493-96 (1988).
This unanmous scholarly consensus has been swallowed by most circuit courts to consider
these issues. See cases and authorities cited infra notes 177-95.
176. See cases cited infra notes 177-95.
177 828 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1987).
178. See Leonard v Dixie Well Serv & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir.
1987). 1
179 Id. at 294 & n.7 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
180. Id. at 294 n.ll.
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dence is limited to "discount[ing] such evidence as unspecific or immaterial,
but not as unbelievable."181
The Fifth Circuit's reasoning was adopted the next year by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In McLaughlin v Liu,"m the
Government brought an action against Liu for failing to make overtime
payments to Ins employees as required by federal law 18 In support of
its motion for summary judgment, the Government put forward an unpres-
sive array of undisputed factual evidence which, although circumstantial,
gave rise to at least a colorable argument that Liu's story was literally
incredible,8" and the district court granted the motion." The Ninth Circuit
reversed solely because Liu filed an affidavit claiming to have made the
payments." Citing the Anderson opuuon's direction that the nonmovant's
evidence must be "believed"'" and a law review note that argued that "[a]
conflict of direct evidence concerning a material historical fact may never be
settled by the judge on a motion for summary judgment,"'"3 the Ninth
Circuit held that a district judge has no power under Rule 56 to even
entertain an argument that the sworn story of an alleged eyewitness is
implausible or unbelievable."9 In a more recent case, that same circuit has
taken this reasoning to its logical conclusion and has gone so far as to hold
that summary judgment may not be granted m the face of conflicting
affidavits, even if the district judge believes that the facts of some claim
181. Id. at294.
182. 849 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1988).
183. See McLaughlin v Liu, 849 F.2d 1205, 1206 (9th Cir. 1988).
184. Although he had destroyed his financial records m violation of federal law, Liu
claimed that he always did make such payments, except for a limited two-week span of time
when he inexplicably claimed to have adopted a different pay computation practice on the
casual advice of a friend - the exact same two-week period when the Government had
obtained copies of his financial records (funny coincidence!) - and even that he did not
admit until he learned that the Government had the goods on him for those two weeks. Id.
at 1207 n.5. Even the court of appeals, in a masterpiece of understatement, acknowledged
that these facts cast "doubt" on Liu's claims. Id.
185. Id. at 1206.
186. See id. at 1209.
187 Id. at 1208 (citing Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
188. Id. at 1209 n.9 (emphasis added) (citing Collins, supra note 175, at 494-95).
189. See id. at 1207-09 (holding that judge has no power to reject direct evidence as
"implausible" or "unbelievable"). This case is still good law in the Ninth Circuit. See Lam
v University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The rule established m
Matsushita pertains only to the plausibility of inferences drawn from circumstantial
evidence."); Cassidy v United States, 875 F Supp. 1438, 1446 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
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descend "to the level of the irrational or the wholly mcredible." 190 Although
this position is indeed extreme and in fact erroneous, it must be conceded
that no other result would be faithful to a literal reading of the Supreme
Court's repeated directions that the evidence of the party opposing summary
judgment "is to be believed."
Likewise, in Adams v Metiva,191 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed a summary judgment that had been granted by
a district judge who had supposedly made the mistake of thinking that he
had "at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is
plausible."" The court of appeals disagreed with the district judge and
agreed instead with the Ninth Circuit that "the trial court may only inquire
into the plausibility of circumstantial evidence, and that when the non-
moving party presents direct evidence refuting the moving party's motion
for summary judgment, the court must accept that evidence as true. "1 The
court reasoned that this result was compelled by the Supreme Court's direc-
tion that "[t]he judge may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence. "9
Other circuits have not gone quite as far as these three but have taken
compromise positions that lead to even more incongruous and inconsistent
results. For example, following the Supreme Court's lead, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated for years that the
affidavits and other evidence of the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment "must be taken as true.""195 Yet that same court evidently has
190. Bator v Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Denton v Her-
nandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992)). The quotation here is taken from the test m Denton
for dismissals of m forma pauperis complaints as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)
(1988). The Ninth Court expressly declined to accept such grounds as a basis for "summary
judgment dismissals, where the district court cannot assess credibility " Bator, 39 F.3d at
1026. The Court went so far as to say that summary judgment may not be granted even
where the facts alleged were apparently "fantastic." Id. at 1026 n.6.
191. 31 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 1994).
192. Adams v Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (quoting
opinion of district judge).
193. Id. (emphasis added) (citing and distinguishing Matsushita).
194. Id. at 379 (citing Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
Not having seen the actual record in this case or m McLaughlin, I do not take any position
as to whether summary judgment should have been denied, but I am most defimtely
criticizing the methodological approach used to reach that conclusion by those courts of
appeals.
195. See lacobelli Constr., Inc. v County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1994).
It is noteworthy that the panel that decided lacobelli included Judges Pratt and Feinberg, who
were two of the three judges who had decided United States v 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897
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adopted a different rule to deal with the recurring frustration posed by
defendants in civil forfeiture actions who make outrageous and unbelievable
claims under oath to prevent (or at least postpone) the seizure of their homes
and other assets. For example, in two different cases, female defendants
sought to oppose summary judgment by filing sworn affidavits denying any
knowledge that their husbands were using their homes for storing or traf-
ficking in illegal drugs despite circumstantial evidence that cast such denials
into great doubt. " Such sworn denials, of course, constitute direct (not cir-
cumstantial) evidence based upon personal knowledge and comply in every
detail with the requirements for opposing affidavits set forth in Rule 56(e).
Nevertheless, without even mentioning its supposed "rule" that the evidence
of the nonmoving party "must be believed," the Second Circuit held in both
cases that such sworn statements may be disbelieved and rejected by the
court if they are "untenable" in light of extensive drug paraphernalia or cash
found in the home. " That approach might strike some as a satisfying
response to the common problem of lying forfeiture defendants, but it is
totally mconsistent with the Second Circuit's holdings in all other summary
judgment contexts, where the court has paid lip service to the supposed rule
that sworn statements by the nonmoving party must be "believed."
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has been guilty of the same flagrant
inconsistency In civil forfeiture proceedings, that circuit has followed the
Second Circuit in holding that a sworn denial that the defendant knew about
drugs being used by her husband in their home will not defeat summary
judgment if it is thoroughly "impeached" or "incredible. "' 98 Yet in other
F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1990), discussed infra at notes 196-97
196. See United States v 755 Forest Rd., 985 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1993); 15 Black Ledge
Drive, 897 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1990).
197 See 755 Forest Rd., 985 F.2d at 71, 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d at 102. In
support of its conclusion that summary judgment might be granted where affidavits con-
cernmg "state of mind" are incredible and untenable, the Second Circuit cited its own prior
holding in Quarles v General Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985). See 15
Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d at 102-03 (citing Quarles). That reliance was completely
misplaced, however, because Quarles affirmed the dismissal of a racial discrimination charge
despite the sworn allegations of the plaintiff about the allegedly discriminatory mental state
of the defendant, of which the plaintiff obviously had no direct personal knowledge. See
Quares, 758 F.2d at 840; see also FED. R. Civ P 56(e) (requiring all affidavits to be made
on personal knowledge). That is almost the opposite of what the court did in 15 Black Ledge
Drive, when it rejected a woman's sworn statements about her own knowledge and mental
state, despite the fact that the moving party (the Government) had no direct evidence to the
contrary, nor any evidence by anyone with personal knowledge of her mental state! See 15
BlackLedge Dnve, 897 F.2d at 101-03.
198. See United States v 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 533, 534 (3d Cir. 1993).
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contexts, the Third Circuit has said, in complete contradiction, that the
sworn allegation of a party opposing summary judgment "is to be be-
lieved." 1" And to top it all off, the Third Circuit has cited the Supreme
Court's opinion m Anderson to justify both so-called "rules" 1 Thus has
that Court unwittingly fulfilled the prophetic warning of one observer that
someone easily could be tempted to "cite Anderson's dicta for completely
repugnant propositions. "I'
To summarize, under the prevailing view embraced by virtually every
commentator and now accepted by every court of appeals to squarely
address the issue, the Supreme Court's holding in Matsushita authorizes a
federal judge to reject a party's claims as "implausible" only if they involve
proposed inferences from circumstantial evidence but never if they are
supported by direct evidence - such as a sworn statement of an alleged
eyewitness - no matter how incredible or unbelievable it mght seem
(unless perhaps the witness is the defendant in a civil forfeiture proceeding).
This commonly accepted reading of Matsushita, like much of what is
written these days about summary judgment, is both incoherent and wrong.
It is incoherent because tis supposed distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence has no basis in the way such evidence is handled at
trial,' in the traditional division of powers between the American judge and
jury, or in the language of Anderson, which held that a judge ruling on a
motion for summary judgment must let the jury handle "[c]redibility deter-
199. See Tabas v Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1287 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2269
(1995).
200. See id. (quoting Anderson for rule that judge must "believe" opposing party's
evidence); 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d at 533 (citing Anderson for rule that judge must
decide whether opposing party's evidence could "be credited by a rational juror").
201. Mullenix, supra note 108, at 462.
202. The Supreme Court itself has made it clear that the probative value of circumstan-
tial evidence "is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence," Holland v United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954), and such evidence sometimes can be "more certain, satis-
fying, and persuasive than direct evidence." Michalic v Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S.
325, 330 (1960). In fact, that is exactly what we routinely tell juries m federal court. See
COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DIsTRIcr JUDGES ASSOCIATION,
SIXTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS Instr. 1.06 committee commentary
1.06 (1991) ("The purpose of this instruction is to define direct and circumstantial evidence,
to make clear that the jury should consider both kinds of evidence, and to dispel the tele-
vision notion that circumstantial evidence is inherently unreliable."). As one judge correctly
observed, "direct evidence can consist of something as incredible and unreliable as the testi-
mony of a convicted perjurer who asserts that the defendant confessed his intent and motive
to hun." Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 6 F.3d 789, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Edwards, J., dissenting),
vacated on other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995).
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minations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferencesfrom the facts. 'I Nobody has explained why a iudge should be
allowed to take a case away from a jury based upon hIs rejection of an
utterly implausible inference but never based upon his rejection of a totally
implausible claim about a lustorical fact. Either ruling poses equal "threat"
to the province of the jurors, who will both decide witness credibility and
draw inferences from circumstantial evidence if we let them get the case.
Tus common reading of Matsushita suffers from another major flaw as
well: It is also patently inconsistent with what those same circuit courts have
said in another, closely analogous context. In deciding what sorts of allega-
tions or evidence may be reasonably required of a plaintiff seeking to defeat
a summary judgment motion based upon the defense of qualified immunity,
the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits (among others) have explicitly rejected
the suggestion that the plaintiff must produce direct rather than circumstan-
tial evidence. All three circuits have correctly reasoned that it would be
irrational and unfair to permit such an arbitrary distinction to determine
whether a case could survive summary judgment.21 Yet outside the context
of qualified immunity, those same circuits have tried to reconcile Anderson
and Matsushita by adopting a rule that provides that the ability of an "im-
plausible" claim to survive summary judgment turns entirely on whether the
claim is supported by direct or circumstantial evidence!ff This is typical of
the inconsistency that is rampant in our so-called "understanding" of sum-
mary judgment.
Besides, even if the logic of Matsushita were artificially limited to
circumstantial evidence cases, as everyone insists, none of these academic
commentators or lower courts has yet explained what we are to make of that
opimon's direction that judges faced with implausible claims must ask that
party to produce not merely more evidence, but "more persuasive evi-
dence. "' If a judge is categorically barred from assessing the strength of
203. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (emphasis added).
204. See Tompkins v Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Circumstantial evi-
dence is equally as probative as direct evidence m proving illegitimate intent."); Branch v
Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1991); Crutcher v Kentucky, 883 F.2d 502, 504
(6th Cir. 1989); see also Fowler v Smith, 68 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1995); Elliott v
Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991) ("ITihere is no principled difference between
direct and circumstantial evidence."). The Supreme Court recently heard argument on
whether such a distinction might be proper in the qualified immunity context but disposed of
the appeal on other grounds. Kimberlin v Quinlan, 115 S. Ct. 2552 (1995).
205. See cases cited supra notes 177-94.
206. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 578 (1986)
(emphasis added).
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evidence on a summary judgment motion, as so many have insisted for so
long, then how on earth could the judge determine what evidence is "more
persuasive" 9 The very idea is absurd. There is a very simple reason why
the prevailing reading of Matsushita is so incoherent: because it is wrong.
B. The Truth of the Matter
As the foregoing review makes plain, our law governing summary
judgment is in a state of profound disarray and incoherence. The depth of
the analytical problem and the proper route out of this mess are probably
best illustrated by considering a common hypothetical scenario. Among the
Greek chorus of voices crying out to federal judges that they can never
reject a factual claim as implausible if it is supported by some direct evi-
dence, academic commentators have frequently used an automobile collision
as the paradigmatic example of the supposedly "summary judgment-proof"
case.' One of the most prominent authorities on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure even went so far as to make this claim:
Whenever one party moves for summary judgment with sufficient
supporting materials, the opposing party will always be able to defeat the
motion by putting m direct evidentiary material supporting its side of the
case. Thus if a defendant, who is charged with negligently driving into
the plaintiff, moves on the basis of an affidavit that he was not driving at
the time m question, plaintiff can defeat the motion with his own affidavit
that he saw the defendant operating the car when the accident occurred.
It makes no difference how strong a case the defendant presents.
207 See, e.g., QUARLEs ET AL.., supra note 175, § 5.14, at 118 ("When judges are
confronted with conflicting assertions of historical fact, for example, plaintiff's witness
asserts that the light was red, while defendant's witness is equally adamant that the light was
green, there is an issue of material fact that may not properly be resolved on summary
judgment."); Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 487 ("[W]hen the dispute is over which
driver entered the intersection first, conflicting testimony will normally raise a genuine
dispute. In such cases, a bare denial under oath (even if impeached) suffices to preclude
summary judgment."); Collins, supra note 175, at 494 ("Thus, a witness' claim that 'I saw
the light, and it was green' necessarily implies that the light was, in fact, green provided the
witness is speaking honestly and recalling correctly. Since direct evidence concerning a
historical fact therefore hinges on the witness' credibility and cognitive abilities, a true
conflict concerning such evidence is exclusively within the province of the jury and may not
be removed from its consideration by the judge without violating the seventh amendment.").
In an actual automobile collision case, one federal court of appeals held shortly after
Anderson that "[p]lamtiff's allegations as to the accident and attendant injuries must be taken
as true, even if in conflict with those of the moving party." Bushman v Halm, 798 F.2d
651, 656 (3d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
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The court must assume, for purposes of the motion, that a trier of fact
would not believe any of the moving party's witnesses.2
Admittedly, this analysis of current law is universally accepted, °9 but
it is nonsense. Let us take a moment to consider just how strong the defend-
ant's case might be. Suppose that the defendant, who happens to be the
incumbent President of the United States, supplies his sworn affidavit that
he was being inaugurated at the Capitol at the very moment of the plaintiff's
unfortunate car accident, which allegedly took place m Hawaii. The defend-
ant further submits supporting affidavits from three dozen "alibi witnesses"
who were with him on the platform at the swearng-m ceremony, including
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (who administered the oath of
office), the Pope (who said the blessing), and the entire reunited cast of
Fleetwood Mac. The defendant also supplies the Court with duly authenti-
cated films of the ceremony, taken by every major news network, and sup-
porting affidavits from the cameramen. Not persuaded yet? The President
also furmshes affidavits from eight of his personal physicians, complete with
authenticated x-rays, all attesting that he has been unable to drive and para-
lyzed below the waist because of childhood polio and a devastating spinal
injury twenty years ago so he could not be the man the plaintiff claims to
have seen driving a car that day on the island of Maui. 210 In response to all
this, the plaintiff offers nothing but his own coffee-stained handwritten
affidavit, wich states:
I don't know how the President could have fooled so many people into
thinking that he was in Washington or how he managed to get out of that
208. Friedenthal, supra note 175, at 781 (emphasis added). Dean Friedenthal goes on
to voice the standard view that a different result might obtain if the case involved circum-
stantial evidence. See id. at 781-87
209. See authorities cited supra note 207; see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 9.3, at 445 (2d ed. 1993) ("If, however, the responding party does produce
information contradicting that of the moving party , summary judgment must be denied
") (emphasis added); Collins, supra note 175, at 495 ("In summary, a conflict of direct
evidence concerning a material historical fact may never be settled by the judge on a motion
for summary judgment.") (emphasis added).
210. Still not satisfied that this case is ripe for summary judgment? We could go on.
What if the President also offers affidavits from the plantiff's physicians, who all attest that
he was undergoing extended surgery m Denver at the time and that he has been hospitalized
for severe mental health problems for 30 years? What if the plaintiff claims the accident
took place in a former lifetime or on the bridge between Hawaii and California in a blinding
snowstorm? And that he was smoking marijuana at the time but swears that he did not
inhale? There must come a point where even sworn statements of personal knowledge about
certain so-called historical "facts" are simply too implausible to defeat summary judgment.
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wheelchair and drive that car or who that Impostor was at the maugura-
tion. But I have seen the President on television at least three times, and
I know him when I see him, and, although I admit my eyesight ain't what
it used to be, I swear to God that he is the man who drove into my car m
Maul and then threatened to break my legs if he ever saw me around town
again. I know it was him because I was pretty drunk at the time and he
scared me so bad I sobered up real quick.
What result? Should the President's motion for summary judgment be
granted? If you believe everything you read m law reviews or decisions by
the courts of appeals, the answer is easy- Because the case involves a direct
conflict between alleged eyewitnesses over historical facts, the judge cannot
"weigh" the evidence and must "believe" the plaintiff's affidavit - or at
least assume its truth - and assume that the jury will not believe the defend-
ant or any of his witnesses. The plaintiff's claim obviously is implausible
and unbelievable, but we are told that cannot be a basis for rejecting his
sworn allegations of first-hand knowledge about historical facts. If we truly
believed this poor victim's remarkable story, after all - or at least assumed
its truth - he has got a very good case, perhaps even for punitive damages.
And so, under the conventional logic, the motion must be demed. But is
there really anyone mad enough to think this case should go to trial?2ii
Unfortunately, the absurd result sketched out here is not confined to the
pages of law reviews. Influenced by such writers, federal courts uniformly
have applied the same principles to real cases.212 But what is the proper
211. If summary judgment cannot be granted on such facts (assuming that the plaintiff
paid the required filing fee), it will go to trial because it obviously cannot be dismissed for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Motions made under
that rule "operate[ ] on the assumption that the factual allegations m the complaint are true"
and may not be granted "based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations."
Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989); accord Denton v Hernandez, 112 S. Ct.
1728, 1733 (1992) (noting that when making determination based solely on pleadings, court
is normally bound "to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations"). If the
plaintiff is proceeding m forna paupens, of course, the court has slightly broader authority
to dismiss the complaint as "frivolous," Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, but that power only applies
to plaintiffs who do not pay the filing fee. It gives a court no power to dismiss complaints
by paying plaintiffs or the frivolous and fantastic claims of the many lying defendants who
will say anything to save their necks and homes. See cases cited supra notes 195-99. A poor
litigant who is not paying filing fees and court costs "lacks an economic incentive to refrain
from filing frivolous [and] malicious" claims, Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, but in federal court
there are no fees required of lying defendants who wish to file frivolous defenses.
212. See cases cited supra notes 177-95. Ironically, under current law in most circuits,
summary judgment might be granted on the basis of such facts - but only if the plaintiff said
something ambiguous at his deposition that arguably contradicts or disproves his affidavit,
even if he insists under oath that his comments were not inconsistent, that his deposition
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answer9 In what principled way can a trial judge effectively safeguard the
plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to a jury and still remain faithful to his
obligation "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see
whether there is a genuine need for trial"2 3 and to the Supreme Court's
instruction to weed out cases where "the evidence presented m the opposing
affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity, 214 to permit a rational jury to
find in favor of the party opposing the motion? The answer is quite plain.
For starters, the judge must forget all that nonsense about "assuming
the truth" of the plaintiff's affidavit, much less "believing" it. In fact, as
noted above in Part I, the judge should not even be trying to decide what
happened in the past, much less considering the affidavit for its truth. The
judge should focus only on the future and ask himself only one question: "If
I assume that all of these witnesses - including the plaintiff himself -
would testify at trial just as they have in their affidavits, is there any way
this case could survive a motion for a directed verdict?1215 The answer to
that question, on the facts of our hypothetical Hawaiian lawsuit, is "no,"
and the motion for summary judgment must be granted. Without a trial, we
cannot say for sure if this man is lying, mistaken, or insane - but we do not
need a trial to know that he is wrong.216
testimony was misunderstood, or that he was confused when he said it, and even if he
demands that a jury resolve such disputes. This monstrous incongruity is discussed more
fully later in this Article. See infra part IV
213. 1963 amendment to FED. R. Civ. P 56(e) advisory committee's note.
214. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).
215. This procedure is suggested by the Advisory Committee's suggestion that the
"admissibility of depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits should be determined
as if the deponent, person answering interrogatories, or affiant were testifying m person."
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Prelirmnary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 149-50 (1991). In deciding this question,
of course, the court will assume that the afflants would be allowed to testify only to the facts
in their affidavits that would be admissible at trial. FED. R. Civ. P 56(e). The judge also
would make all reasonable allowances for the superior opportunity of the jury to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses, just as a court does when deciding a motion for a directed verdict
during the trial. In Anderson, the Supreme Court made it quite clear that the summary
judgment standard is designed to mirror the standard for a directed verdict and to intercept
those cases where "there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson,
477 U.S. at 250. In federal court, such motions have more recently been renamed as
motions for "Judgment as a Matter of Law." FED. R. Civ. P 50.
216. I am not so foolish as to suggest that no jury could possibly rule m his favor; the
modem jury has proven that it is quite capable of doing just about anything. See, e.g.,
United States v Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir. 1986) (involving Florida jurors
deciding crimmal tax charges that told anti-Semitic jokes about defendant and his witnesses
1579
52 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1523 (1995)
We live m an age of moral and epistemological relativism, and it is
fashionable to suggest that there is no "absolute truth."217 But that is false.
Outside of academia, there are a great number of hard facts that are "not
subject to reasonable dispute."218 These facts, which are the subject of
judicial notice,219 include those that are known generally by all sane
members of the community or those that can be verified through unmpeach-
and joked early m trial that they were "just going to hang him" because he was "a Jew");
Powell v Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So.2d 354, 355 n.2 (Fla. 1995) (describing behavior of all-
white Florida jury deciding personal injury clamis of black couple as including speculation
that couple's children were drug dealers, joking about "niggers," and comparing couple to
chimpanzees); Clyde Haberman, Color-Blind? Justice, Maybe, But Not Juries, N.Y TIMEs,
Nov 26, 1995, at 39 (describing jury that was bitterly deadlocked along racial lines over
whether to convict two minority defendants charged with violent crime against white victims,
after one black juror reportedly told another, "We have to stick together and protect our
boys"); Jurors Recommend 30,000-Year Sentence, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1994, at 29 (quoting
Oklahoma jury explanation that it recommended sentence of 300 centuries for convicted child
rapist "to send a message to the offender that we are not going to tolerate it" - evidenty m
case he proved to be slow learner); OuUa Board Verdict Spells Out a Mistrial, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 27, 1994, at 21-A ("A man jailed for life for a double murder has
won a retrial because four members of the jury used a ouija board to consult the spirit of one
of his alleged victims."). But a verdict based upon such factors would not be allowed to
stand, and a civil case cannot get to trial solely m the hopes that the jury might return an
irrational verdict on the basis of impermissible influences. See Schwarzer et al., supra note
13, at 476 n.193.
217 See, for example, Justice Blackmun's remarkable assertion that "arguably, there
are no certainties in science." Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786, 2795 (1993). To borrow a phrase from another member of the Court, that is precisely
the sort of "theory that only the most removed appellate court could love." Kyles v
Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1581 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As a matter of fact, even
those who talk that way really do not mean it. Justice Blackmun himself once complained m
another case that psychiatric predictions about future dangerousness at a man's capital
sentencing hearing were "probably wrong and certainly prejudicial" and would make "the
Eighth Amendment's well established requirement of individually focused sentencing a
certain loser." Barefoot v Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 929-35 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). More recently, Justice Blackmun warned that "the inevitability of factual,
legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants."
Callins v Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from demal of
certiorari) (emphasis added). The fact of the matter is that even the most ardent self-
professed skeptics are perfectly "certain" of at least one thing or another.
218. FED. R. EvID. 201(b); see DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)
("We hold these truths to be Self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.").
219. A court is entitled to rely on judicial notice when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 68, 56.11[9].
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able sources,' such as certain basic truths about geography, biology,
history, physics, mathematics, chemistry, and medicme." Anyone who
claims to have seen something inconsistent with those truths is either lying
or mistaken, and no jury will be permitted to find otherwise, regardless of
what that witness is willing to put m an affidavit. Even if the case were to
go to trial, the judge will not let a witness testify contrary to those funda-
mental truths.m
On a slightly lower plane of certainty, there are certain basic clais
that witnesses might make that are not provably false but are so wildly
implausible and unbelievable that no rational jury would be allowed to
return a verdict on the basis of such testimony ' These consist of clais
and defenses that "rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,
whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict
them," 24 and they are no rarity m federal courts.' For more than a
220. See FED. R. Evm. 201(b).
221. These would include, of course, "theories that are so firmly established as to have
attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermodynamics." Daubert v
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 n.11 (1993). For a typical list
of such facts, see any textbook surveying the case law applying the judicial notice rule.
E.g., WEISSENBERGER, supra note 10, § 201.9.
222. In a civil action, a federal judge who takes judicial notice instructs the jury that
they must take that fact as conclusive; the judge will not allow either party to offer the jury
evidence to the contrary. See FED. R. EviD. 201(g) advisory committee's note. It is curious
that this time-honored rule has not come under withering constitutional attack from the many
analysts who cry out that it would violate the Seventh Amendment to take part of a case away
from the jury under Rule 56 any time the objecting party clais to have direct contrary
evidence to a historical fact. See cases and authorities cited supra notes 172-95. That is
exactly what happens almost every time a federal judge takes conclusive judicial notice in a
civil case over someone's objection!
223. As noted above, one of the most common categories of such cases involves clais
asserted by defendants in civil forfeiture proceedings who are seeking to stave off summary
judgment by the Government m an effort to avoid (or at least postpone) the seizure of their
homes or other valuable assets. See United States v 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97,
99-102 (2d Cir. 1990) (involving defendant opposing summary seizure of her home who filed
affidavit denying any knowledge of her husband's extensive drug activities, even though
cocaine, drug paraphernalia, weapons, and large sums of cash were found throughout house);
see also cases cited supra notes 196-200. These claims are not too surprising because few
other litigants have as much to gain merely by avoiding summary judgment and postponing
the trial, even if they know they have no hope of winning at trial.
224. Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992).
225. Even the Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the abundance of claims in
federal court that are "clearly baseless," including those "describing fantastic or delusional
scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too familiar." Id. at 1728
(quoting Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)). "Moreover, indigent litigants
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century, our legal system has provided that a factual question will not reach
a jury "merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party
having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such character that it
would warrant the jury m finding a verdict m favor of that party "I The
judge cannot discharge that responsibility unless he is willing, when
necessary, to reject even the sworn claims of an eyewitness that are literally
incredible - even on a motion for summary judgment.'m
I am not suggesting, of course, that a judge is empowered to grant
summary judgment merely because she does not believe the affidavit of an
alleged eyewitness; that is clearly forbidden.' But that is not at all the
hardly corner the market on frivolous filings. We receive a fair share of frivolous filings
from paying litigants." In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 181 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting
on other grounds).
226. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) (quoting Improve-
ments Co. v Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1872)).
227 This conclusion does not presuppose any metaphysical view as to whether the
proverbial "laws of nature" can admit of occasional and unexpected deviations m the form
of "miracles," and I do not mean to imply that they cannot. For the sake of the present
discussion, it suffices to observe that our federal rules of procedure, as presently drafted,
tolerate a slight risk of occasional factual error for the sake of enhanced judicial efficiency
See FED. R. CIv P 1 ("These rules shall be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and mexpensive determination of every action."); FED. R. EviD. 102 ("These
rules shall be construed to secure fairess in administration [and] elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay "). Those rules, by design, knowingly run the risk that they
"inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights" because our
legal system is "designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the
particularized resolution of legal disputes." Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798-99 (1993) (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 702). For that
reason, even those who are unwilling to concede that anything is "absolutely certain," see
supra note 217, can readily agree that the demands of efficient judicial administration permit
us to take many factual propositions as being sufficiently established to serve as the basis for
summary judgment. If the mere metaphysical possibility of a miraculous suspension of the
ordinary "laws of nature" were sufficient to defeat summary judgment, the motion could
virtually never be granted and would lose much of its utility
228. Even at trial, with respect to the simple question of whether to admit an item of
evidence, "[flor a judge to exclude evidence because [s]he does not believe it has been
described as 'altogether atypical, extraordinary.'" FED. R. EviD. 801 advisory committee's
note (quoting James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule - A Benthamic View of
Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV L. REV 932, 947 (1962)); see
also An Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 154 F.R.D. 508, 534 (1994) (explain-
ing that one sentence of Rule 412 was eliminated because it "would appear to authorize a
trial judge to exclude evidence of past sexual conduct based upon the judge's belief that
such acts did not occur," thus raising "questions of invasion of the right to a jury trial").
Because a judge normally cannot exclude even a single item of testimony or evidence merely
because she personally does not believe it, it follows with even greater force that the judge
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same as a judge who grants summary judgment based upon her informed
professional assessment that the story is unbelievable; that is, that no
reasonable jury could accept such a claim in the face of all the available
evidence. This determination is the same type we routinely permit and
expect judges to make when ruling on motions for a directed verdict, in
taking judicial notice over a party's objection, or in deciding whether to
grant habeas corpus relief. 9 There is no sound reason why the exercise of
such power in the context of a summary judgment motion would pose any
greater insult to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
This conclusion, although unorthodox to the point of heresy, actually
is borne out by the Advisory Committee Notes as well. In 1963, Rule 56
was amended to severely limit the ability of an adverse party to survive
summary judgment merely by relying on the allegations of Ins pleading.
The standard explanation for that amendment is that the Committee sup-
posedly decided that pleadings ought to have no evidentiary value - but the
Committee actually gave an explanation that was much more subtle. In fact,
the Committee explained: "The amendment is not intended to derogate from
the solemnity 'of the pleadings. Rather it recognizes that, despite the best
efforts of counsel to make his pleadings accurate, they may be overwhelm-
ingly contradicted by the proof available to his adversary "'
Sounds rather like "weighing the evidence," doesn't it? Of course it
does (in the sense of assessing whether it is sufficient to go to a trial)
because that is what judges are supposed to do when deciding a summary
judgment motion. It would be remarkable if the Advisory Committee
intended to allow summary judgment in such cases but to utterly forbid it if
the plaintiff converted his complaint into an affidavit that, despite his best
efforts at accuracy, was still "overwhelmingly contradicted by the proof."
In an analogous context, the Court has correctly held that it would under-
mine the purposes of summary judgment if a party could successfully op-
pose the motion merely by "replac[ing] conclusory allegations of the com-
plaint or answer with conclusory allegations of an affidavit. "' In a similar
could not grant summary judgment and deny a party a tril altogether on the same grounds.
229. When ruling upon a habeas corpus petitioner's claims of newly discovered evidence
of innocence, the decision whether to grant the petition does not depend upon "the district
court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt exists"; "rather[,] the standard
requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable,
properly instructed jurors would do." Schlup v Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 868 (1995).
230. 1963 amendment to FED. R. Civ P 56(e) advisory committee's note (emphasis
added).
231. Lujan v National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
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way, it would greatly compromise the utility of Rule 56 if an incredible
allegation that is "overwhelmingly contradicted by the proof" can be trans-
formed magically from a worthless bunch of words into a guaranteed non-
stop ticket to trial simply by transferring it from an incredible pleading into
an incredible affidavit. A sworn story that is overwhelmingly contradicted
by the evidence will not get past a motion for a directed verdict;232 there is
no reason why it should survive summary judgment, wich is supposed to
be governed by the same legal standard. 3
This conclusion also is supported, perhaps unwittingly, by the Supreme
Court's recent dictum that "[s]ome improbable allegations might properly be
disposed of on summary judgment. "' How could that ever happen under
current law9 TIus dictum was made in passing, and the Court gave no
explicit indication of when that might be the case. If you subscribe to the
almost universal view taken by the courts and commentators quoted above,
you would conclude that the Court was talking here only about the very
unusual situation in which a party has no direct evidence to support a crucial
portion of his claim or defense and is relying on nothing more than
circumstantial evidence to support an inherently "improbable" inference. If
the thesis defended here is sound, however, that narrow and cramped
reading misses the full significance of this remark - which is actually a fair
description of the power judges have to dispose of inherently fanciful and
unbelievable claims in every case, regardless of whether someone swears to
have seen them happen with his own eyes.
It is safe to assume that these simple points have gone unnoticed for so
long because of the closely related confusion caused by the Supreme Court's
statement in Anderson that a judge ruling on summary judgment cannot
make "[c]redibility determinations." '  Countless observers have assumed
from this language and the direction to "believe" the adverse party's evi-
dence that a judge may never grant summary judgment rejecting a factual
232. Under federal law, judgment as a matter of law (formerly called a directed verdict)
may be granted during the trial "[i]f the facts and inferences point so strongly and over-
whelmingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary
verdict." Enlow v Tishomingo County, Miss., 45 F.3d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1995); accord
cases cited supra note 145.
233. See Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-52 (1986).
234. Denton v Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992) (emphasis added). The same
suggestion is also contained m the Court's even more recent remark that summary judgment
may be granted where "the scintilla of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient
to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than not is true."
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993) (dictum).
235. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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story or claim on the grounds that it is incredible, inconceivable, or in-
plausibleY That is surely the inference one would get from many (albeit
not all) of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on this topic. But that is
not the law The Advisory Committee had it quite right when it said that:
"Where an issue as to a material fact cannot be resolved without observation
of the demeanor of witnesses m order to evaluate their credibility, summary
judgment is not appropriate. "'7
We must take care to observe precisely what this comment does and
does not say It does not say that the judge is forbidden from making all
"credibility determinations" or that he may never decide if a story is cred-
ible enough to have any chance of success at trial." Rather, the Note
forbids summary disposition of a question of fact that "cannot be resolved"
without an assessment of the credibility of a witness, where that assessment
might be affected by observation of their demeanor. That is simply another
way of saying, as we noted earlier, that a judge may not "weigh" the
evidence in the sense of comparing to see whose case is stronger where, it
appears, on paper, that the question is close enough that it could "reasonably
be resolved in favor of either party" by the jury '9 But that is not the same
as weighing (in the sense of "assessing") the credibility of a claim or a story
to determine if it at least meets the test of minimal plausibility or if it has
any chance of being accepted by a rational jury
In most cases, that question cannot be resolved without an opportunity
to meet the witnesses in person and to gauge their demeanor - but some-
times it can. If someone claims that he actually met Napoleon Bonaparte
last week on the bridge between Hawaii and Califorma, I do not need to
meet him to decide whether his story is incredible, and no jury on earth will
be in a better position than I am to decide that question after meeting him.'
The unfortunate reality is that our courts are visited not infrequently -
236. See authorities cited supra notes 172-95.
237 1963 amendment to FED. R. Civ P 56(e) advisory committee's note (emphasis
added).
238. If the Committee had intended to say such a thing, of course, it merely would have
said that summary judgment is not appropriate "where there is a dispute over the facts."
That rule, which has been advocated vigorously by countless observers m cases turning on
direct evidence, see supra notes 172-95, would effectively read the word "genume" right out
of the requirement that there must be a "genume issue as to any material fact." FED. R. Civ
P 56(c).
239. Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see supra part II.
240. If anything, the jurors may well be m a worse position to decide that issue, if their
assessment of the poor man's "demeanor" makes them prey to emotional factors that have no
rational or permissible bearing on the reliability of his testimony See supra note 216.
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although sometimes involuntarily, in the case of defendants - by liars and
lunatics with stones so absurd and fanciful that nobody in his right mind
could ever believe such a thing and with literally no hope of success at
trial.2 4" These clais are destined to be inpaled on the horns of a directed
verdict, if not judicial notice. To intercept these cases under Rule 56 would
be a mercy killing.
Some might be tempted to respond that my reading of Rule 56
would collapse the difference between summary judgment and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d), which already gives courts the power to dismiss certain claims
that descend "to the level of the irrational or the wholly mcredible." 24
If judges were given the power to dismiss claims on such grounds under
§ 1915, the argument might go, there would have been no reason for Con-
gress to have given judges the power to do the same thing in the summary
241. As anyone who has ever worked m a federal court can tell you, one of the easiest
ways to locate some of the most extreme examples of such cases is to run a search on
Westlaw or Lexis for cases containing the words "trillion" and "dollars" in the same sen-
tence. See, e.g., Garcia v Chernetsky, No. 91-16412, 1993 WL 8723, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan.
19, 1993) (noting that pro se prisoner sought $4.5 trillion for "corrupt conspiracy" between
Jehovah's Witnesses, Arizona Civil Liberties Union, F.B.I., Arizona Supreme Court, and
federal judiciary); Windsor v Pan Am. Airways, 744 F.2d 1187, 1188 (5th Cir. 1984)
(noting that pro se plaintiff demanded over $400 trillion, claiming that major airway
conspired with President Carter and family of President Kennedy to commit "nuclear
sabotage on Flight 759," that Carter stole over $40 trillion from plaintiff in copyright
and patent violations, and that widow of Dr. Martin Luther King intended to take over
Catholic Church and "install herself as a self-proclaimed 'Black Popess'"); Nationline, USA
TODAY, June 6, 1995, at 3A (noting that Supreme Court refused to hear appeal of death row
inmate Fredric Jermyn, who was convicted of killing his mother and who "claimed to be a
Nobel-Prize winning author, trillionaire, and time traveler who talks to God"). Others with
slightly more modest claims are generally willing to settle for something in the range of
billions of dollars. See America v United States Passport Agency, No. 93 CIV 6540, 1993
WL 427421, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1993) (involving pro se plaintiff named "Mr.
America" who threatened in his complaint to kill a number of federal officials and demanded
over $10 billion, passport, birth certificate, immediate rank of "honorary general" in Air
Force, and reminder to President Clinton of plaintiff's support and vote in last election);
Schmidt v Utah, No. 90-3536, 1990 WL 74255, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 1990) (involving
pro se plaintiff suing Utah and Mormon church for Establishment Clause violations who
requested over $1 billion and "an order directing that all members of the Church be branded
on the forehead or hands"), aft'd, 919 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1221
(1991).
242. Denton v. Hemandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992); see also Neitzke v Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1989). The Ninth Circuit relied on similar logic in concluding that
the power to dismiss "frivolous" clais under § 1915 has no analogy to "summary judgment
dismissals, where the district court cannot assess credibility." Bator v Hawaii, 39 F.3d
1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 1994).
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judgment context.'i The short answer to that objection is the fact that
§ 1915 was not designed as the exclusive source of a court's power to
dismiss frivolous claims.24 But even under my proposed reading of Rule
56, the two provisions overlap only partially and serve very distinct
purposes.245 Unlike summary judgment, dismissals under § 1915(d) are
permitted only m the case of claims filed m forma paupens by plaintiffs; it
gives courts no power over claims, however incredible, that are filed by
defendants (who are not required to pay costs and filing fees) or by plaintiffs
who can pay the minimal filing fee. In the limited class of cases where
§ 1915(d) applies, however, such dismissals "are often made sua sponte
prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the
mconvemence and expense of answering such complaints," '  which is not
the case with summary judgment. 7
Indeed, the analogy to § 1915 actually supports my interpretation of the
extent of a federal court's power under Rule 56 because only my reading is
243. Section 1915 was passed by Congress m 1892, see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, long
before the adoption of the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but several years after
the first recorded grant of summary judgment in a federal court. See supra note 148.
244. "Statutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or powers. Section
1915(d), for example, authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there
is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory pro-
vision." Mallard v United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (dictum). The
Supreme Court did not specify what other rule or procedural device would permit a federal
judge to dismiss "frivolous" claims, but the Court presumably had summary judgment in
mind; dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) cannot serve that function as long as the plaintiff's
complaint, if true, states a viable claim for relief, no matter how unlikely or incredible the
clauns might be. See cases cited supra note 211.
245. C. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-28 (noting and explaining that "the failure-to-state-a-
claim standard of Rule 12(b)(6) and the frivqlousness standard of § 1915(d) were devised to
serve distinctive goals, [and] the considerable common ground between these standards
does not mean that the one invariably encompasses the other").
246. Id. at 324; accord Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1733.
247 Techmcally, nothing in Rule 56 would literally forbid a judge from granting
summary judgment against a plaintiff before the defendant has even been served,. although
such sua sponte rulings are permissible only if the plaintiff "was on notice that she had to
come forward with all of her evidence." Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986)
(dictum). But that would never happen in the real world, where districtjudges have neither
time nor incentive to resort to such complex procedures to screen out frivolous complaints
in the short time span between their filing and their service on the defendant. See FED. R.
Civ. P 4(m). The only reason judges can do so where the plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis is because the court will not even issue the summons in such cases until the court
has made at least a cursory review of the complaint's potential merit. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a).
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"consonant with Congress' over-arching goal m enacting the in forma
paupens statute" of "assur[ing] equality of consideration for all litigants"
and "putting indigent plaintiffs on a similar footing with paying plain-
tiffs. "248 Under that statute, Congress gave federal judges the power to
dismiss a complaint filed by a poor man if the judge believes the complaint
is "wholly incredible," and the judge may do so sua sponte before the
defendant learns about the action." But suppose the same "utterly fantas-
tic" allegations were filed in a complaint by a slightly wealthier man who
can afford to pay filing fees. Under the current state of the law as the lower
courts universally understand it, the federal judge is utterly powerless to
dismiss the complaint by summary judgment, even after the parties have
been given years to complete all discovery and even if the defendant is able
to come forward with a seemingly insurmountable mountain of evidence to
prove that the plaintiff's claims are both false and incredible. The poor
man's case may end up m the trash without being served, it is widely
thought, while the slightly richer man's frivolous and incredible complaint
supposedly will find itself on an unstoppable track to a full trial. That
hardly would be consistent with the overarching congressional intent of
putting all plaintiffs on a roughly equal footing - unless, of course, I am
right about my contention that Rule 56 does give a federal judge an anal-
ogous power to intercept and dismiss claims that are too incredible or
implausible for reasonable minds to possibly believe.'
248. Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329-30 (1989) (citations omitted).
249 See Denton v Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992). Of course, this discre-
tion is not unlimited and must take into account several factors, such as whether the plaintiff
had a lawyer. It will not prevent the plaintiff from filing another complaint with the same
allegations, but such a dismissal could "have a res judicata effect on frivolousness determina-
tions for future in forma pauperis petitions." Id. at 1734. Consequently, in the common
case where the indigent plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay court costs, a dismissal under
§ 1915 is quite literally the end of the road.
250. To all those who think the sacrosanct constituinonal right to a jury trial is threatened
irreparably by taking the case away from the jury under such facts, see authorities cited
supra notes 172-95, I also must make the following response: If my heretical interpretation
of Rule 56 is unconstitutional, then by what logic can anyone defend the draconian strictures
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, which has been interpreted to deprive even pro se
litigants of their constitutional right to a jury because of some minor slip-up in the timing or
service of their demand for a jury9 See FED. R. Civ P 38; King v Patterson, 999 F.2d
351, 353 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that pro se prisoner suing for alleged beating waived jury
by filing demand approximately nine weeks late); Favors v Coughlin, 877 F.2d 219, 220-21
(2d Cir. 1989) (holding that pro se prisoner waived jury because demand on civil cover sheet
was filed with his complaint on time but was not served on defendant); Jackson v Cain, 864
F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that pro se prisoner suing for claimed physical
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For the sake of clarity, which is so desperately needed m this area, the
Supreme Court must stop saying that a judge is forbidden from making
"credibility determinations" in the summary judgment context." That
unfortunate phrase is much too ambiguous and has caused serious confusion.
It would be far more accurate to state, as the Advisory Committee has said
by clear implication, that a judge may dispose of questions about credi-
bility - whether it is the credibility of people, stones, or evidence - but
only if the evidence is so one-sided that the issue cannot be decided either
way by a tner of fact; if the question is close enough that it could be
affected by a rational jury's assessment of witness demeanor, the motion
must be denied. That is the only conclusion one can reach from a fair
reading of the entire opinion in Anderson, as this Article has shown, but it
has been almost totally obscured by the Court's cursory and confusing
condemnation of "credibility determinations." 
abuse waived his right to jury because his demand was served seven weeks late); Tushner v
United States Dist. Court, 829 F.2d 853, 854 (9th Cir. 1987) (reversing, on other grounds,
district court's holding that right to jury trial should be denied if demand was filed one day
late); Washington v. New York City Bd. of Estimate, 709 F.2d 792, 797-98 (2d Cir.)
(stating that, even where plaintiff is pro se, failure to make timely demand is binding waiver
.even though it was inadvertent and unintended and regardless of the explanation or the
excuse"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983); Rutledge v Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 511
F.2d 668, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that antitrust plaintiff waived right to jury trial
because his written demand was typed at top of complaint rather than at end of complaint, as
required by local court rules). Moreover, it has been held that a judge has the power to
decide disputed questions of fact in this context - and thereby deprive a litigant of a jury -
by making findings of fact about credibility! E.g., Lewis v Thigpen, 767 F.2d 252, 262-63
(5th Cir. 1985) (holding that blind pro se litigant may be relieved of his waiver only if lower
court found his claimed ignorance as to Rule 38 to be "credible"). Which of these
unfortunate real-world litigants honestly can be said to be less deserving of a jury trial than
our hypothetical lunatic from Maui? I gladly will meet anyone m a public debate as to
whether the Seventh Amendment is threatened more profoundly by Rule 38 or my
interpretation of Rule 56.
251. If that poorly chosen language were taken literally, as I have said, we could not
make sense out of the Court's holding that "more persuasive evidence" may be required of
those whose claims are rendered "implausible" by "the factual context." Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). You cannot decide what is
"plausible" and what is "more persuasive" without making a few decisions about the extent
to which the parties' evidence and claims are "credible."
252. I will be the first to concede, however, that the Court shows no signs of realizing
the error of its ways any time soon (unless perhaps it sees this Article). In one of its most
recent comments on the subject, the Court expressly contrasted summary judgment with
habeas corpus by noting that the latter permits a court to "assess the probative force of the
newly presented evidence [of innocence]" and to "consider how the timing of the submission
and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that evidence."
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C. How Did the Supreme Court Get the Absurd Idea That the Evidence
of the Adverse Party "Must Be Believed"?
Now that we have seen the folly behind the Supreme Court's insistence
that the evidence of the nonmoving party must be "believed" - and the ter-
rible confusion sown in the lower courts as a result - one question remains:
How could so many justices of the Court be so wrong? Where did they get
the profoundly mistaken idea that summary judgment procedures require a
judge to believe the nonmoving party's evidence? After all, if the thesis
outlined here is sound, there must be at least a plausible explanation of
where the Court went wrong and why ' The answer probably can be il-
lustrated best by considering the Court's most recent comment on the sub-
ject, in a case decided just last term.
In McKennon v Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,' the plaintiff
charged that her former employer had dismissed her, in violation of federal
law, because she was sixty-two years old. 55 In its defense, her ex-employer
made, among others, the following two claims: (1) Mrs. McKennon was not
dismissed because of her age but because of a work force reduction forced
by cost considerations, and (2) in the alternative, regardless of why
McKennon was truly fired, undisputed facts turned up later would have
justified her dismissal in any event. 6 At least m theory, the Banner could
have moved for summary judgment on the basis of either one of those two
defenses. As it happened, the Banner elected to move for summary judg-
ment solely on the basis of the latter defense.' The motion was granted,
and McKennon appealed. 8
Schlup v Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 869 (1995). Citing its earlier statement m Anderson, the
Court then stated m dictum that this was "[o]bviously" not the same "standard appropriate for
deciding a motion for summary judgment." Id.
253. There is an outside possibility that this error might be influenced m some small part
by a bit of confusion with the law governing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires the judge to "accept without
question the truth of the plaintiffs allegations." Denton v Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733
(1992). There is no way to know if such confusion may have played any role in the Court's
pronouncements on summary judgment, but it seems safe to say that the primary reason for
the Court's confusion is the one I outline here in the text.
254. 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995).
255. McKennon v Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 882-83 (1995).
256. Id.
257 See id. at 883.
258. See id.
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Before turning to the merits of the appeal, Justice Kennedy, m an opm-
ion written for a unanimous Court, stated: "We shall assume, as summary
judgment procedures require us to assume, that the sole reason for Mc-
Kennon's initial discharge was her age, a discharge violative- of the
ADEA." 9 Justice Kennedy cited no rule or authority for is relatively
casual assertion that summary judgment procedures required the Court to
"assume the truth" of McKennon's claim, although it can be safely inferred
that he was referring to the line of Supreme Court cases holding that the
nonmoving party's evidence must be "believed. "I
But is that really what Rule 56 requires a federal judge to do in that
position? Of course not. Suppose that the Banner had come forward with
seemingly overwhelming evidence that McKennon's claims were sinply
false. Imagine, for example, that they produced conclusive documentary
proof - including videotapes, birth records, and authenticated affidavits
from McKennon's own parents and doctors, among others - proving that
she never* worked there or anywhere else, that she has been in a prison
hospital since a devastating head injury ten years earlier, that she is only
twenty-eight years old right now, and that the company has never employed
anyone within 1000 miles of North America. Despite all these facts,
McKennon filed nothing more than a reply affidavit, handwritten on prison
stationery, m which she states: "I don't know why all these people would lie
about me, including my own parents, but I feel sure that I was at least sixty
years old when the Banner fired me a few years ago right here in Tennes-
see." What should be the result? Would the Court still say m such a case
that "summary judgment procedures require us to assume" that McKennon
was fired because of her age, just like she says? Of course not."
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. See cases cited supra note 154. As noted above, most lower courts have likewise
interpreted the Court's direction to "believe" the adverse party's evidence as an instruction
to "assume its truth." See cases cited supra note 160. By the way, it is noteworthy that the
Court applied its old "assume the truth" rule to Ms. McKennon's claims of discriminatory
motive, even though those claims were supported by nothing other than her proposed
inferences from circumstantial evidence! So much for the view of all those who have argued
that Matsushita authorizes a federal court to examine the "plausibility" of such inferences.
See authorities cited supra notes 172-95. The truth is that many of the Court's statements in
this area are inconsistent and cannot be taken literally without leading to radical incoherence.
261. Of course, if you listen to everything that has been written on the subject before
today, see authorities cited supra notes 172-95, 207-09, you would say that this is an "easy"
decision: Summary judgment must be denied as long as she swears to such facts in an affi-
davit because we would have to "believe" McKennon, we must assume that the jury also will
believe her claims, and we cannot resolve such a dispute in the direct evidence. If you think
that conclusion seems odd, you are beginning to perceive the absurdity of current law.
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So what on earth would justify this assertion by a unanimous Court?
What fact about that case supposedly required the Court to "assume" that
McKennon had been the victim of age discrimination? Certainly it was not
because McKennon had made such an assertion m her complaint because a
party's own pleadings themselves are not taken as true for such a motion
and cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. 2
Nor would the Court say such a thing merely because McKennon had filed
a sworn affidavit asserting that her age was the reason for her termination
because she would have no personal knowledge of such a thing and Rule 56
requires opposing affidavits to be based on "personal knowledge." 2
In fact, there is only one reason why it was proper for the Court to
assume that McKennon was fired for her age, and it has nothing to do with
"summary judgment procedures." The Court was entitled to make that
assumption, just as the lower courts did, for one simple reason: because the
defendant invited them to do so for the sake of ruling on the defendant's own
motion.264 The Banner conceded the point arguendo, or "for the sake of
argument." This rhetorical device is an ancient and time-honored staple of
logical and moral reasoning and has been employed for centuries by
logicians, politicians, and philosophers. It is in no way uique to lawyers,
much less summary judgment motions, and it is used from time to time by
lawyers making virtually every motion described in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Whenever the Supreme Court speaks about the supposed need to
"believe" the adverse party's evidence or to assume its truth, you safely can
assume that the Court has temporarily forgotten a vital distinction between
two different (but equally common) kinds of summary judgment motions.
262. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (citing Rule 56(e)).
263. FED. R. Civ P 56(e). Indeed, m the absence of an admission of discriminatory
purpose by the defendant (which is most unusual), a plaintiff who alleges employment dis-
crnmmation rarely will have any proof of discrimiatory motive other than circumstantial
evidence. For that reason, a plaintiffs sworn statement that he has been the victim of
discrimmation, even if sincere, will not save his suit from summary judgment if the circum-
stantial evidence of nondiscrimination is literally overwhelming. Quarles v General Motors
Corp., 597 F Supp. 1037, 1042-43 (W.D.N.Y 1984), aft'd, 758 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1985).
264. "For purposes of summary judgment, the Banner conceded its discrimination
against McKennon." McKennon v Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 883
(1995). In that same case, the Court of Appeals noted that there was conflicting evidence as
to whether McKennon had been fired because of her age, McKennon v Nashville Banner
Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 541 n.2 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), but that
"[t]he Banner's summary judgment motion assumed, for the purposes of the motion, that it
would be liable to Mrs. McKennon under the ADEA in discharging her for age discrimina-
tion.' Id. at 541.
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As the Court itself has noted on occasion, there are, broadly speaking, two
general forms that a defendant's summary judgment motion can take:'
(1) "There is no genuine issue of fact here." That is, on some crucial
factual issue, the plaintiff literally has no evidence, or her only evidence is
neither significantly probative nor sufficient to support a verdict by any
reasonable jury in her favor. There is irrefutable and overwhelming docu-
mentary evidence that will compel the jury to conclude that one of the
crucial allegations of her complaint is false or at least that she cannot prove
it is true (for example, that McKennon ever worked for the Banner, that she
was ever fired, or that she was fired because of her age).2
(2) "There is no issue of material fact here." Even if we were to
assume that some (or perhaps even all) of the facts were as plaintiff claims,
she still would be required to lose, as a matter of laW, because there is some
other fact that renders those claims inadequate to permit recovery under the
governing law (for example, because we later acquired undisputed evidence
of wrongdoing that validated her removal after the fact).
Of these two kinds of summary judgment motions, only the latter per-
mits the Court, at the invitation of the moving party, to assume the truth of
certain allegations made by the opposing party for the sake of showing that
those claims are not "material."'  The other type of summary judg-
265. This distinction and much of the language used here is taken directly from
Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
266. This type of summary judgment motion closely resembles the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), with the main dif-
ference being that such motions must be made under Rule 56 if they require that the Court
consider affidavits or other materials outside the pleadings. See FED. R. Civ P 12(b)-(c).
(For example, where the defendant moves for judgment dismissing the complaint on the basis
of the statute of limitations, such motions might be made under either Rule 12 or Rule 56,
depending on whether the dates and facts necessary to establish the defense can be found m
the plaintiff's own complaint.) It bears repetition that this sort of summary judgment motion,
although it may confront the judge with evidence about the past or about the falsity of
plaintiff's claims, does not invite (much less require) the judge to decide the "truth of the
matter." For the purposes of the summary judgment motion, the judge treats the affidavits
and other exhibits containing historical information solely as evidence of what the available
witnesses are likely to say at a trial in the future. Even if the judge grants the motion, it is
based on his assessment that the likely future testimony does not warrant a trial, and his
ruling does not entail any necessary inplications about the ultimate truth or falsity of the
parties' claims about the past. See supra notes 72, 103.
267 The word "material," as used in Rule 56(c), reflects the same concept embodied in
the rule that evidence is irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible, if it does not affect the
probability of "any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." FED. R.
Evin. 401, see id. advisory committee's note. A court decides which alleged facts are "of
consequence to the determination of the action" by assuming their truth and asking whether
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ment motion, by contrast, asks the Court to assume nothing about the truth
of the plaintiff's claims, much less to believe them, but rather requires the
Court to determine whether those claims are supported by sufficient evi-
dence to permit a jury to accept them as true. 2sa
Rule 56 is broad enough, by design, to permit a party to make a motion
under either one of these theories. I would not hazard a guess as to which
of these two kinds of summary judgment motions is more common, but
every experienced practitioner knows that both are employed with great
frequency In McKennon, for example, the Banner raised both types of
claims in its defense but only the latter in its summary judgment motion. If
the Banner instead had based its motion on the grounds that McKennon
never worked for it and offered seemingly conclusive proof to that effect, it
would be folly for the Court to "assume the truth" of her contrary affidavits,
no matter how absurd and implausible her allegations appeared to be.
Thus, the Supreme Court was quite mistaken to suggest in McKennon
(and earlier cases) that there is anything inherent m or umque to "summary
judgment procedures" that requires a federal court to "assume the truth" of
any or all of the adverse party's claims for the sake of ruling on a motion
for summary judgment. The only reason the Court was tempted to say such
a thing m Anderson and McKennon, among other cases, is because the Court
(like all. federal courts) often is confronted by summary judgment motions
in which the defendant is willing to concede certain factual allegations and
dispute their sufficiency as a matter of law But there are just as many cases
where the moving party makes no such concession and instead seeks to
exercise its right to press for a judicial resolution as to whether the opposing
party's evidence is sufficiently plausible to justify a trial. In such a case, it
is illogical, poor judicial administration, and contrary to law to insist that
the opposing party's evidence must be believed. To be far more precise,
therefore, the McKennon opinion should have said simply" "We shall
assume, as defendant invites us to do for the sake of argument, that the sole
the outcome of the case might be affected by that assumption.
268. For example, this sort of motion was made by the defendant m Celotex Corp. v
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), who argued that the plaintiff had no evidence that her husband
had been exposed to the defendant's asbestos. Id. at 319-20. In that case, even though the
defendant admitted that it had no knowledge or evidence either way as to whether the
decedent had been exposed to its asbestos, the Court held that summary judgment could be
granted if Celotex could show that Mrs. Catrett had no idea either. Id. at 322-23. The
Court thereby overruled sub silentio its earlier statements that summary judgment may be
granted only "where it is quite clear what the truth is." Poller v Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962) (quoting Sartor v Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321
U.S. 620, 627 (1944)); see supra note 44.
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reason for McKennon's initial discharge was her age." But next time, leave
Rule 56 out of it. That rule requires no such thing.
IV When May a Court "Strike" or Disregard a "Sham Affidavit"
Because It Is Inconsistent with the Prior Testimony of the Same Witness?
As noted above in Parts II and III, the administration of summary judg-
ment has been bedeviled by various pervasive myths that deceive judges into
believing that they have no power to entertain some summary judgment
motions that may well be meritorious, out of an exaggerated fear of "usurp-
mg the province of the jury" or violating the Seventh Amendment rights of
litigants with implausible or unbelievable claims. Iromcally, but not by
coincidence, there has emerged a countervailing error m the law in a more
or less unconscious reaction to the excesses of the absurd view that evidence
cannot be "weighed" and can only be "believed." In an artificial effort to
limit the problems posed by that mistaken view, lower courts and commen-
tators have developed a rule that does, in fact, truly and routinely threaten
the Seventh Amendment.
This stunted development in the law finds its roots in the judiciary's
reaction to a problem that is relatively common, judging from the reported
cases. The scenario is as follows. A party, usually the plaintiff, makes
certain adrmssions in a statement, typically at a deposition, that are at least
arguably fatal to some aspect of that party's claims.2 9 At that point, the
defendant moves for summary judgment, relying in whole or in part on the
plaintiff's admission. In response to that motion, the plaintiff comes
forward with an affidavit to "correct" the problem. The parties then take
predictable positions. The defendant argues that the new affidavit is a
deliberate lie and a flagrant contradiction designed for the sole purpose of
269. This scenario does not always involve the plaintiff, or even a party. On rare
occasions, it may involve nonparty witnesses who change their story between their deposition
and their affidavit, although it normally would have to be a witness sufficiently close to one
of the parties to give rise to a plausible argument that the witness knowingly would lie for the
sake of that party. See, e.g., Darnell v Target Stores, 16 F.3d 174, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1994)
(involving plaintiffs former co-workers); Rohrbough v Wyeth Lab., Inc., 916 F.2d 970,
972-76 (4th Cir. 1990) (involving plaintiffs retained expert witness); Adelman-Tremblay v
Jewel Cos., Inc., .859 F.2d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1988) (involving plaintiff's sole expert
witness); c.f Johnson v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 883 F.2d 125, 127-29 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (involving inconsistencies in statements by "disinterested witnesses" who contra-
dicted themselves, creating factual issue precluding summary judgment), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1027 (1990). For the sake of simplicity, this section will refer to the ordinary case of
a plaintiff who changes his story, although the same principles are applicable to defendants
and many nonparty witnesses.
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saving the lawsuit from dismissal, perhaps m the hopes of salvaging some
sort of settlement value out of the case.27 The plaintiff swears that there is
no real inconsistency, that the affidavit was meant only to clarify an answer
that was confused or ambiguous, or that the variation (if any) was the
innocent product of a recollection that has been refreshed now " To
complicate matters further, suppose - as is often the case - both sides
claim to have at least some circumstantial evidence to support their proposed
explanation of the alleged variation. When confronted with this apparent
question of "credibility" on a motion for summary judgment, what should
the judge do9
A. The Traditional Answer(s)
The circuit courts and commentators addressing this supposed problem
have adopted three different approaches, all of them wrong. At one
extreme, some have suggested that the inconsistency always raises a ques-
tion of fact that prevents summary judgment and that the jury always should
be allowed to consider both the deposition and the allegedly inconsistent
affidavit. This view has been adopted by one circuit court of appeals, at
least m dictum.' Although this standard has been criticized by other
270. Every experienced litigator knows that every claim has some settlement value -
even if it has virtually no chance of winning at trial - as long as it can get past summary
judgment and, indeed, even if it loses at trial. Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 740 (1975) (noting that even marginal complaint "has a settlement value to the
plaintiff out of proportion to its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit
from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment"); see Sports Illustrated
Gives Iverson Plaintiff $15,000, VA. PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, May 7, 1994, at D2 (noting
that, after her libel suit against Sports Illustrated was dismissed at trial, losing plaintiff
"agreed not to appeal the case in exchange for a $15,000 settlement"). That is why offers to
settle by defendants do not necessarily represent a concession that the clan has any merit
and one reason why the law m turn makes such offers inadmissible to prove the validity of
the claim. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
271. Our law of evidence is modeled on the assumption that the memories of even
honest witnesses sometimes get better and more reliable after they have been jogged by some
stimulus. If not for that assumption, it would make no sense for us to allow recollections to
be refreshed, especially while the witness is on the stand. See FED. R. EviD. 612. Judging
from the reported cases, it seems that nothing refreshes human memories quite like the pause
one is given when he finds himself quoted in his opponent's motion for summary judgment!
See cases cited infra notes 272-83.
272. The Fifth Circuit has stated that such inconsistencies "present credibility issues
properly put to the trier-of-fact. Credibility assessments are not fit grist for the summary
judgment mill." Dibildale, Inc. v American Bank & Trust Co., New Orleans, 916 F.2d 300,
307-08 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); accord Kennett-Murray Corp. v Bone, 622 F.2d
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circuits, it at least has the notable advantage that it is the only one that is
consistent with a literal reading of the Supreme Court's repeated insistence
that the judge is required to "believe" the evidence of the party opposing
summary judgment. If courts truly were serious about the supposed
requirement of assuming that the jury would believe the party's affidavit, we
also would be required to presume that he somehow would manage to
persuade the jury to discount or forgive his earlier inconsistency
A few circuits have criticized tins approach on the grounds that it
would permit lying parties to evade summary judgment, even after making
damaging adrmssions at a deposition, through the simple expedient of con-
tradicting themselves in a later affidavit. These courts have gone to the
opposite extreme of simply disregarding the inconsistent affidavit as a
"sham."27  In so doing, the courts taking this position almost invariably
quote or cite the Second Circuit's statement, more than a quarter century
ago, that "[i]f a party who has been examined at length on deposition could
rase an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own
prior testimony, this would greatly diminish the utility of summary judg-
ment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact. "274 Iromcally,
this alleged concern for "screening out sham issues of fact" continues to be
887, 894 (5th Cir. 1980) ("In light of the jury's role in resolving questions of credibility, a
district court should not reject the content of an affidavit even if it is at odds with statements
made m an earlier deposition."). This language arguably was dictum m both cases because
in each case the Fifth Circuit also found that the alleged inconsistencies were not inherently
in irreconcilable conflict.
273. E.g., Darnell, 16 F.3d at 176 ("party should not be allowed to create issues of
credibility by contradicting his own earlier testimony") (quoting Babrocky v Jewel Food
Co., 773 F.2d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1985)); Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v Star Trading &
Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir. 1991) ("a party may not, in order to defeat a
summary judgment motion, create a material issue of fact by submitting an affidavit dis-
puting his own prior sworn testimony"); Gagn6 v Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d
309, 315 (6th Cir. 1989) ("a party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after
a motion for summary judgment has been made, which contradicts his earlier deposition
testimony"); Mack v United States, 814 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 1987) ("a party's affidavit
which contradicts his own prior deposition testimony should be disregarded on a motion for
summary judgment").
274. Perma Research & Dev Co. v Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969).
Ironically, although this line is still widely quoted today, the Perma case itself actually held
that "the court may not exclude the affidavit from consideration." Id. at 578 (emphasis
added) (quoting 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.22[1], at 2814 (2d ed. 1965)). In the
context of that case, both lines were dictum m any event because the court concluded that
even the allegations of the affidavit did not raise "any triable issue" or "any issue which we
can call genuine," id. at 577, 578, so there was no need for the court to decide whether the
new affidavit should be credited, considered, or disregarded.
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cited widely by the circuit courts even since Anderson, at the same time
these courts labor under the perception that, m all other situations, Rule 56
supposedly leaves a court powerless to dismiss a sworn claim that seems
utterly incredible.
The vast majority of the circuits have taken an intermediate position
that allows district judges to strike some allegedly inconsistent affidavits as
sham - but not in every case. These courts correctly have observed that an
inflexible rule striking all mconsistent affidavits does not account for the
fact that even honest witnesses may have innocent confusion or lapses of
memory and is not fair to the witness or the jury ' After all, not every
prior inconsistency is devastating to the credibility of a witness; there is
always the possibility that the apparent change was the product of an
innocent misunderstanding of a question, nervousness at a deposition, or
maybe a suddenly refreshed recollection. Under this intermediate position
taken by most circuits, the district judge is required to distinguish m each
case "between discrepancies which create transparent shams and discrepan-
cies which create an issue of credibility or go to the weight of the evi-
dence. "6 This approach has been adopted by the clear majority of circuit
courts to consider the issue2  and has been endorsed by many of the most
prominent writers m the field."
275. "To allow every failure of memory or variation m a witness's testimony to be
disregarded as a sham would require far too much from lay witnesses and would deprive the
trier of fact of the traditional opportunity to determine which point m time and with which
words the witness (in this case, the affiant) was stating the truth." Tippens v Celotex Corp.,
805 F.2d 949, 953-54 (11th Cir. 1986).
276. Id. at 953; accord cases cited infra note 277
277 Rios v Bigler, 67 F.3d 1543, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995); Sinskey v Pharmacia
Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2346
(1993); Munz v Parr, 972 F.2d 971, 973 (8th Cir. 1992); Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,
952 F.2d 262, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1991); Rohrbough v Wyeth Lab., Inc., 916 F.2d 970, 975
(4th Cir. 1990); Richardson v Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1433 (7th Cir. 1988); Adelman-
Tremblay v Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1988); Martin v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1988); Franks v Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230,
1237 (10th Cir. 1986).
278. QUARLES ET-AL., supra note 175, § 5.17, at 124 (stating that "a contradictory
affidavit that does not explain the variance between the affidavit and the deposition testimony
may be treated as a sham and disregarded by the district court'); 1OA WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 44, § 2726 (Supp. 1995); Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 480. Professor Brunet
suggests that it is "inappropriate for the court effectively to usurp the jury's function by
resolving issues of credibility on a summary judgment motion," Brunet, supra note 52, at
668, but still concludes that these "decisions that permit courts to strike sham affidavits
create an appropriate safeguard which is useful to the summary judgment process." BRUNET
ET AL., supra note 31, § 5.10, at 137
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But how does one draw the line between inconsistencies that render an
affidavit a worthless sham and those that will not? Any time the party
moving for summary judgment asserts that the opponent's affidavit is a
sham, the opponent almost invariably responds that there is no inconsistency
or that the variation (if. any) is attributable to some innocent misrecollection
or misunderstanding. How are those disputes to be decided, and by whom?
The leading reference works currently suggest that the court may strike the
inconsistent affidavit as a sham unless the deponent can give "a credible
explanation for the contradiction"" or "a satisfactory explanation of why
the testimony is changed [and] why tlus later assertion should be taken
senously. "' This standard, or one like it, also has been endorsed by most
of the federal circuits to consider the issue. 2 1
And who makes this critical decision as to whether there really is a true
inconsistency and whether the explanation is "satisfactory" when those
disputes are litigated with all the vigor that normally attends an issue that
will spell life or death for a lawsuit? Proceeding on the basis of the rule that
preliminary questions of admissibility are normally to be decided by the
judge,' these circuit courts all have held that whether the affidavit is a
279. Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 480 (emphasis added).
280. 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 44, § 2726, at 31-32 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis
added).
281. See, e.g., Sinskey v Pharnacia Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F.2d 494, 498 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (stating that affidavit will-be "disregarded" unless party can "provide a satisfactory
explanation for the discrepancy"), cert. dented, 113 S. Ct. 2346 (1993); Richardson v
Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1433 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[a] party may not create a genuine
issue of fact by contradicting his own earlier statements" unless he offers "a plausible
explanation for the sudden change of heart"); Martin v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
851 F.2d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that district court may "disregard" affidavit if party
offers "no satisfactory explanation"); see also Munz v Parr, 972 F.2d 971, 973 (8th Cir.
1992) (stating that plaintiff's changed story may be rejected if Court finds alleged mconsis-
tency "implausible"); Kennedy v Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1991)
(noting that affidavit is to be disregarded unless it was "the result of an honest discrepancy,
a mistake, or the result of newly discovered evidence"); Rohrbough v Wyeth Lab., Inc.,
916 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 1990) (inquiring whether "affidavit is m such conflict with his
earlier deposition testimony that the affidavit should be disregarded as a sham issue of fact");
Adelman-Tremblay v Jewel Cos., 859 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that affidavit
is to be disregarded unless it "clariflies] ambiguous or confusing deposition testimony" or is
"based on newly discovered evidence"); Tippens v Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 954-55
(11th Cir. 1986) (noting that mconsistent affidavit may be "disregarded as a sham" only if it
is "inherently inconsistent" and offered "without explanation").
282. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court "). This process normally requires the
judge to make the necessary findings solely by the preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily
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"sham" (and therefore subject to a motion to strike) is a question of fact for
the judge, not the jury 283 It should be obvious that this standard authorizes
a judge to engage in the "weighing of the evidence" far more than any judge
normally would be allowed to do on summary judgment, even under the
expansive interpretation of Rule 56 advanced in this Article.
The irony of these cases is palpable. As noted in the preceding sections
of this Article, lower courts unanimously have swallowed the mistaken view
that an affidavIt submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion, if
allegedly based on personal knowledge of historical facts, normally must be
believed and necessarily will defeat the motion, even if it is rendered
literally incredible by a seemingly overwhelming mountain of extrinsic evi-
dence. Such extremism is absolutely necessary, we are told, to preserve the
inviolable right of the jury to decide issues of credibility And yet almost
all of those same courts have carved out an illegitimate and arbitrary excep-
tion for affidavits that are allegedly "incredible" because they supposedly
contradict prior statements by the witness. If that same affidavit allegedly
conflicts with nothing more than a few lines of arguably inconsistent tran-
script taken from the middle of a five-day deposition, we are told, the affi-
davit is a potential "sham" that may be stricken and utterly disregarded,
possibly resulting m dismissal of the action with prejudice, depending
entirely on whether the judge deems the putative explanation for the varia-
tion to be "satisfactory" or "credible." The incongruity and incoherence of
that disparate treatment is ludicrous.
In fact, this body of "law" is misguided and illegitimate. It is suspect
on its face because it singles out only one of a number of equally plausible
reasons for rejecting a sworn story as incredible.' Even at trial, moreover,
the alleged existence of a devastating prior mconsistent statement merely
goes to the weight of a witness's intended testimony and not to its admissi-
bility ' It also flies in the face of the Supreme Court's supposed insistence
v United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987).
283. All of the cases cited supra notes 276-77 have reached this conclusion. E.g.,
Kennedy v Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 267 (9th Cir. 1991) (remanding with
directions for district judge to make finding as to whether affidavit was "sham" or merely
"the result of an honest discrepancy, a mistake, or the result of newly discovered evidence").
284. Under the law and rules governing impeachment of witnesses at trial, there are a
great many different well-recognized ways for trying to undermine the credibility of a
witness or his story. See FED. R. EVID. 608-613; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 21,
ch. 5. Impeachment by prior inconsistent statement is only one of those many ways. See
FED. R. EviD. 613.
285. The alleged existence of a prior inconsistent statement is made grounds for
impeachment of a witness, see FED. R. EvID. 613, but is not a ground for holding a witness
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that a judge is not to weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations,
or do anything but believe the adverse party's evidence.m Indeed, although
the Supreme Court has not yet squarely addressed this line of cases, it has
recently and unambiguously indicated (albeit in dictum) that summary
judgment does not permit a judge to decide whether the affidavit of a wit-
ness may be rejected on the grounds that it conflicts with his earlier sworn
testimony '
This line of cases also is contradicted by the fairly unambiguous
language of Rule 56(e), which outlines a number of detailed requirements
for supporting and opposing affidavits but contains no requirement that they
be "consistent with all prior statements made by the witness." Under
normal principles of statutory construction, fully applicable to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the specification of certain detailed requirements
normally implies the deliberate exclusion of all others.' Indeed, Rule 56
affirmatively states that affidavits may include "such facts as would be
incompetent to testify and will not prevent a witness from testifymg at trial simply because
there is evidence that he has testified differently mn the past. See FED. R. EVm. 601. This
is because the law has always recognized that "[i]nconsistent testimony by [a witness] ser-
iously impairs and potentially destroys his credibility," Mathews v United States, 485 U.S.
58, 65 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 985 (9th
Cir. 1975)), but not necessarily. Cf. id. at 68 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that, even m
crimmal cases, allowing parties to contradict themselves does not threaten interests ofjustice
because such conduct is generally self-penalizing).
286. One might attempt to get around the last of these three rules by splitting hairs over
what is "the plaintiff's evidence"- the testimony he gave at his deposition (and that was
tendered to the court by the defendant) or the affidavit subsequently signed and submitted to
the court by the plaintiff himself? But even if we put that almost metaphysical difficulty to
the side, that hardly gets one past the Supreme Court's supposed ban on "credibility deter-
minations," as long as the court is deciding which of the plaintiffs stories is more believable
or whether his explanation for the change is "credible."
287 In Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), the Court addressed the proper scope of
review of habeas corpus claims by prisoners claiming to have newly discovered evidence of
innocence. The petitioner in that case had come forward with an exculpatory affidavit from
a witness, but the Court of Appeals had discounted the affidavit without an evidentiary
hearing because, among other reasons, it was inconsistent with his earlier trial testimony m
the case. Id. at 859. The Supreme Court held that it was proper for the lower courts to
"assess the probative force of the newly presented evidence" and in particular to "consider
how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on the
probable reliability of that evidence." Id. at 869 (emphasis added). The Court expressly
contrasted this aspect of habeas corpus procedures with summary judgment, noting that this
inquiry was not the "standard appropriate for deciding a motion for summary judgment." Id.
(citing Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).
288. Leatherman v Tarrant County Narcotics & Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160,
1163 (1993).
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admissible m evidence, ' 289 which would include all statements of a witness
who claims to have first-hand knowledge, even if the judge knows in
advance that those statements are inconsistent with what the witness has said
before.2'
To make matters even less defensible, most (if not all) of these same
courts have made up and enforced a spurious rule that an affidavit may be
disregarded and stricken as a sham only if the other party makes a motion
to strike the affidavit on the basis of that supposed defect. This rule, which
has nothing to recommend it in this context, z"1 leads to the unnecessary
multiplication of papers and additional motions, along with the additional
delay that is required under the local rules of most district courts for the
289 FED. R. CIV P 56(e).
290. See supra note 285. Such an "inconsistent statement" -may have little probative
value in some cases, but it has enough to fit the deliberately broad definition of "relevant
evidence," FED. R. EviD. 401, and the law clearly states that all relevant evidence is
admissible unless excluded by the Constitution, by some specific rule, by an act of Congress,
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. FED. R. EVID. 402. There is no such
rule that makes "inconsistent statements" inadmissible, see FED. R. EvID. 613, and the judi-
cially made case law that has done so under Rule 56 is a usurpation of authority that is
expressly denied to the federal courts by Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
291. It has been suggested that insisting on a motion to strike a defective affidavit can
be justified m the name of fairness and judicial efficiency, see, e.g., In re Teltronics Servs.,
Inc., 762 F.2d 185, 192 (2d Cir. 1985); BRUNET ET AL., supra note 31, at 129-30, even
when attacking the papers of the party opposing summary judgment, see FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 209, § 9.2, at 441-42; see also DeCintio v Westchester County Medical
Ctr., 821 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987). That logic arguably
makes some sense when applied to allegedly defective papers filed in support of summary
judgment because the opponent otherwise might have an incentive to "sandbag" by first
waiting to see if he can wm the motion without having to file any response or disclose any
of his evidence. As applied to the affidavits of the party opposing summary judgment,
however, that argument is senseless because (1) the party seeking summary judgment has
the burden of proof on the motion, nothing to hide, no conceivable interest in sandbagging,
and nothing to gain by failing to move to strike an arguably defective affidavit opposing
the motion, and (2) the failure to make such a motion to "strike" the responding party's
defective affidavit will not bar the moving party from prevailing or perhaps even obtaining
a directed verdict at trial, see Schwarzer et al., supra note 13, at 482. If a party makes an
otherwise meritorious motion for summary judgment on the grounds that his opponent has
absolutely no evidence to overcome an indisputable fact but forgets (through inadvertence)
to make a meritorious motion to strike when the opponent replies with a transparently
worthless sham affidavit, it is ridiculous to "penalize" the moving party by denying his
motion and forcing the case to a trial with only one possible outcome. To justify that sort of
gratuitous waste of court time on a pathetic technicality not even grounded in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure - in the name of "judicial efficiency," of all things - is
unadulterated lunacy
1602
MYTHS ABOUT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
mminmum time period between the filing of motion papers and the argument
of the motion.
B. The Truth of the Matter
In most other contexts, as we have seen, the United States courts of
appeals rigorously and literally have enforced the Supreme Court's admom-
tion that evidence cannot be "weighed" on a summary judgment motion.
But when the factual dispute presented involves an alleged inconsistency
between an affidavit and prior statements by the same witness, those courts
allow the lower court extremely broad discretion to disregard the affidavit
altogether if there is a motion to strike, if the judge concludes that there is
an inconsistency, and if the judge does not deem the explanation for the
variation to be sufficiently "satisfactory" or "credible." This procedure has
no basis in the text of Rule 56, is inconsistent with both the text of the rule
and the Supreme Court's comments on it, creates an unnecessary and unpro-
ductive multiplication of motion practice, and poses a direct threat to the
integrity of the jury's role as fact-finders on disputable matters of fact.
With all those strikes against it, what on earth would possess so many courts
and commentators to embrace such a procedure?
The answer, of course, goes back to the other myths outlined above.
Confronted with the specter of the false and "sham" affidavit filed in opposi-
tion to a summary judgment motion, federal judges today assume that it will
be a major obstacle to the administration of justice unless it is strcken from
the record because they still are laboring under the mistaken view that the
nonmovant's evidence cannot be weighed and must be taken as true so long
as it remains in the record before the court - even if it is false (and perhaps
even incredible). As tlus Article has shown, however, those fears are
unfounded.2"
To anyone who has read closely up until this point, the route out of this
mess is plain. When a judge ruling upon a summary judgment motion is
confronted with an affidavit in opposition that is at least arguably mconsis-
292. As noted above, the seminal case m this line did not authorize the conflicting
affidavit to be stricken; quite to the contrary, it held that the inconsistent affidavit may not
be excluded from consideration by the court. Perma Research & Dev Co. v Singer Co.,
410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969) (quoting 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.22[1], at
2814 (2d ed. 1965)). But that case was decided long before Anderson, back in the halcyon
days when federal judges did not fear that every piece of incredible evidence in the record
was an insuperable impediment to the granting of summary judgment and still understood
that they had the power to disregard such evidence if it is simply too incredible to be
accepted by any reasonablejury See supra note 150.
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tent with prior testimony or statements by that same witness on a material
question, the judge need not, and should not, "assume the truth" of the
affidavit nor even worry about what the truth is (as the Supreme Court
seems to have directed). Nor should he try to make any findings concerning
whether there is an inconsistency, whether he is satisfied with the explana-
tion for the variation, or which version is more credible (as virtually all of
the lower courts have done). Rather, in keeping with the procedure outlined
above, the judge should ask himself one snple question: "Assuming that
all of the witnesses would testify at a trial just as they have in their most
recent affidavits, that they are cross-examined about the allegedly mconsis-
tent statements they made at their depositions, and that the jury hears the
same explanation I have been given (if any) about the variation, is there any
genuine possibility that the jury might find in favor of the adverse party?"
This simple solution, unlike the three approaches currently taken by the
federal courts, is simple in application, coherent, and correct. It eliminates
the current need for worthless and time-consuming motion practice over
whether the alleged "sham" affidavit should be stricken or whether the
defect was waived by the failure of the moving party to also file a written
motion to strike the affidavit. It preserves and safeguards the constitution-
ally guaranteed role of the jury as arbiters of disputable factual issues. And
it still permits the judge to weed out those truly sham affidavits that have no
possibility of being accepted by any jury
Some might be tempted to suggest that this standard would permit any
lying snake to survive summary judgment, no matter what he inadvertently
admitted in a rare moment of candor while his guard was down at his
deposition, because he always can make a plausible claim that a genuine
question of fact will be raised by his subsequent retraction in an affidavit.29
That suggestion is false. As the Supreme Court recently has noted, common
sense teaches that there are some occasions when "the evolution over time
of a given [witness's testimony] can be fatal to its reliability "294 Such
changes in a witness's story sometimes are capable of "destroying confi-
dence in [the witness's] story and raising a substantial implication that [his
lawyer] had coached him to give it."2I But of course that is not always the
293. This is the fear voiced by those circuits that- seemingly have adopted the extreme
position of always disregarding statements that are inconsistent with prior deposition
testimony See cases cited supra note 273.
294. Kyles v Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1571 (1995); see also Anderson v City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (noting that testimony of witness "may be so
internally inconsistent that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it").
295. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1570.
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case, as the Court also has noted.2' There always will be plenty of cases m
which reasonable minds can disagree over whether a witness's claim of an
inproved memory is believable, depending on a host of factors such as the
nature of the testimony itself, and whether his latest version of the story, if
true, is the sort of thing that anyone possibly could have forgotten. Indeed,
such matters are frequently and explicitly entrusted to the jury at trial.297 In
those cases, summary judgment must be demed.
Of course, the legal standard proposed here will continue to weed out
many of the most frivolous cases that otherwise would be saved only by an
unlikely last-minute change of a party's story, but not as many as presently
are being disnissed under current law In contrast with the law m most
circuits, this proposal admittedly would give judges a much narrower range
of discretion to grant summary judgment based on the decision to "S.trike"
an affidavit merely because the judge thought that the putative explanation
for certain inconsistencies was not sufficiently credible or satisfactory
Some certainly would argue, as many courts already have,298 that this
reduced level of discretion "would greatly dimimsh the utility of summary
judgment as a procedure for screening out sham issues of fact."2' The
numerous circuit courts that have accepted that claim fear the specter of
countless "sham" cases slipping through the cracks of Rule 56 and wending
their way inexorably to the courthouse doors, with no way to stop their
onslaught. With all due respect, these fears are also greatly exaggerated.
It might be helpful to take stock for a moment of all the ways in which
a judge can deal with the allegedly rampant problem of witnesses who
change their sworn testimony to protect themselves from summary judg-
ment. To make the case as compelling as possible, let us take the worst
case scenario. Imagine that a plaintiff m a personal injury suit has ghastly
296. See supra note 285.
297 See COMMITTEE ON MODEL CRiMINAL JURY INsTRUCTIONs WITHIN THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CIvIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIsTRICT COURTS OF THE
EIGHTH CIRCUrr 3.03 (1993) ("In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, [y]ou
need to consider therefore whether a contradiction is an innocent misrecollection or an
intentional falsehood, and that may depend on whether it has to do with an important fact or
only a small detail."). Anyone could understand if the victim of police brutality clauns at his
deposition that there were four cops and then remembers a fifth after his head injuries got a
little better or after he saw pictures of all five m a mug book. But there are certain facts that
no reasonable person possibly could forget and some claims that no reasonable jury possibly
could accept from a man who claims that he "forgot" about them at his earlier deposition.
In such extreme cases, summary judgment is appropriate.
298. See cases cited supra notes 273-81.
299. Perma Research & Dev Co. v Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 1969).
1605
52 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1523 (1995)
and devastating injuries. He has a relatively weaker claim of liability, but
one that potentially could involve protracted and sensitive discovery of the
defendant's confidential records. Moreover, he has made an admission at
his deposition that appears to be fatal to his claim under the applicable law
(for example, an admission that shows he never read some warning, that he
misused the product, or that he actually used a product made by the defend-
ant's competitor).' But in response to a summary judgment motion, he
retracts and changes that admission in a later affidavit that complies in all
respects with Rule 56(e). If the judge has no power to "strike" that affidavit
from the record, as I have argued, what can the judge do to curtail this
possible abuse of the judicial system? Let me count the ways.
(1) First, of course, the judge can and should apply the test I have
outlined above and determine whether there is any genuine possibility that
a reasonable jury could possibly believe the plaintiff's changed story If the
reasons for the change literally are too incredible for any reasonable mind
to accept, as will sometimes be the case, the judge should not strike the
affidavit but should simply grant summary judgment on the grounds that the
statement is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact that merits a trial.
But what if (as will often be the case) the judge is persuaded that the new
affidavit is false and a sham and that the earlier deposition testimony was the
truth but that there is room for some doubt about whether a reasonable jury
could conclude otherwise after observing the demeanor of the witness?
Under the analysis proposed here, the judge may not grant summary judg-
ment, but there are a number of things he can still do if he suspects that the
judicial system is being abused deliberately by a calculating liar.
(2) After denying summary judgment in a suspicious case, if the judge
has serious doubts about whether the plaintiff truly is deserving of a trial,
the judge can and should call an immediate pretrial conference under Rule
16 to apprise the plaintiff of his misgivings and to encourage the plaintiff to
seriously consider accepting a nuisance settlement or to accept a voluntary
dismissal of the lawsuit. 0 ' If the plaintiff has difficulty taking those sugges-
tions seriously, the judge can make sure the plaintiff's attorney understands
300. I call this the "worst case" because a sympathetic plaintiff with terrible mjunes
but no case for liability is the one party who is probably most likely to benefit from a sys-
tem that permits him to get his case before the jury, which is more likely than a judge to
be moved by the emotional appeal of his plight. See TXO Prod. Corp. v Alliance
Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2728 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). And if there is
the potential for extensive or sensitive discovery, the pressure on the defendant to settle will
be greater.
301. See FED. R. Civ P 41(a)(1).
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the risks he takes- by persisting and the road that is likely to lie ahead of
him. (Perhaps the easiest way would be to give the lawyer a copy of this
Article and tell him to start reading right about here.)
(3) If the plaintiff's lawyer strikes the judge as obstinate and unreason-
able and if the judge has doubts about whether the plaintiff himself is being
miampulated by unscrupulous counsel, the judge can take necessary steps to
make sure the client also understands the possible perils that lie ahead.
Even if there is any doubt about the authority of the judge to force a
represented party to attend a Rule 16 settlement conference,' the judge has
explicit authority to decide that he wishes to conduct a brief hearing with
oral testimony before ruling on the summary judgment motion and to bring
the plaintiff in as a witness under oath.33 (If the judge already has ruled on
the motion, he can decide sua sponte to re-open the matter for further con-
sideration.) At that hearing, the judge himself will be able to question the
plaintiff under oath.' For the plaintiff who is new to either lying or liti-
gation, the experience of being examined by a judge under oath will prove
to be far more disconcerting than the process of signmg a bogus affidavit in
his attorney's office. Either during the hearing or afterwards in chambers,
the judge can make sure that the plaintiff understands the personal risks he
runs in persisting with the uphill battle that his case became the day he
changed Ins own story under oath. (Perhaps he can give the plaintiff a copy
of this Article and tell him to start reading right about here.)
(4) If the plaintiff still has not withdrawn his claim voluntarily or
settled the case, the judge should make sure that the plaintiff and his counsel
do not leave chambers until both are intimately and personally familiarized
with the provisions of Rule 56(g), which authorizes the court to unpose sub-
stantial sanctions, including attorneys' fees and contempt, if he later con-
cludes that the-affidavit was filed in bad faith.' 5 The plaintiff should be
302. See 1993 amendment to FED. R. Civ P 16(c) advisory committee's note.
303. See FED. R. Civ P 43(e). Of course, the purpose of such a hearing is not to see
if observation of witness demeanor might help the judge resolve the dispute because that is
not a factor in the judge's ruling. But it always is possible that more penetrating questioning
will bring out a more detailed explanation of the plaintiff's inconsistent statements, and the
resulting testimony conceivably could tip the balance in the judge's determination. (For
example, if the party confesses under examination that he never read the affidavit before
signing it or that his attorney told him he had to sign it.)
304. See FED. R. EviD. 614(b).
305. A judge has ample discretion to find an affidavit to have been made in "bad faith"
and subject to sanction if it "flatly contradicted earlier sworn depositions." In re Gioioso,
979 F.2d 956, 962 (3d Cir. 1992); accord Richardson v Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1433 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("Attempts to manufacture issues of fact in response to a motion for summary
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personally apprised of how much money that is likely to entail and of the
fact that the judge presently is inclined to make such a finding if the jury
agrees with hun that the new affidavit is not reliable.
(5) If the threat of financial penalties is not compelling, the judge
should offer plaintiff and Ins counsel one more cup of coffee before leaving
chambers and give them a highlighted copy of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c), which
is designed to make it easy for the Government to obtain a criminal perjury
conviction against a witness who makes two or more statements under oath
"if they are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily
false" - even if the Government cannot prove which one was false. (If the
statements are not false to that degree, the judge should not be considering
summary judgment in the first place.) He also should read them Sec-
tion 1623(d) out loud, which gives the plaintiff a complete defense if he
"recants" the statement before the declaration has "substantially affected the
proceeding" and tell the plaintiff he will make such a finding on the record
if the case is withdrawn immediately There may be plenty of plaintiffs who
will sign a lying sham affidavit on the advice of counsel to keep a civil suit
alive; how many have the nerve to risk a felony conviction?
(6) Still no settlement or voluntary dismissal? The judge then should
notify the parties (if the defendant has not yet made this request) that the
court has decided sua sponte to sever out for a separate jury trial the single,
narrow factual issue on which the plaintiff testified differently at his
deposition and in his affidavit.' He also should notify the parties that he
has likewise decided, sua sponte if necessary, to limit the scope of discovery
prior to that trial so that the plaintiff will not be able to obtain discovery on
any other issue.' Now he has eliminated the opportunity to extort a
nuisance settlement through the threat of extensive and sensitive pretrial
discovery and also has mmmzed the plaintiff's incentive to hope that he
might swing a jury in his favor on liability after they have heard emotional
testimony about pam and suffering.
(7) Is the plaintiff still determined to go ahead and risk a prison
term, even though his odds of winning are getting slimmer? Then the court
will summon a jury to hear and determine the single narrow issue on which
the plaintiff has contradicted himself (for example, did he actually remove
the safety guard, just as he testified at ins deposition?). At that trial, the
judge shall be free, within limits, to make reasonable comment on his
judgment may be a basis for sanctions.").
306. See FED. R. Civ P 42(b) ("Separate Trials").
307 See FED. R. Civ P 26(c)(4).
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assessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the wit-
nesses.3 The judge also may give the jury any one of a number of standard
judicial instructions on how to weigh testimony that is contradicted by prior
mconsistent statements, especially where the witness is a party with a finan-
cial stake in the outcome of the case.' To m nimze the risk of the jurors
being influenced improperly by emotion or sympathy, the judge also should
ask them to return a special verdict on the narrow factual question that has
been litigated before them .3 " A trial conducted along these lines rarely
would involve more than one witness and usually could be completed in just
a few hours of the judge's time. If the jury finds for the defendant, the
case is over, and the plaintiff has no substantial grounds for complaining on
appeal.
(8) If the jury finds in favor of the plaintiff and the judge still is
convinced that there has been a possible miscarriage of justice, he may grant
a new trial sua sponte. 3" The judge may weigh the evidence presented at
the trial and grant a new trial if he is firmly convinced that the jury's verdict
308. This is permissible as long as the judge does not convey his purely personal
reaction and makes it clear to thejury that they are final-judges of such matters. Quercia v
United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933); Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 199-200 (1973) ("Summing Up and Comment By Judge")
(containing advisory committee's note to proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 105) (not
enacted).
309. See COMMITTEE ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CIvIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DisTRiCT COURTS OF THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 3.03 (1993).
310. See FED. R. Civ P 49(a).
311. For judges too busy to conduct such an abbreviated jury trial themselves, this
proceeding may be tried before a magistrate judge with the consent of the parties. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1988). Even in the worst case scenario, such a trial would take less than
one full day, and the losing plaintiff then would have no substantial grounds for an appeal.
To all those who think that this would represent an intolerable strain on the resources of the
court, ask yourselves this: How many hours of judicial manpower would be consumed
instead if the district judge had granted summary judgment, written an opinion explaining
that decision, and the three-judge panel of the court of appeals then had been required to
consider and decide the inevitable appeal by the plaintiff who claimed that he was denied his
right to ajury and that the lower court erred m granting summary judgment? See cases cited
supra notes 272-83. Not to mention the additional court time that will be involved in those
cases where the grant of summary judgment is reversed and the case is returned to the
district court for further proceedings. E.g., American Metal Forming Corp. v Pittman, 52
F.3d 504, 507 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing grant of summary judgment after concluding that
district judge should not have stricken affidavit as sham). A three hour trial with one witness
starts to sound fairly efficient by comparison, doesn't it?
312. See FED. R. Civ P 59(a).
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was manifestly against the weight of the evidence, even if he still is unable
to say that no reasonable jury could have so found. 13
(9) Now we try again at a second trial, conducted along the same lines
as the first. If the judge is correct in his strong suspicion that the plaintiff's
affidavit is truly a sham and a lie, we should not expect two different juries
to find otherwise. Besides, the defendant's chances of prevailing at the
second trial can only have improved because the defendant now will have
access to a third detailed statement by the plaintiff on the same topic, thus
magnifying the chances of the plaintiff contradicting himself or being caught
in some inconsistency 314 If the second jury finds against the plaintiff, the
case is over.
(10) But what if all nine steps fail? What if two different juries find in
favor of the plaintiff, even after they have heard hun vigorously cross-
examined about the supposedly prior mconsistent statement? Perhaps then
we will know why this particular plaintiff had the tenacity to persist to the
very end. Then the time will have come for the judge to swallow a bit of
his pride, admit that he evidently might have been wrong in his assessment
of the case and the value of the jury system, and acknowledge that a
nuscarrage of justice apparently would have been done if he had adhered to
the old system of "striking" inconsistent affidavits and granting summary
judgment in the case.
This ten-step process, I submit, would far better insure the primacy of
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, while still protecting the
judicial system from the abuse of those who knowingly would perjure them-
selves just to avoid summary judgment. In fact, this arrangement probably
would do a better job than current law does of achieving both of those
goals. The current body of case law, in its obsession to stave off the sup-
posed threat to the ability of Rule 56 to screen out sham cases, ends up
trampling upon the jury's domain while generating many time-consuming
appeals. 15 In comparison with the procedure of simply tossing out an
affidavit as a "sham" (and the plaintiff's case with it), the system outlined
313. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 209, § 12.4, at 558.
314. Because of the hearsay rules, the plaintiff's testimony from his first trial ordinarily
cannot be offered by him at his second trial in support of his case, no matter how helpful
it might be to him, FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1); see Tome v United States, 115 S. Ct. 696,
700 (1995), but it may be used against hun freely if it contradicts his later testimony,
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A), or if it helps the defendant's case in any way, FED. R. EvID.
801(d)(2)(A). For primarily this reason, it truthfully can be said that, the more often a party
is compelled to tell his story under oath, the more of an advantage his opponent receives.
315. See cases and authorities cited supra notes 272-83, and 311.
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above admittedly would entail a little extra work for the district judge m
certain cases. But, m the long run, it surely would entail less work and less
threat to the integrity of the judicial system as a whole.
Under the current regime where judges are empowered to throw out
unsatisfactory affidavits - ironically, in the name of "efficiency" and
protecting the system's integrity - the reported cases reflect that the trial
and appellate courts continue to be inundated with complicated legal chal-
lenges to such dismissals and that litigants continue to file supposedly sham
affidavits with impunity As long as federal courts continue to simply
"strike" sham affidavits and do nothing else about such abuses, unscrupu-
lous litigants and lawyers will see no good reason to refrain from trying it.
After all, an affidavit that merely ends up being stricken leaves them no
worse off, and they just might get lucky and find that their overworked
opponent forgets to make the required "motion to strike."
Under the system proposed here, by contrast, almost every one of the
ten steps outlined above involves a way in which a little bit of extra work
can close the case without giving anyone any substantial grounds for appeal
and potentially will encourage lawyers and litigants to think twice before
attempting such tactics in the future. Judging from the remarkable fre-
quency with which the courts continue to find themselves resolving disputes
over whether an affidavit is a spurious and worthless sham, perhaps it is
time for us to worry a little bit less about the supposed threat that sham
affidavits might pose to Rule 56 and a little more about the threat that our
current approach poses to the integrity and the efficiency of the entire
judicial system.
Conclusion
In both theory and practice, our current system of summary judgment
is crippled by a great number of pervasive myths that are attributable to
ambiguities and errors that have been made by the Supreme Court and the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence.316 These errors
have created an incoherent and confused regime in which judges mistakenly
believe they are utterly powerless to disregard incredible claims, the courts
of appeals are bitterly divided as to whether summary judgment may be
resisted by inadmissible evidence, indigent and wealthy litigants unjustly
316. In fact, the careful reader will note this Article has identified and solved a total of
"Twenty Common Myths" about summary judgment. But I decided to organize this dis-
cussion around the skeleton of four central misconceptions - because how many of you
would have read an article with a title like that?
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find themselves on unequal footing, and courts react by npermssibly
arrogating to themselves the authority to dispose of genuine and close issues
of fact concerning the credibility of inconsistent statements. These assorted
misconceptions have done - and will continue to do - great damage to our
understanding of the law and to the efficiency and integrity of our system of
justice. This web of interrelated misconceptions now pervades the case law
in every circuit and virtually all of the leading manuals and reference works
on these topics.
Fortunately, although the present state of confusion has been decades
in the making, there is now a clear way out of all this chaos. This Article
has laid out that path and has shown how all of these mysteries can be clan-
fled with just a little bit of help from the Supreme Court, the Advisory
Committee of the United States Judicial Conference, and the authors of the
leading manuals on civil procedure and evidence. Unfortunately, although
I have been blessed with all the answers, I do not yet have much influence
with those people or institutions myself. But if any prominent reader with
such influence sees the wisdom of tis essay, you could help me do our
system ofjustice a great favor by sending a copy of tis Article to them with
your cover letter.317
317 I hereby consent to the copying of this Article for the purpose of sharing it with a
court, judge, or author named in this Article.
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